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ABSTRACT
Social Enterprises as Agents of Technological Change:
Case Studies from Tanzania
Gussai H. Sheikheldin Advisor:
University of Guelph, 2017 John F. Devlin, PhD
This thesis explores the potential role of social enterprises as agents of technological change in
developing societies. By ‘agents’ it is meant active participants in processes of conceiving and
implementing new technological solutions for communities. The thesis argues that technology-
oriented social enterprises can be effective agents of technology localization which includes
diffusing, supporting and adapting technologies for local conditions. Technology localization is a
main variable in the pursuit of technological autonomy in developing societies. Technological
autonomy refers to the endogenous capacity of developing countries for generating, transferring
and managing technologies on their own terms in support of economic and human development.
The thesis examines 6 case studies of technology-oriented social enterprises in rural regions of
Tanzania. The cases were headquartered in Tanzania but operated in other East African countries
as well (Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda). To assess the effectiveness of the cases as agents of
technology localization, they were assessed for their engagement in the activities of diffusion,
support and adaptation, who they engaged with in these activities and whether their clients
showed relative satisfaction with the technological change that the social enterprises promoted.
Field data were collected from December 2014 to September 2015, through interviews with the
staff, clients and partners of the social enterprises, as well as through field observations and
scanning of accessible reports and documents of social enterprises and their partner
organizations. The field work also identified three distinct models of diffusion represented by the
cases: microfranchising, sector-enterprise cultivation, and business-technology incubation. All
three models appeared effective as approaches to the diffusion of new technologies.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the potential role of social enterprises as agents of technological change in
developing societies. The term ‘agents’ refers to active participants in processes of conceiving
and implementing new technological solutions for communities. The three activities of
technology diffusion to communities, provision of institutional support for such diffusion efforts,
and adaptation of technologies to local conditions are termed “localization”. The thesis examines
the work of technology-oriented social enterprises in rural regions of Tanzania and concludes
that technology oriented social enterprises can be effective agents of technology localization. To
assess the effectiveness of the cases as agents of technology localization, the research asked
whether the cases demonstrated ongoing engagement in the activities of diffusion, support and
adaptation, whether they demonstrated competence in engaging what have been termed “early
adopters” of innovations in the diffusion process, and whether their clients showed relative
satisfaction with the technological change that they experienced.
Agents of technological change are important because they can actualize and accelerate
technological change processes. The thesis assumes that it is imperative for developing societies
to build endogenous capacity for creating and transferring technologies on their own terms as
they seek economic and human development. Hence, developing societies need technological
change agents. The research assessed the potential of social enterprises as technological change
agents and concludes that they have been effective in localizing technologies in rural Tanzania.
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Background
In the BBC documentary series, The Africans: A triple heritage, prepared and hosted by the late
Ali Mazrui, in part 4 of the series (1986), Mazrui took the viewers through big, state-of-the-art
industrial factories in two West African countries. Those factories were built right after political
independence was gained, and they were built from the ground-up paid for by their respective
states. They were built to represent a proud leap forward by the newly independent countries
towards the era of modern industrialization. However, people and products were missing from
the floors of those factories. Mazrui walked through these empty factory floors and told their
story. They were decommissioned plants that lasted for only short periods of time before the
governments realized they were running at a cost higher than their return, with no foreseen
change in that situation in the near future. Being high-tech plants, they were not only
commissioned and built by western corporations; they were also operated by them on contracts
with the government. The plants were foreign plants on African soil, and they were unable to
serve the development priorities of their host countries. In the end a tough lesson was learned
(hopefully) the hard way.
Processes of technological change pose many challenges for developing societies. They
tend to be complex and multi-faceted, involving numerous variables, agents, and contexts.
However, they are a critical part of economic and human development for all societies. Historical
evidence shows a strong correlation between technological development and human
development (Hill & Dhanda 2003). The UNDP shows how the seminal advances in human
development in the 20th century were largely attributed to technological improvements and
breakthroughs, in different sectors (e.g. health and hygiene, agriculture, transportation, etc.)
(UNDP 2001). In terms of economic development the terminology of ‘industrialized economies’
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is widely used to refer to technologically advanced, wealthy countries. Many development
solutions involve people and technologies working in combined efforts that form functional
wholes; sometimes referred to as technosocial systems (Woodhouse & Patton 2004).
Development in different sectors requires different stimulants and interventions
depending on the social and cultural context. For example, in Africa, agriculture has had slow
rates of adoption of new technologies and minimal increases in productivity (Jones 2009).
Researchers have pointed to subjective and social challenges facing agricultural technology
adoption in Africa, such as farmers’ negative perceptions of technological changes, or cultural
barriers to accepting them (Stamp 1990; Simalenga 1999; Adesina 1995; Rauniyar 1992).
Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) demonstrate that besides subjective resistance there are also
risks that farmers consider such as crude cost-benefit analyses and the multitude of household
priorities, which lead many of them to avoid adopting new technologies. The story of Africa and
agriculture resonates, in varying degrees, with other developing regions such as Southeast Asia
and Latin America (Binswanger 1986; Adeel et al. 2008; Martinez-Torres et al. 2010).
In contrast, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have in a relatively short
period experienced rapid adoption in developing societies around the world. ICTs have been
adopted in healthcare, tourism, small and medium-sized enterprises, and in education (UNDP
2001; Lekoko and Semali 2012; Rensburg et al. 2008; Nasir et al. 2011). Between the two
extremes of modern agricultural technologies and ICTs there are varieties of other technology
sectors with different levels of adoption in developing societies, such as water and sanitation
(Adeel et al. 2008; Fidiel 2005), alternative energy (Williams et al. 2011), and small industries
(Dengu et al. 2006).
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Processes of technological change and industrialization in various societies show varying
patterns and degrees of success. Measures of technological innovation capacity and output such
as the Global Innovation Index (GII)1 and the Technology Achievement Index (TAI)2 suggest
that there is no roadmap appropriate for all countries pursuing technological progression. The
historical paths of industrialization followed by the USA, the UK, Germany, Russia, China,
Japan, India and Brazil are dissimilar and largely influenced by local variables, including factor
endowments, socioeconomic institutions, market relations, policies and sociopolitical histories.
In addition, these indices show that some developing regions have made almost no technological
progress over long periods of time, leaving a huge gap between them and countries that have
progressed (Desai et al. 2002). In spite of this gap, the indices suggest that technological change
is building up globally. Despite serious setbacks in some contexts, technological knowledge and
skills of local populations and global interconnectedness of technological markets, procedures
and R&D methods are increasing overall (Desai et al. 2002; Nasir et al. 2011). There are good
reasons why most technological capacity assessments focus on national scales, since calculating
indicators at national levels is more accessible. Yet it makes sense as well to assess technological
capacity (and achievements) with smaller and more ‘organic’ social aggregates – i.e. aggregates
formed around ecological or socioeconomic relations such as communities of geo-ecological
regions and industrial clusters. Some attempts at explaining this phenomenon refer to evidence
that such social aggregates tend to correlate with ‘technological hubs’ within countries.
According to the Global Development Index Report, these hubs – such as Silicon Valley-type
1 See the 2013 ranking of countries, by the Global Innovation Index, here: http://strat-
staging.com/content.aspx?page=data-analysis
2 The Technology Achievement Index (TAI) is used by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) to
measure a country’s technological capacity and progress in comparison to other countries. The TAI uses four
dimensions of technological capacity: creation of new technology; diffusion of recent innovations; diffusion of old
innovations that are still fundamental for industrialization; and the building of human skills base for technology
origination and adoption. Each one of the dimensions has two statistical sub-indicators (Desai et al. 2002).
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industrial clusters – are usually responsible for painting the entire country’s technology mode or
level suggesting that the mode is evenly distributed across the whole country when it is actually
concentrated in a few places (Dutta & Lanvin 2013). There are indicators of a statistically
significant positive correlation between technological achievement and human development—
presented in a comparison between the UNDP-initiated indices: Technology Achievement Index
and Human Development Index (Hill & Dhanda 2003, 29). The technology divide between
countries of the world appears to be a strong indicator of the human development divide as well.
From this broad overview several general ideas emerge: 1) that technological change is
important for development, 2) that it evolves in multiple ways; 3) that it can be measured in a
variety of ways; 4) that there may be alternative ways to explain the main features of its
evolution and diversity; and 5) that sustained economic development requires increasing local
capacity to use, control and maintain technosocial systems.
Discussion continues in international development circles about the importance of
developing and increasing endogenous technological capacities (see for example Shaw 2002;
Adeel, Schuster and Bigas 2008; Nasir et al. 2011). The discussion is not so much about whether
endogenous capacities are important, but about what levels of them are needed in order to
advance the economic and human development agenda. This thesis assumes that higher levels of
endogenous capacities are necessary to achieve development in key sectors of technology and
science, such as agriculture, energy, water supply, health and hygiene, infrastructure and basic
industries (Mazrui 1986; Haug 1992; Nyerere 1968 and 2011; STIPRO 2010; Page 2016).
Problem Statement
Effective agents of technological change are necessary for development. While social enterprises
have received significant scholarly attention in Europe and North America, they have not yet
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received similar attention elsewhere. Technology-oriented social enterprises in some developing
societies have received high praise and support in the last few years but there is limited research
published on their actual contribution to technological development in the region. Recently in
developing countries new models of social enterprise have begun to engage in localizing
technologies in agriculture, alternative energy, and ICTs in rural communities. Assessing their
effectiveness as agents of technological change is required to inform development planning and
policies.
Research Context
The technological change literature is relatively diverse and abundant, yet not sufficiently
integrated. There is considerable scholarship on the theory and historical analysis of developing
technological capabilities in firms and national systems (Lall 1992; Wolff 1999; Kim & Nelson
2000; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & McCormick 2007; Mazzucato 2013). There is work on
technological change models, as they relate to dynamics of markets, resources and stimulation of
industrial innovation (Dosi 1982; Arthur 1989; Ruttan 1997). There are established fields that
relate to technological change and overlap with it, such as diffusion of innovations (Wejnert
2002; Rogers 2003; Huh & Kim 2008; Haider & Kreps 2010; Zanello et al. 2015) and
institutional economics of technology affairs (Polanyi 1944; Rosenberg 1982; Binswanger 1986;
Kroszner 1987; Haug 1992; Page 2016). There is also an influential literature on understanding
the phenomenon of technology as it pertains to both developed and developing societies
(Mumford 1967 and 1970; Galtung 1979; Franklin 1989; Aunger 2010; Franssen et al. 2013). As
for developing societies there is literature on the dichotomies between traditional and modern
technologies (Hyman 1987; Gamser 1988; Scott 1999; Roy 2002; Adeel, Schuster and Bigas
2008) as well as the role of national and international dynamics and technology transfer, in
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affecting technological development through various factors, such as development policies and
international relations (Morehouse 1979; Nyerere 1998; UNDP 2001; Shaw 2002; Diyamett &
Risha 2015).
Few works connect the multiple scholarly fields mentioned above through conceptual
frameworks that integrate and map big pictures. One such framework is the National Innovation
System (NIS) framework, which aims to organize the productive forces and structures, and the
flow of information and skills in a country, in order to increase the output of innovative solutions
to development constraints (Maharajh, Scerri and Sibanda 2013). In that framework, STI
(science, technology and innovation) play a central role, and thus require strategic investment. At
the policy level the NIS will include careful investments in education systems, enterprise support
and labour markets (Lundvall 1992). The NIS framework can be used in any country and be
adjusted to its level of development. Many countries are careful to devise and improve their own
NISs as part of their national plans. The NIS framework operates only at the national policy level
by default and thus contributes to the design of macroeconomic policies. It is also vague on key
technological activities that are not considered ‘innovative’, but customary or traditional, even if
they are recognised as important for the particular context. Another framework has been
developed by Aubert (2005) for promoting innovations in developing countries. Based on new
intuitional economic thought, this framework is largely a policy blueprint for developing
countries for strengthening the technological capabilities of their firms to innovate and compete
in national and international markets. Aubert’s framework makes recommendations on IPR
(Intellectual Property Rights) regulations and how to address the brain drain of R&D
professionals from developing to OECD countries. Overall it presents itself as a framework for
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promoting innovations, but offers little specificity to identifying main concepts, goals, priorities
and relations.
The framework of technological autonomy, presented in the next chapter, builds on the
literature discussed above and seeks to ameliorate some of the mentioned shortcomings of other
conceptual frameworks. It describes processes of technological change in developing societies. If
developing societies seek to improve levels of human and economic development it will be
necessary for them to develop an endogenous capacity to oversee technological affairs. This
capacity is termed “technological autonomy”. Such autonomy includes a “strengthened
autonomous capacity for creating, acquiring, adapting and using technology” (Morehouse 1979,
387) and an autonomous decision-making capacity to plan and manage the local affairs of
industrial and infrastructural development. The framework presents two main variables that lead
to technological autonomy: technology localization and technological capabilities. Technology
localization consists of three activities: diffusion, institutional support, and technical adaptation.
Technological capabilities, on the other hand, consist of: production activities, investment
activities and networking of actors who generate technological innovations and knowledge.
Advances in technology localization and technological capabilities work together to advance a
society along the path towards technological autonomy. Agents of technological change – such
as the state, private industries, and non-governmental organizations – actualize and set the
process of technological change in motion. They activate and support – i.e. operationalize – the
variables of the framework. The proposed framework identifies the main elements of
technological change and helps to visualize and connect its goals and objectives in developing
societies.
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In some contexts, conditions call for emerging agents of technological change to fill some
gaps that existing agents have not been able to fill. The thesis argues that social enterprises are
potential agents of technological change who may advance technology localization and thus
contribute to advancing towards technological autonomy.
Objectives
Social enterprises were chosen for this study because of their unique mission and approach, their
recent arrival on the rural development scene in developing countries, their engagement in the
marketing of a variety of technologies in rural areas, and because their contribution to
technological change in the region has not yet been clarified. Social enterprises are considered
part of ‘the third sector’, which includes NGOs, civil society organizations, as well as many
cooperatives. However, they differ from others in the third sector in that they combine a social
mission with business rigor, and that their income-generating activities are integral to their non-
profit goals. These qualities should give social enterprises a capacity to fill gaps in technology
localization in developing countries; gaps that other technological change agents, such as the
public sector and private industries, are not filling.
The main research question for the field study was: are social enterprises effective agents
of technology localization in developing societies? To respond to the research question, the study
set out to answer three sub-questions about social enterprises as agents of technology
localization, and explored their responses in the context of rural Tanzania: 1) do social
enterprises demonstrate involvement in the three activities of technology localization, which are
diffusion, institutional support, and technical adaptation; 2) do the diffusion activities of social
enterprises demonstrate success in identifying and engaging those described as “early adopters”
of innovations (also known as the trendsetters in communities and the ones who often influence
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the rest of their communities to adopt innovations); and 3) do the clients and partners of social
enterprises give overall favourable accounts of the technological changes adopted or promoted.
Case studies were selected from a number of active social enterprises in Tanzania from 2014 to
2015. The enterprises were based in Tanzania but operated in other East African countries as
well (Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda). Several were recruited to participate and six of them
accepted, along with some of their partner organizations. Data were collected through interviews
with the staff, clients and partners of the social enterprises, as well as through field observations
and literature scanning of accessible reports and documents of social enterprises and their partner
organizations. Data were collected to answer the three sub-questions about social enterprises and
technology localization. Analysis used Nvivo for qualitative data, along with MS Excel for
descriptive statistics.
Main Conclusions
The findings support the claim that social enterprises can be effective agents of technology
localization in Tanzania. The three sub-questions were answered positively for the social
enterprises studied. The evidence suggested that the social enterprises surveyed demonstrated
involvement in the three activities of technology localization. Their diffusion activities
demonstrated success in identifying and engaging early adopters, and the clients and partners of
the social enterprises studied gave overall favourable accounts of the technological changes they
had adopted or promoted.
The study uncovered additional, relevant information. For instance, it was found that
particular models of diffusion, such as microfranchising and technology-business incubation,
were successful in diffusing technologies. It was also found that particular technology types have
significant acceptability by rural communities. These included agricultural machinery and
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sustainable energy technologies (e.g. solar lanterns, energy-efficient cookstoves, biogas
digesters, and solar PV home systems). According to records, the acceptability of these
technologies is recent, either due to lesser efforts of localization in the past or that some of these
technologies are generally recent arrivals to rural Tanzania and East Africa.
Overall, the findings of this study support the argument that social enterprises can
contribute to technological autonomy not only in East Africa but across the developing world.
Organization of the Thesis
Following this introduction, chapter II presents a conceptual framework in three sections: the
first on technological change and development, the second on technological autonomy, and the
third on social enterprises as potential agents of technological change. Chapter III presents the
design and methodology of the field study, including a description of the data collected and how
it was analyzed. Chapter IV presents the detailed findings on the main research question and sub-
questions. Chapter V presents some additional findings from the field study. Chapter VI offers
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTURAL
FRAMEWORK
This chapter presents a literature review on technological change and its dynamics. It is divided
into three sections. The first explores, discusses and synthesizes the existing literature on
technological change and development. It also provides a review of some of the main models of
technological change and discusses their strengths, weaknesses and overlaps. The second section
proposes a technological autonomy conceptual framework. The framework identifies the main
variables of technological change – technological capabilities and technology localization – and
how they interact as a society moves along a path from technological dependency to
technological autonomy. The framework is operationalized by agents of technological change,
the groups, organizations and bodies that set technological change in motion. The thesis proposes
that the combination of the framework and the agents provides a valid theoretical lens for
studying and explaining the process of moving a society or a specific sector towards
technological autonomy, in various developing societies. This framework suggests that social
enterprises, alongside the state and the private sector, can serve as potential agents of
technological change in developing societies; particularly in activities of technology localization.
The third section explores the potential of social enterprises as agents of technological change
through identifying features and attributes of social enterprises that make them credible
candidates to fill gaps in local technological development processes.
Defining Technology
Encyclopaedia Britannica defines technology as “the application of scientific knowledge to the
practical aims of human life or, as it is sometimes phrased, to the change and manipulation of the
human environment.” The Greek origins of the word come from the two words techne and logos,
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with the first meaning ‘art, skill, craft’ and the second meaning ‘expression of’—rendering a
somewhat literal meaning of ‘expression of skill, art, and craft’. However, writings that focus on
technology and development and technological change have provided various and more
elaborate definitions of technology.
Everett Rogers’ (2003) defines technology as, “a design for instrumental action that
reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships involved in achieving a desired
outcome.” (p. 13). According to Rogers a technology would typically have two components: (1)
a hardware aspect, represented by the material or physical embodiment of a tool; and (2) a
software aspect, represented by the information base for the tool. An example would be the
computer, where the hardware component is represented by the semiconductors, transistors,
frame, etc., while the software component consists of the coded commands, instructions, and the
package of operative information that allow users to utilize the computer to achieve certain
outcomes. Other technologies of various degrees and kinds can also be showcased by this
definition, such as animal-drawn ploughs—where the hardware is represented by animal power
and the plough tool itself and the software aspect is represented by the human knowledge that
combined and utilized the hardware in a particular arrangement to achieve a certain outcome.
Johan Galtung (1979) offers another theoretical perspective, with some critique of Rogers’
approach.
“A naive view of technology sees it merely as a question of tools (hardware) and skills
and knowledge (software). These components are certainly important, but they are only
the surface of technology, like the visible tip of the iceberg... Underlying knowledge
there is a certain cognitive structure, a mental framework, a social cosmology, serving as
the fertile soil in which the seeds of a certain type of knowledge may be planted and grow
and generate new knowledge. And in order to use the tools, a certain behavioural
structure is needed. Tools do not operate in a vacuum; they are man-made and man-used
and require certain social arrangements to be operational.” (Galtung 1979, 6).
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According to Galtung, technology consists of techniques and structures (as opposed to
hardware and software). The techniques are the tools and know-how, while the structures are the
social relations, or modes of production, within which the techniques are operational. Galtung
adds a social dimension to the understanding of technology that Rogers’ definition did not
include.
Aunger (2010) argues that, whenever we talk about technology, artefacts have to be
involved. Technology is “about interaction with artefacts in particular contexts of engagement.”
(p. 764). Artefacts, defined as crafted material entities of known use, are the centre of interaction
between an animal and the material environment in ways which that animal sees as useful means
to ends. It is similar to the hardware aspect in Roger’s definition, but emphasizes human
intervention to alter the material from its natural state. Only then it becomes an artefact.
In synthesis, this thesis defines technology as artefacts built and used to reduce
uncertainties related to particular problems within particular structures. The remainder of this
manuscript will use the term ‘technology’ and its derivatives in accordance with this synthesized
definition, unless otherwise indicated.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In developing societies, where economies are less industrialized, technological change processes
are mainly influenced by three conditions: technology-institutional dynamics, the dichotomy




Many writers on technological change agree with Galtung (1979) and identify a necessary
interconnectedness between social institutions and technology (Visvanathan 2004). Social
institutions refer to socioeconomic regulations, behavioral norms, incentives and expectations
that constrain and shape human relations (Menard et al. 2005; Orrnert 2006; Hodgson 2004;
Voss 2004). These social elements are ‘institutions’ when they persist through time. Hodgson
defines institutions as “durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure
social interactions” (Hodgson 2007, 67), and North defines them as “humanly devised
constraints to human interaction” (North 1990, 3). To Rogers (2003) institutions “define a range
of tolerable behavior and serve as a guide or standard for the behavior of members of a social
system” (p. 26). The elasticity of the term institution allows it to be used to describe social
entities (such as organizations) as well as social arrangements that do not have a material
representation (such as laws, values and norms). Institutions stem from culture, belief systems
and established common rules of conduct and ‘doing business’ (written or unwritten). They are
structures that embed culture and laws, and thus to use “institution” is to evoke both structure
and culture. Therefore, we can reasonably speak of cultural institutions, legal institutions,
economic institutions, etc., all as variations of social institutions.
Understanding processes of technological change requires an understanding of the
interdependence of technological knowledge, material resources and social context (Galtung
1979; Shaw 2002; Eisler 2002). The concept of ‘technological embeddedness’ captures this
interconnectedness. It is drawn from the concept of embeddedness in the work of Polanyi (1944,
1957 and 1968), Hopkins (1957), Dalton (1990), Harriss (2003), and Hyden (2006), which refers
to how economic activities and processes are usually dependent upon social institutions.
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Technological embeddedness implies that, to be sustainable, technological choices need to be
compatible with the socioeconomic and cultural structures within which they operate. Rogers
(2003) suggests that the adoption of innovations is dependent upon “the degree to which an
innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs
of potential adopters. An idea that is incompatible with the values and norms of a social system
will not be adopted as rapidly as an innovation that is compatible.” (p. 15). He refers to this
condition as “compatibility”. To Karl Polanyi the economy itself “consists of technology
employed within a context of institutions. This context is one of dynamic interaction. Institutions
mold technology and technology molds institutions” (Stanfield 1990, 203-4). Karl Marx also put
technology at the centre of his economic analysis of history, especially the history of the
industrial revolution in Europe. Rosenberg (1982) argues that the main reason behind “the
fruitfulness of Marx’s framework for the analysis of social change” was that “Marx was, himself,
a careful student of technology.” (p. 34). Indeed Marx was one of the early writers to
acknowledge the paramount social consequences of technological change. He largely saw the
material forces of production as technological and the relations of production as social:
“Technology discloses man’s mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by
which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social
relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them.” (Marx 1887, 352)
From a general historical-materialist perspective, Marx (1977) suggests that changes in
the material forces of production render changes in production relations. Marx’s statement, in
The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), that, “The Handmill gives you society with the feudal lord:
the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist” captures his general approach to the topic of
technology-institutional dynamics. This perspective is consistent with Polanyi’s conclusion that
the main difference between capitalism and contemporary socialism is how modern technology
is instituted in society (1957). While Polanyi was more supportive of the argument that economic
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and political institutions tend to precede technological shifts—i.e. social change precedes and
determines technological change (1944), Marx reordered the two. For example, to Marx the
introduction of the factory workplace was a result of the emergence of the steam engine.
All the arguments above converge on the notion that there is a dynamic interdependence
between technology and institutions and that technologies require a level of social embeddedness
to be functional and continuous. Technological change requires institutional support, which
makes technological development a social challenge. A 1993 report on technology transfer by
the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) asserted that “the
capacity for managing technological change is basically societal in nature, that is, it must
permeate through many public and private institutions, all levels of society and be absorbed into
the general “culture” of a country.” (p. 4).
Traditional vs. Modern Technologies
In developing societies, development processes find themselves entangled in conflicts between
two technological paradigms—old and new (or traditional and modern). The first is often the
creation of technology users themselves (Gamser 1988; Visvanathan 2004), while the second is
often the creation of designated professionals in modern societies, namely engineers and
scientists, who are often generally separate from the technology users. This divide between
creators and users does not hold with traditional technologies (Gamser 1988; Roy 2002;
Visvanathan 2004). In developing societies traditional and modern technologies have to coexist
and sometimes compete. This divide poses a challenge for localizing technologies – i.e. making
them technically functional and institutionally embedded at the local level – and may result in
delays in adopting new technologies even if they are objectively more effective.
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Old local technologies and techniques are often described as ‘traditional’ or indigenous
technical knowledge (ITK). In the historical cases of ITK, the lines are blurry between what
constitutes technology and what constitutes cultural institutions (i.e. technological embeddedness
is well established). This can explain part of the challenge of technological change in developing
societies. For example, while agricultural mechanization in Africa needs to find a way to either
replace or coexist with traditional agricultural technologies that are already embedded in local
socioeconomic institutions, ICTs do not have to deal with that complexity. ICTs do not face
similar resistance to adoption, compared to agricultural mechanization, because they are not
replacing any technology that is already embedded in local socioeconomic institutions. The
difficulty of replacing an existing technology that performs the same function could be a reason
for the slow adoption rate of new agricultural technologies. This line of argument generally
asserts that existing social institutions could be significant barriers in technological change
processes. The effects of cultural institutions on technology seem to only be highlighted when
the case of technology diffusion or transfer fails, for several reasons (among which may happen
to be the cultural unsuitability of the technology) (see, for example, Eisler 2002; Rogers 2003;
Adeel et al. 2008; Dengu et al. 2006). When cases of technological change are reasonably
successful (see, for example, Lekoko et al. 2012; Fidiel 2005; Gulrajani 2006; Gilbert 2009; Al-
Ghafri 2008) there is little highlight on how accommodating the local values and beliefs were to
making that technology adoption a success. When technology users who are adopting a new
technology are in considerable agreement with the technological change, the cultural suitability
is not given particular highlight. What the literature suggests is that people’s cultural institutions
are relevant to the genuine participation of technology users in the technological change process.
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Howes and Chambers (1979) synthesize expert opinions that conclude the need for strong
cooperation between ITK and modern science in the quest for development. Lucena et al. (2010)
and Lekoko et al. (2012) also highlight the essential need for this type of cooperation. Scott
(1998) adds the concept of Métis to the literature of ITK, which generally means ‘practical
knowledge’, and “denotes the knowledge that can come only from practical experience.” (p.6).
“Far from being rigid and monolithic, [Métis] is plastic, local and divergent.” (p. 332). The lack
of access to scientific methods, laboratories and writing, did not mean that communities that
relied on Métis lacked reliable knowledge, but rather only meant that they documented their rich
and “remarkably accurate” knowledge systems through oral traditions and apprenticeship
institutions passed from generation to generation. Scott criticizes development theories adopted
by modern state-sanctioned schemes that place large faith in modernization and modern products
and services while dismissing the contribution of Métis from indigenous and native populations.
However, Métis has its own pitfalls since it is not democratically distributed (i.e. passed through
generations by means of direct apprenticeship that prefer kinship and exclusive leagues of
artisans) and survives today by more isolation from the rest of the world instead of engagement.
These pitfalls can be mitigated through cooperation with scientific methods (Scott 1998). In
further support of Scott’s critique, studies such as that in Adeel et al. (2008) and UNEP (2008)
conclude that traditional water technology systems are not achieving their promised potential in
contributing to technological development (and to climate change adaptation), due to two biases:
1) scarcity in scholarly research dedicated to evaluating and improving traditional systems, and
2) less favour by funding agencies (public or private) for research and development (R&D)
projects that aim towards improving the status of traditional ITKs (or Métis). Thus, for
technological development schemes it is quite important to prioritize which sectors demand
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introducing new technologies and which sectors require more support and local upgrading for
existing traditional technologies.
Development Priorities
When people get better at utilizing a technology they also often get better at realizing how they
can improve it. Hence, learning and improving by practicing is an essential part of technological
change. Rosenberg identifies a number of factors he calls ‘supply side problems’ that determine
the rate of new technologies replacing old ones (1982). The first factor is the continuity of
inventive activity. Rosenberg observes that diffusion of technologies tends to be relatively slow
everywhere with wide variations in the degrees of acceptance of different inventions. If we
consider the steam engine a primary invention, for example, we can observe many ‘secondary
inventions’ that improved the steam engine over a considerable period of time (Rosenberg 1972).
The second factor is the development of technical skills among users. For example, it takes time
to get labour to adopt or perfect a new use. Only then it will be possible to demonstrate the extent
of the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the new technology over the old one. The third
factor is the journey from conceptual solutions to working machinery. With the institutional
separation between modern science and R&D circles, on the one hand, and machinery making
circles, on the other hand, it often happens that conceptual solutions take long periods of time to
translate into working machinery. Other factors, like economic feasibility of mass production and
connection with willing investors (public or private), play a part as well. The fourth factor is the
importance of the enabling environment for supporting innovations (i.e. macro policies and
resources). An example is the role of the Japanese government in fostering Japan’s automotive
industry, starting early from reverse engineering American automobile engines, which grew to a
prominent global leadership (Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, nd). Hence,
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successful technological development must be accompanied by a process of skill upgrade for
both makers and users. This is one dimension of increasing technological capabilities.
Additionally, technology adoption stories may express themselves differently according
to the technology sector and a society’s priorities. Binswanger (1986) offers some insights on
this issue through focusing on agricultural mechanization, and proposes generalizations about the
multiple factors that influence transitions toward agricultural mechanization in different parts of
the world (such as the US, Japan, Pakistan and Brazil). Three of the relevant highlights
Binswanger presents apply to more than agricultural mechanization alone. The first highlight is
on how the economy of land and labour endowments affects the priorities and pace of the
process of shifting to agricultural mechanization. The second highlight is on the relation between
machinery design and capital costs: “Machinery design adjusts to high capital costs by lack of
convenience features, simplicity, and reduced durability” (p. 36). While the cost of energy is a
very important factor in machinery use, the costs of capital and maintenance tend to be usually
larger. If capital cost is relatively high, then the innovator/adopter of the technology will try to
maximize profit by compromising convenience, simplicity and durability. This highlight may
explain why countries with least developed infrastructure tend to produce simpler, and less
durable, engineered machinery—i.e. to compensate for the huge capital costs resulting from
weak infrastructure to support industrialization (e.g., transportation infrastructure, consistent
electricity and water coverage, industrial safety standards, strong vocational education) (Zanello
et al. 2016). The third highlight is related to the argument of the decentralized nature of
technology innovation. To the question of ‘where does technological innovation often take
place?’ Binswanger has a direct answer: “In the early phase of [agricultural] machinery
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invention, subinvention3 and adaptation are done almost exclusively by small manufacturers or
workshops, working closely with farmers. Public sector research has contributed little to
machinery development, but more to education” (p. 50). Also, in agreement with Rosenberg
(1972), Binswanger adds that “Inventive work on a particular operation often precedes by
decades the widespread use of machinery. It reaches a peak during the initial adoption cycle,
when derivative invention, refinements, and adaptation to different environments are required.”
(p. 51). Learning from Binswanger’s observations in agricultural mechanization, a country’s
context informs technological change patterns, and different patterns call for different priority
areas of technological development. Selected technologies may be chosen and given more focus
for localization.
In summary, technological change experiences in developing societies are mainly
influenced by three conditions: technology-institutional dynamics, development priorities, and
the dichotomy of ‘traditional versus modern’ in key technology sectors. Addressing
technological development requires a way of addressing all these conditions together through a
common approach or a framework.
Technological Change Models
The technological change literature proposes a number of models that explain the main features,
movements and vehicles of technological change. Such models are not conclusive or universal
but each model may work well in explaining certain cases. In other words, each model has its
3 Perhaps what Binswanger refers to by ‘subinvention’ is the category of inventions that modify or change only parts
of the one machine or unit rather than the whole machine. For example, the invention of the automatic transmission
in automobiles, in the 1950s, was a subinvention in the sense that it did not change the automobile or the function of
the transmission itself in it, but rather invented a new part that substituted an older one within the same machine. It
is perhaps the same as how Rosenberg (1982) distinguishes between inventions and innovations. Other terms that
could perhaps be used to describe subinventions are: upgrades, derivative inventions (a term Binswanger also used
in the same manuscript), secondary inventions, or even innovations.
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strengths and weaknesses. These models seek to draw general trajectories and mechanisms of
technological change that integrate some of the multiple factors discussed above.
Demand-pull Model
The demand-pull model suggests that economic demands (not necessarily other forms of
demand) and their transformation in response to different economic dynamics, are the main
stimulus for new technological innovation and adoption (Dosi 1982). Studies that have been
undertaken in support of this model show good evidence in some contexts. Ruttan (1997)
narrates the story of a classic study, from the 1950s, of “the invention and diffusion and hybrid
maize”, which “demonstrated the role of demand in determining the timing and location of
invention” (p. 1520). Another study, from the same era, of patents statistics of innovations
multiple industries (railroads, agricultural machinery, paper and petroleum) “concluded that
demand was more important in stimulating inventive activity than advances in the state of
knowledge.” (Ruttan 1997, 2520).
In the demand-pull model – which itself has many versions –R&D of new technologies,
and improvements to existing ones, are induced by economic demand pressures, which include
competition, increasing demands, and external or environmental shifts that change demand in the
market from one direction to another. For instance, Arthur (1989) proposes that competition
between technologies in the market renders an ‘increasing return’: “Complex technologies often
display increasing returns to adoption in that the more they are adopted, the more experience is
gained with them, and the more they are improved” (p. 116). Competition in the market also
highlights competitive advantages of different versions of the same technology, which will then
promote the improvement of technology to respond to the demands of adopters. According to
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Arthur (1989) sometimes earlier access to some markets may determine the course of
technological domination.
This model is not particular to developing societies, of course, but its implication in
development studies is that to stimulate technological development it is necessary to stimulate
local economic demand. This suggests that promoting technological change can largely happen
through market incentives and regulations. This model says little about where the technology
comes from (i.e. local or imported) and how sustainable that is. Places like the oil-rich Middle-
Eastern countries can be said to be technologically advanced from this perspective, while it is
evident that there are big deficiencies in terms of national technology and science education and
innovation in these countries (Pink 2009; Shaw 2002). In such cases the technologies have not
been really localized, and the countries’ own technological capabilities cannot be said to have
improved proportionately over time. The demand-pull model also seems to take human creativity
for granted. It provides no clues as to how to nourish and support innovative talents within
developing countries to advance technologically. Furthermore, this model suggests that where
economic demand stabilizes, or competition is non-existent, technological change will likely
stall. This suggestion would be challenged by a body of historical economic studies of pre-
modern-capitalist, and older societies across the globe, where market forces did not seem to have
contributed decisively to the many advancements – or regressions – that happened in technology
and innovation (see for example, Polanyi et al. 1957). A number of modern technology
breakthroughs were a result of the material and ideational sponsorship of the state’s public sector
without the initial triggering of demand, such as computer numerical control (CNC) machining
(manufacturing automation) in the United States (Noble 1987). For one extreme example, it was
through the efforts of the state, without clearly expressed economic demand, that the USSR took
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its society through a mammoth technological change process that, in a few decades, transformed
it from a largely agrarian economy to launching the first artificial earth satellite and sending the
first human into outer space. Rosenberg (1982) also gives an example of the technical change
that happened in the commercial aircraft industry in the USA over the fifty years period between
1925 and 1975. While it is by many measures a very successful story of rapid technological
advancement, productivity and economic growth, the role of the federal government was the
most important factor. Generally governments of industrialized economies fund science and
technology R&D generously through military and civilian research, and much of that funding
renders technological breakthroughs that later ‘trickle down’ to the civilian markets (both
national and global) (Mazzucato 2013), but these breakthroughs are not necessarily triggered by
existing economic demands. Evidently the demand-pull model works quite well in many cases
but not all.
Technology-push model
In the technology push model, technological change is instigated by innovative talents of
individuals and teams. This model has a number of characteristics. First, there is the increasing
connectedness between objective, non-market driven, scientific inquiry and technology
innovation processes. Second, there is “the increased complexity of R&D activities which makes
the innovative process a matter of long-run planning” (Dosi 1982, 151), for private and public
organizations, which further distances the innovative process from direct market response. Third,
while there is clear correlation between R&D efforts and “innovative output” (which can be
measured by the patent activity, for example), there is not a similar clear correlation between
market demands and the same measures of innovative output. Finally, as processes that seek to
unfold what is not yet known, innovative processes are naturally surrounded by uncertainty (i.e.
26
whether the R&D process, or scientific inquiry, is going to find solutions to the posed problems
or not, or not-yet, etc.).
The technology-push model can explain how, for example, Singapore’s massive
investment in technology and science education helped transform it, in a few decades, from a
poor country to a technologically advanced one (Patterson & Bozeman 1999). This model can
also explain better the path of the Japanese Toyota company that made leaps in automotive
engineering until it became a world leader in the manufacturing field with the Toyota Production
System (TPS) (Monden 1993). The development policy implications of this model focus on
innovative talents. It is important to invest in building and sustaining the proper institutions for
nourishing technology and science and encouraging innovation. Yet, the shortcomings of this
model seem to be the same advantages of the demand-pull model. At some point, innovative
processes must be connected to the larger economic cycle to diffuse in society. The technology-
push model says very little on this aspect.
Path-dependence model
This model cites a number of historical case studies to emphasize how technological change is
built up with every step dependent on the steps taken before it. The model explains historical
developments. It also suggests that innovative talents and economic incentives are sometimes not
able to save technologies from locked-in trajectories. Path-dependence can be illustrated by the
case of the QWERTY keyboard (a descendent of the QWERTY typewriter). Rogers (2003; 8-10)
gives a good historical account of how a more efficient typewriter (the Dvorak) is being ignored
by the vast majority of computer users today due to a series of historic events that brought the
QWERTY typewriter only as a temporary solution to reduce the speed of typing (and thus reduce
the number of mistakes printed). The evolution of the computer keyboard was locked into a
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system of path-dependence inherited from the slower keyboard layout. Today we do not need to
worry about slowing down our typing speed for the sake of printing fewer mistakes, because we
type on word processors and correct mistakes before printing to paper (and we may not even
print at all).  But still the majority of computer users around the world use the QWERTY
keyboard and not the faster Dvorak. Ruttan (1997) also mentions the QWERTY case, and says
that this particular case has attained the status of “a founding myth” in the path-dependence
literature.
Rosenberg’s observations (1972) also give credit to the path-dependence model.
Rosenberg argues that most technological innovations appear incrementally, diffuse
incrementally, and depend on many external factors in the process.4 He then presents a historical
review of some of the outstanding technological changes that define our industrial times, such as
the steam engine (which was patented in 1781 by James Watt):
“Steam did not begin to play an important role in powering the British economy until the
1830s and 1840s, and was not massively applied until the 1870s and 80s. Even as late as
the 1870s less than a million horsepower was generated by steam in the factories and
workshops of Great Britain.” (Habakkuk 1962, quoted in Rosenberg 1972, 5).
Rosenberg also follows the incremental improvements of the steam engine, and how they
needed other inventions to appear before they took place (such as the invention of more accurate-
measure cylinders that helped James Watt decrease significant loss of steam from his engine).
There is also a learning curve of technology improvement that takes years, if not decades. During
this time many events and incremental changes accumulate, without which the final product – if
there is ever such a thing – does not stand. Furthermore, the early versions of any technological
4 While the point Rosenberg is making – the incremental nature of technological improvement – is not necessarily
the same as path-dependence, they two are evidently related.
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innovation tend to change dramatically over time due to these incremental changes, often
contributed by various sources.
Table 1 Summary of explanatory models of technological change
Model Main Claim Implication Blind Spots
Demand-pull The nature of market demands,
and their transformation in
response to different economic





change needs to happen
indirectly though
stimulating the market, by
inducing market incentives
and regulations.
- Obscures the role of
innovative talents.
- Says little about the
substance of science and
technology R&D processes.
- Does not account for the
inherent uncertainty in the
R&D inquiry process.
Technology-push Technological change is
autonomous, or quasi-
autonomous, of market
mechanism, has its own
dynamics, and is highly
instigated by innovative
talents.
Investment in building and
sustaining the right
institutions for nourishing
science and technology and
encouraging innovation.
- Fails to account for the
importance of economic
conditions (institutions,
resources, demand, etc.) to
complete the technological
change cycle.
Path-dependence Technological change is an
incremental process that is
path-dependent. New
innovations build on the
previous prevalent products
and techniques (which are not
necessary the best ones, but
happened to be prevalent due
to other social, economic, or
peculiar circumstances).
Policy implications of this
model are unclear. It helps
explain the evolution of
many forms of products
and techniques, but does
not quite indicate what
development policy can use
from the model.
- May cover a good range
of technologies, but not all
of them.
- Policy implications are
less lucid.
Multiple writers argue that the three models above are not sufficient – especially without
integration – in explaining technological change in its generality (see Table 1). Ruttan (1997)
argues that the three models represent elements of a general theory that has not yet been
invented. However, the likelihood that such a theory could be found is small and detracts from
the more useful effort to understand the diverse mechanisms or factors that contribute to
technological change. Each of the models reviewed above describes some mechanisms and
factors. It is thus sufficient to see them as part of a larger framework that encompasses and
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connects them and adds to them. The models above, for example, do not take into account
cultural resistance to new technologies (i.e. embeddedness).
Other scholars attempt to explain technological change processes more broadly. Dosi
(1982) proposes the more general concepts of 'technological paradigms' and 'technology
trajectories'. Technological paradigms are uniform patterns of solutions offered to sets of
technological problems, “based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on
selected material technologies.” (p. 152). A typical technological paradigm would include a basic
set of prescriptions to follow when addressing a certain ‘cluster of technologies’ (e.g. agricultural
technology, transportation technology, energy technology, etc.). Technology trajectories are the
'normal', cumulative progress within the same technological paradigm (a continuity). A shift to a
substantially different way of innovation represents a 'discontinuity' of the paradigm, hence a
new technological paradigm. People following a certain technological paradigm can excel in
finding and implementing similar solutions to familiar problems, but they also tend to exclude
different imagined possibilities, as solutions, in favour of normal – or normalized – expectations
within the paradigm. New paradigms can emerge with dramatic breakthroughs, either due to
innovative talents or institutional transformations (e.g. the emergence of the steam engine, or the
personal computer). A technology trajectory can also change if significant changes happen in the
same cluster of technologies, but without causing a change in the main principles of the
technological paradigm. An example for this change in trajectory – but not paradigm – is the
introduction in the 1950s to automatic transmissions in automobiles. Dosi’s model of
technological paradigms may prove useful in explaining some historical events, but does not
seem quite capable in explaining contemporary processes of technological change in developing
societies. For example, the technological divide that may exist inside the same developing
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country – between modern and traditional technologies, or urban and rural communities – is
among development challenges that are difficult for this framework to explain. In a developing
country, such contradictions may look as if they are somehow all embedded, as far as this
framework is concerned, but the status of technological dependency and its consequences on
human development, are not flagged. Generally, Dosi’s model explains changes in individual
technologies but not the general movement of countries along the path of increased technological
capacity or technological autonomy.
In summary, we can conclude that in order to describe what an effective technological
change process would be for developing societies, the models of technological change are not
sufficiently broad. They offer points of guidance but need to be put together in a framework that
provides a more coherent understanding of the objectives and challenges of national or sectoral
technological development. In particular, a framework is required that identifies how
technologies are localized by a developing society and technological autonomy created.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TECHNOLOGICAL AUTONOMY
Technological autonomy refers to a society’s attainment of a sufficient level of endogenous
capacity for generating, transferring and adapting technologies, guiding industrialization and
innovation, and setting technological development priorities in order to achieve self-
determination in planning and managing its technological affairs. The concept of technological
autonomy has not been widely discussed in the technological change or development literature,
but Morehouse (1979) referred to it as a goal for developing countries:
“Development strategies, relying on importation of capital-intensive, socially
inappropriate, environmentally destructive Western technologies… have been at the heart
of the accelerating de-industrialization of the Third World… While we cannot be certain
that greater autonomy will lead to greater equity, few Southern countries can go very far
in meeting the minimum material needs of most, not to speak all, of their people without
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a greatly strengthened autonomous capacity for creating, acquiring, adapting and using
technology to solve their own urgent economic and social problems.” (p. 387)
Morehouse later adds that, “technological autonomy is not, of course, autarky, but it does
imply greater selectivity in, and closer control of, externally acquired technology” (1979, 397).
Technological autonomy is reached when self-determination of technological affairs is attained.
This requires both increased technological capabilities and technology localization. Elaboration
and integration of these key concepts is below.
Technological dependency and autonomy
To develop the concept of technological autonomy we can begin by looking at its opposite: the
state of technological dependency. During the 1960s and 70s many ‘third world countries’
sought to negotiate terms of technology transfer with ‘first world countries’ and transnational
corporations, through UNCTAD (The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development),
NIEO (New International Economic Order ),5 and other multilateral organizations and
frameworks. That experience was summarised by Haug (1992):
“The third world’s frantic attitude toward technology transfer resulted in the countries
falling victim to a sort of “technological colonialism.” Taking advantage of the third
world’s desperation, TNCs [Transnational Corporations] drew-up largely one-sided
transfer agreements. For example these agreements often linked the transfer of
technology to the right to build, operate, and maintain the manufacturing plants.
Suffering from a lack of information about the technology and about the transfer process,
many third world nations accepted these agreements. Consequently little technology was
actually transferred to the developing countries, and those countries failed to develop an
indigenous technological capacity.” (Haug 1992, 218)
Haug (1992) lists a number of problems that made developing countries vulnerable to
such ‘technological colonialism’: lack of reliable infrastructure conducive to optimal technology
5 NIEO: a program of action that was approved in 1974 by UN General Assembly, which was “intended to eliminate
the economic dependence of developing countries, promote their accelerated development based on the principle of
self-reliance, and introduce appropriate institutional changes for the global management of world resources.” (Haug
1992, 219).
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utilization, failure to develop local technological skills, import of inappropriate technologies for
local contexts due to insufficiency of information and knowledge, and absence of technological
development plans (i.e. institutional and policy immaturity).
Desai et al. (2002) argue that “Not all countries need to be on the cutting edge of global
technological advance, but every country needs the capacity to understand and adapt global
technologies for local needs.” (p. 97). Anything below that capacity can be described as a
situation of technological dependency. Desai et al. argue that many developing countries today
are in that situation. Lall (1992, 182-82) also says:
“Technological development always needs technology imports from advanced countries.
The extent of dependence on imported technology and the form that technology imports
take, however, affect NTC [National Technological Capabilities] development. A passive
reliance on foreign skills, knowledge and technology may lead to NTC stagnation at a
low level, while selective inputs of foreign technology into an active domestic process of
technology development can lead to dynamic NTC growth.”
Therefore, technological autonomy does not mean that a society is self-sufficient in
technological products and services, without having to engage with the rest of the world. In this
age of globalization, self-sufficiency is extremely difficult and, more importantly, gives no
particular advantage. The technology supply chain and global market give no advantage to self-
sufficiency, but to technological autonomy. “Autonomy” implies the ability to engage the rest
the world in the exchange of technological products and services with a level of agency that does
not make the society a helpless receiver of technology, without power to choose, negotiate, and
have a degree of technological sovereignty.
Proposed Technological Autonomy Framework
Technological autonomy refers to the attainment of a sufficient level of self-determination of
technological affairs for the given society. A “sufficient level” implies that there is endogenous
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capacity for making and executing decisions on guiding innovation, industries, technology
transfer, and priorities for development. For example, a country can be technologically
autonomous when its food security and basic infrastructure (housing, utilities, transportation, and
basic telecommunication networks) are not threatened by supplier countries. On the basic
services of education and healthcare, technological autonomy means the capacity to build and
reproduce technological knowledge and skills of the local population, and to foster their
innovative talents, in an environment that also meets basic health and safety requirements,
without being particularly dependent on external powers as suppliers of those basic services.
The framework provided below identifies a set of concepts and relationships that can be
used to build theories and explanations about technological autonomy. Following Ostrom’s
(2005) criteria of a conceptual framework, it is comprehensive enough to address the general
problem of technological autonomy and flexible enough to allow for the creation of multiple
models and policy strategies, depending on the context, to achieve a broad goal. The
technological autonomy framework can support the development of explanations for
technological change processes, guide research on technological change, and contribute to policy
formation. Additionally, the specification of the main variables of technology localization
(diffusion, institutional support and adaptation) is useful in identifying research gaps and in
mapping and selecting policies that suit various organizational, social, and jurisdictional
contexts.
By highlighting the elements in technological change processes, the framework is
intended to guide areas of focus for research as well as support informed decision-making. The
main features of the framework are shown in Figure 1. It shows a technological change process
leading to the achievement of a basic level of technological autonomy—i.e. to abate
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technological dependency. The main variables of that process are the internal factors of (a)
technology localization, and (b) technological capabilities. While technological capabilities
relate to the general enabling environment for productive in society, technology localization
addresses chosen technologies of particular importance and priority in specific local contexts.
Different developing societies manifest different levels of technological dependency, as
could be determined from their state of technological affairs. Moreover, their various contexts
will determine various policy and structural planning and implementation priorities, based on
their relative sets of assets and vulnerabilities. Therefore, different levels of technology
localization and technological capabilities are expected (figure 1). A developing society
(country, region, community, etc.) can be located at any point on the continuum leading towards
technological autonomy at any particular point in time, and can be moving forward (or
backwards) on that spectrum. Technological development implies moving forward on that
spectrum towards technological autonomy.
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Figure 1 Framework of technological autonomy
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The dependency threshold in the framework (Figure 1) suggests that if a society is
beginning to free itself from the limitations of technological dependency and move towards
technological autonomy, then we can say that that society is at a dependency threshold. This
threshold state is made possible by internal and external factors that, together, can lead a society
towards technological autonomy. The internal factors, are represented by the activities of
technology localization and the increase of technological capabilities (production activities,
investment activities, and networks of technological actors). The external factors are represented
by an assumption of relative political and economic stability. External forces have an influence
on any process of technological change, even if the internal factors are optimal. However, the
scope of the external factors is beyond the reach of this thesis. Reference to them in the
framework was important so as not to suggest that only internal factors play a role in the creation
of technological autonomy.
Increase of Technological Capabilities
Technological capabilities refer to the “dynamic resources which encompass the skills,
knowledge and routines involved in generating and managing technological change, whether
they concern production activities, investment activities, or relations with other [technological
actors]” (Albu 1997, quoted in Gulrajani 2006, 154). Thus, the activities for increasing
technological capabilities fall into three categories: production activities, investment activities,
and the networking of technological actors (Figure 1). Production activities include the
integration of skilled labour and natural resources in making and utilizing technologies.
Investment activities concern decisions and actions in channeling finite resources into enhancing
technological sectors by increasing human resources, accessing natural resources, or R&D
endeavors. Networking of technological actors refers to the interactions and communication
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between producers, investors and innovators that coordinate their work and pursuits. Networks
are known to be generally more productive and efficient than isolated or fragmented groups of
actors. In other words, technological capabilities address the general enabling environment for
technologically productive forces in a society. The technological change literature demonstrates
that effective technological change experiences, by and large, have been the outcome of multiple
actors and institutions building upon each other’s work (see for example Rosenberg 1972; 1982;
Binswanger 1986; OECD 1993; Nasir et al. 2011).
The concept of technological capabilities was introduced by Lall (1992) and Gulrajani
(2006) in the context of industrial clusters but was later enhanced and applied to firms as well as
to national systems. Lall (1992) takes technological capabilities from the firm and industrial
cluster level to the national level. Lall suggests a ‘simple framework’ for explaining national
technological change planning includes: policies of market incentives (micro and macro),
increasing technological capabilities, and institutions. By incentives Lall refers to the policy and
market stimulants that encourage investment in innovative endeavors, on-the-job training and
business environment improvement. By institutions Lall refers to the national bodies that plan
and execute interventions, and regulate constraints, to induce economic, social and innovative
factors to work together in investing in human and physical capital.6 A similar conclusion is
reached by others who examined the stories of industrial development in Asian Newly
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, South Africa, India, and
Malaysia) (See Kim & Nelson’s (2000) edited volume).
6 Note: the definition of institutions by Lall (1992) is not the same as the definition adopted by this paper. Lall’s
definition is particularly limited to national formal institutions.
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These stories of NIEs can be viewed as stories of transformation from technological
dependency to technological autonomy. Yet the framework that Lall suggests does not address
issues of diffusion and technical adaptation, particularly at the level of users and smaller social
units within the national umbrella (such as rural communities). Additionally Lall’s framework
does not sufficiently address two of the conditions that technological development faces in
developing societies: the dichotomy of modern and traditional technologies and the context-
determined priorities of development (which can seriously influence the trajectory of
technological change in a given society). Such issues have a record of causing resistance to
technological change among targeted communities in developing societies. The framework of
technological autonomy addresses these issues through the variable of technology localization.
Technology Localization
While the increase of technological capabilities represents the strategic, continuous and
cumulative side of a technological change process, technology localization represents the
interventionist side of the process. It is meant to respond to incidents where there are persistent
elements of resistance to change regarding particular technology types. For a variety of reasons,
some technology types suffer persistent low levels of adoption over time in developing societies
(e.g., agricultural technologies in sub-Saharan Africa in the last 3 decades) while others do not
(e.g., ICTs in sub-Saharan Africa during the last decade). In cases of resistance focused
interventions may be required. Technology localization refers to activities that seek to make
chosen technologies locally functional and locally embedded (i.e. without high resistance). Such
technologies are typically of particular importance and priority in specific contexts. The main
activities of technology localization are:
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1- Diffusion; which refers to persuading the concerned segments of society, through
communication and promotion, to adopt new technological innovations.
2- Institutional support; which includes policy advocacy, resource mobilization (e.g. finance
and credit systems), and logistical and training assistance for the operationalization of
chosen technologies.
3- Technical adaptation; which includes additional, incremental, technical modifications to
the technologies of concern, or complementing technologies in ways that add value and
increase usability of the technologies in specific contexts.
In brief, local technological change requires diffusion of new technologies, support for
the technologies’ operationalization, and sometimes adaptations of available technologies to fit
more effectively into a local context. The three processes are mutually supporting. Technology
localization, if successful, increases technological change and increases technological
capabilities. To explain the contribution of technology localization to technological autonomy,
we first have to look at the nature of the life cycle of technological innovations. Understanding
that life cycle – from inception to maturity to diffusion and adoption – allows us to recognize the
value of the role played by diffusion, institutional support and adaptation in promoting
technological change.
Innovations emerge out of conditions where different objective and subjective elements
come together in particular historical contexts. Those contexts present incentives and constraints
that are sometimes institutional (formal or informal) and sometimes environmental (i.e.
ecological, geographical, etc.) (Rogers 2003; Hodgson 2004). Most innovations in history occur
in decentralized settings where smaller groups or individuals share the credit for the innovation
(Binswanger 1986; Rosenberg 1972). Even when macro planning is involved, it manifests in
giving latitude, mission and resources to particular small groups, such as engineers, scientists,
technologists and artisans (and their historical equivalents) to undertake innovative projects
(Noble 1984). Innovation tends to be carried out in smaller entities in society, such as firms,
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laboratories, and specialized teams/associations (such as artisans and technicians). Even within
those smaller entities, it is common to find even smaller teams (or individuals) as the initiators
and custodians of new technological products and systems.
It is critical to distinguish between innovation, on the one hand, and innovation diffusion
on the other hand. Innovation involves learning from conditions and environments,
conceptualizing solutions, and providing material demonstrations of those solutions. Diffusion of
innovation, which comes after the realization of the innovation, is “the process by which an
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system… The diffusion process typically involves both mass media and interpersonal
communication channels.” (Rogers et al. 2009, 418). Rosenberg (1972;1982) and Binswanger
(1986) document that, generally, new technologies require a considerable amount of time
between their first incubation and the time when they show a visible level of adoption. Noble
(1984) and Kreszner (1987) also document the time it took private manufacturing firms in the
USA to adopt Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machining from the time the technology was
ready for adoption. Technology localization refers to the activities that take place in the period
between the discovery of a technological innovation and the time it becomes widely adopted in
society. The activities of technology localization can occur at macro as well as micro levels (see
table 2). Diffusion is thus one element in localization.
The other activities of localization are institutional support and technical adaptation.
Institutional support addresses the need with some technologies to have support with advocacy,
resources, training and logistics as they gradually permeate society and become integrated.
Technical adaptation addresses the required alterations to technologies adopted from other
societies to make them more compatible, in functional and sustainable terms, with the new local
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context. Table 2 lays out a variety of sample technology localization activities at national levels,
organizational levels and between. Each level has corresponding sample activities of technology
diffusion, institutional support and technical adaptation.
While innovation has a decentralized nature, localization is a collective process. It needs
more collective work because it addresses a challenge of collective nature, that is to make a
technology adopted and effective in a particular society. Developing societies face critical
challenges in achieving technology localization.
Table 2 Technology localization matrix (sample activities)
Diffusion Institutional Support Technical adaptation













































































Agents of Technological Change
The framework and the variables, described above, are made operational by agents of
technological change. These agents are not ‘in’ the framework because they are not ‘variables’ in
it; rather they are the ones that operationalize the variables. At communal, social, national and
regional levels, these agents are seldom individuals. They represent groups, associations and
bodies, even when they act sometimes and in some respects as individuals. Different contexts
require different agents of change. There are a variety of agents, established or emerging, at
various levels of engagement in stimulating and actualizing technological change, such as
national innovation institutions, educational institutes, technical training and R&D
establishments, manufacturing and design firms, technology incubators, NGOs, and social
enterprises.
In the technological change literature, much is studied about the role of the state
(public/national sector) and private firms (private sector), including any range of combination of
the two, such as public-private partnership programs, parastatal corporations, and transnational
corporations with some public-sector shares. In varying degrees, the state and the private sector
are active in industrialized, semi-industrialized and low-income countries. In developing
societies there is no evidence that any genuine measures of technological development have been
achieved under weak or non-developmental states (see Nyerere 1998, Kim & Nelson 2000 and
Nasir et al. 2011). For example, Kim & Nelson (2000) show that in the newly-industrializing
economies (NIEs) developmental states mobilized national industrialization plans utilizing the
state apparatus and resources as a key agent of technological change. The state can furnish the
enabling environment for industrialization, provide resources, and support the growth of key or
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immature industries.  It can also support human capital formation and innovative technological
R&D thus encouraging continuing growth in general or in particular sectors (see for example,
Noble 1984; Kroszner 1987; Wolff 1999; Ash et al. 2006; Mazzucato 2013). On the other hand,
the private sector, under conducive conditions, can champion significant R&D activities that can
lead to improving products, processes and services (see for example, Arthur 1989; Monden
1993; Rogers 2003).
Yet, in developing societies, there are technological development challenges that neither
the public sector nor the private sector have been successful in meeting. Under such conditions,
new agents of technological change sometimes fill gaps left by the old agents. For example, in
rural regions of developing countries neither the state nor the private sector have made
significant advancements in technological change, particularly in key sectors such as agriculture,
agro-processing, energy generation and distribution, water supply, sanitation, and transportation.
Recently in these sectors a number of social enterprises have begun to emerge, diffusing new
technological products and services to communities. As emerging agents of technological change
in developing societies, they have not yet been studied in that capacity.
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AS AGENTS OF CHANGE
Social enterprises are considered part of ‘the third sector’, which includes NGOs, civil society
organizations, as well as many cooperatives. The entire array of social enterprises that are
growing in number and form in developing societies should draw keen interest from analysts of
technological change. A social enterprise has been defined as “a business with primarily social
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximize profit for shareholders and
owners.” (UK Department of Trade and Industry 2002, 7). It has also been defined as “a social
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initiative that addresses social needs or catalyzes social transformation. The creation of social
value is the primary objective of the venture, while economic value creation represents a
necessary but not sufficient condition” (Mair & Schoen 2007, 55). Social enterprises cross the
boundaries between the conventional private sector and the voluntary or philanthropic sector,
along with carrying some ‘public sector principles’ of democratic/participatory management and
equitable redistribution, for the sake of human and/or environmental well-being (Ridley-Duff &
Bull 2011). They include some cooperative models, credit unions, micro-finance banks, fair trade
businesses, some business incubators, NGOs with a focus on economic activities, businesses
with profit-sharing schemes with their communities, and other organizations with similar
approaches (Alter 2007; Haugh 2012). The social enterprise concept, and recent models,
appeared in Western Europe and Northern America with the aim of filling a gap in the
socioeconomic fabric which neither the public sector, nor the private sector, nor conventional
NGOs could quite fill. The term itself refers to a host of business models, some of which are
new, but some are older than the term itself, such as cooperatives, the fair trade movement, and
some microfinance initiatives and credit unions (Alter 2007; Desta 2010). SEs in Western
Europe and Northern America have attracted attention as a relatively new channel for expressing
and realizing innovative responses to socioeconomic challenges of local communities.
However, since some of them are new forms of organization, with a relatively new way
of looking at problems, social enterprises face many challenges related to defining their territory
and standardizing their areas of work. Some of these challenges may explain why a social
enterprise model would work in one social context and not in another. Another challenge is
related to the degrees of consistency, or dissonance, between theory and practice. Most scholars
of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship agree that a precise and unified definition has not
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yet been reached (Lautermann 2013; Haugh 2012; Pattie & Morley 2008; Dart 2004; Alvord
2004). After “a profusion of definitions found in the first decade of the twenty-first century,”
scholars began to move towards building general consensus on the general characteristics of
social enterprises instead of articulating a universal definition for them (Haugh 2012, 9). The
current general claim is that social enterprises are basically business ventures who have more
emphasis on creating ‘social value’ than the ‘conventional’ businesses (i.e. for-profit private
businesses), but we are still left with the ambiguities of measuring social value and its creation in
the entrepreneurship circles (Lautermann 2013). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that, as Pattie and
Morley put it (2008), social enterprise is “a form of business that is distinctly different to
conventional commercial enterprise.” (p. 91).
As is the case with some other fields of study, social enterprise theory appeared after the
practice itself and sought to catch up with it. Generally, in theory social enterprises broadly
promote products and services that adhere to triple bottom line values (social, economic,
environmental) (Haugh 2012). In practice, they represent organizations that cross the
conventional boundaries between for-profit businesses and voluntary or philanthropic missions,
along with borrowing some ‘public sector principles’ of democratic representation and equitable
redistribution, all for the sake of human and environmental well-being (Ridley-Duff & Bull
2011). In summary, social enterprises include:
 Credit unions, revolving funds, micro-finance banks, or similar organizations which use
financial business models to promote social and/or environmental goals (Henderson and
Vercseg 2010; Yunus 2008; Alter 2007).
 Cooperatives and social firms which apply democratic approaches to sharing surplus and
human resource management (Dacanay 2012; Rodgers 2008; Brookfield et al. 2003; Lim,
Yap & Devlin, 2015). Instead of the typical market economy model of ‘capital hires
labour’ for generating profit, these organizations work on the principles of ‘labour hires
capital’ for purposes determined by labour (Spreckley 1981).
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 NGOs that use business models to promote economic practices for developmental or
environmental benefits, and/or NGOs with revenue-generating activities to self-support
their programs and projects (Willams et al. 2011).
 Private businesses that have significant, above average emphasis on ventures for
development, social innovation, and/or sharing surpluses for the public interest, such as
sustainability and sustainable development, fair trade, equitable employment, etc. (Amm
2009; Alter 2007).
Social Enterprises and Technology Localization
Recently, social enterprise models in developing societies have come to replace some of the
more traditional NGO work with respect to technology diffusion (See for example Amm 2009
and Rensburg et al. 2008). Although the social enterprise literature has been growing over at
least two decades, the study of the success of social enterprises as agents of technological change
has only begun to be explored. For example, van der Horst (2008) presents an account of social
enterprises being potential leaders for diffusing renewable energy technologies in the UK.
Williams et al. (2011) cite the case of Just Energy as an emerging social enterprise model with
potential for diffusing renewable energy in rural South Africa. Buell & Mayne (2011) explore
low-carbon initiatives that take social equity as a main aspect, from South Africa, the UK, and
the USA, with the argument that business approaches with moral/social imperatives are well-
equipped to thrive as sustainable and preferable models. Due to their orientation towards both
social value and commercial value we could expect that social enterprises would be found active
in contexts where there are social barriers to technological innovation because innovative
products – e.g. technologies and/or systems – create social value but can also often be
commercialized in socially responsible ways.
Through their inclination to support decentralized and context-based solutions, social
enterprises have the potential to be effective promoters of transformative technologies and
innovations. Social enterprises that are attuned to the difficult balance of business rigor on the
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one hand, and social altruism and innovation on the other hand, are also likely to be capable of
diffusing new solutions that cause shifts in the usual livelihood activities and crafts. Overall,
social enterprises are not restricted to one way or another of interacting with technology or
innovation for social value creation. They may innovate their own products or services, market
already-existing products for new contexts, or adopt and upscale local or endogenous solutions
(Rogers 2003; United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 2007). They can be agents
influencing multiple variables (and sub-variables) of technological change.
Social enterprises are suitable to play an effective role in technology localization because:
1) technology localization activities that are undertaken by the public sector can be hindered by
bureaucratic channels and social enterprises are not so constrained; and 2) technology
localization may not render immediate monitory rewards, and as a form of business investment
with many risks of un-redeemable costs – especially in developing societies – it makes
technology localization unappealing for the majority of the private sector. Social enterprises have
the potential of being free from these constraints of both public and private sectors. In numerous
technology localization activities, there needs to be some social imperatives, beyond profit-
making, that encourage organizations to take calculated risks for engaging in technology
localization—and that is the element social enterprises may have in comparison to the typical
private sector organizations. On the other hand, many technology localization activities appear to
require flexibility in approach as well as timely responses and seizure of opportunities—a
dynamism that the bureaucratic machinery of the public sector may not be able to accommodate.
These could be reasons for the recent relative increase of social enterprise activities in
developing societies. But have social enterprises proven to be successful agents of technology
localization in developing societies? This thesis investigates that possibility.
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Social Enterprises in Developing Societies
The social enterprise literature has already begun to diversify its perspectives according to
geographical and geopolitical contexts (i.e. different societies, different rules), since social
enterprises cannot avoid being influenced by the institutional environment, cultural context,
economic constraints, and technological infrastructures of their locations. For example, the
environments of Western Europe and North America, where the social entrepreneurship concept
was first realized and initiated, are characterized by an established infrastructure,
industrialization and key public services. Social enterprises then filled in areas of socioeconomic
development for vulnerable communities in that context where the state’s presence receded and
the private sector was yet unaffordable. In developing countries, the context is different, and
social enterprises have to modify their missions and goals to be relevant. For example, the
socioeconomic needs of rural communities in East Africa, where agriculture still relies on
traditional technologies, and the infrastructure of energy, water and sanitation is minimal, will be
essentially different from those of rural communities in Western Europe.
Currently, the social enterprise literature generally supports the claim that Europe is
where social enterprises are most diversified, abundant, legally acknowledged, scholarly studied,
and generating value (Granados et al. 2011; Palmas 2012; Dees 2007; Defourny and Nyssens
2008). Studies about social enterprises in other parts of the world have been growing recently,
covering Japan (Larata, Kakagawa and Sakurai 2011; Nakagawa and Laratta 2010), China (Jiao
2011; Yu 2011), and even indigenous communities in Northern America (Anderson, Dana and
Dana 2006). As for studies of social enterprises in developing countries, and besides the usual
mention of Bangladesh’ Grameen Bank, they are yet minimal. For example, Ramtese and Shah
(2012) provide case studies of two social enterprises in India: Gram Vikas and Aravind Eye
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Care, which took on the causes of better access to drinking water and sanitation and better access
to eye care in rural communities. Gram Vikas, for example, established community-run water
supply and sanitation systems that are financed by community household contributions. The case
of Gram Vikas is an example of a social enterprise with technology localization activities
(particularly diffusion). The Sorosoro Ibaba Development Cooperative in the Philippines offers a
similar example (Lim, Yap & Devlin, 2015).
As for Africa, recent stories of social enterprises began to attract more attention as a new
channel for expressing and realizing innovative responses to development challenges. Thus far
the social enterprise literature on Africa is quite limited in comparison to other continents
(Granados et al. 2011). Yet, studies on social enterprises in Africa are emerging (see, for
example Karanda and Toledano 2012; Abukasawi and ElKarib 2004; Desta 2010). These studies
review cases from Rwanda, Gambia, Sudan, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa, and
Ethiopia. Mair and Scheon (2007) mention Sekem, an Egyptian social enterprise established in
1977, that specializes in organic products and phyto-pharmaceuticals. According to Mair and
Schoen, Sekem shares characteristics of success with big and famous social enterprises such as
Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) and Mondragon Cooperatives (Spain). One can also see that
Sekem’s activities are technology-related. There are also currently young technology-oriented
social enterprises that work at very local levels in some African countries and are making their
presence notable. One example is ‘Just Energy’, an NGO that promotes renewable energy in
low-income communities in South Africa. They engage with some rural communities and
cooperatives in establishing revenue-generating renewable energy schemes. Just Energy partners
with the communities to provide capital and business deals with energy distribution corporations
for the energy project (Williams et al. 2011). Another example is the Ethical Co-op. Located in
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Cape Town, South Africa, it partners with small-scale farmers from the surrounding rural area
and townships, and introduces organic farming techniques and systems to them along with
training and assistance in certification. The co-op buys produce from the farmers and delivers to
urban clients (co-op members) (Entrepreneur’s Toolkit 2007).
In summary there is a promising potential for social enterprises in developing societies
due to their inclination for innovation, their decentralized and flexible nature, their social-
economic balance, and their perceived ‘realism in idealism’. As Altenburg (2008) notes, the
literature on technological innovation in developing countries still leaves room for focus on
addressing the peculiarities of these countries, particularly relevant to poverty reducing and
socially inclusive technological change. There is also less focus in these countries on
understanding the developmental roles of agents of change that are neither the state (or related to
the state), nor typical international development agencies, nor conventional commercial
businesses. We can use this observation to argue for exploring the abilities of social enterprises
as agents of technological change in developing countries, especially by contributing to
technology localization.
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CHAPTER III: FIELD STUDY METHODOLOGY
Social enterprises (SEs) were examined as potential agents of technology localization in East
Africa. This thesis research was conducted under a rural focus program, so the research focused
on rural development and rural areas. The researcher investigated social enterprises that are
engaged in technology localization activities in rural and agricultural communities. Tanzania was
selected for the field research.
FIELD STUDY INTRODUCTION
The main research question was: Are social enterprises effective agents of technology
localization in Tanzania?
To answer this research question, three sub-questions on social enterprises as agents of
technology localization were selected: 1) Do social enterprises demonstrate involvement in the
three activities of technology localization, which are diffusion, institutional support, and
technical adaptation?; 2) Do social enterprises in their diffusion activities demonstrate success in
identifying and engaging what are described in the diffusion literature as early adopters of
innovations?; and 3) Do clients and partners of social enterprises give overall favourable
accounts of the technological change that they experienced through the activities of the social
enterprises.
The field study collected data to answer the three sub-questions through case studies of
technology-oriented social enterprises. Priority was given to rural and agricultural contexts.
Additional sub-questions were used to structure the research, such as:
 What strategic approaches do social enterprises use to realize technology localization?
Do some technologies show more success in localization than others?
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 What forms of institutional barriers or social resistance does technology diffusion face?
How can they be explained?
 Are there other indicators of social enterprise effectiveness that can be recognized in the
field?
ASSUMPTIONS
Recognizing and Engaging Early Adopters of Innovations
Two main assumptions were embedded in the field study design. The first concerned the concept
of “early adopters”. Rogers (2003) identifies four main elements in the process of diffusion of
innovations: 1) the innovation, 2) communication channels, 3) time, and 4) the social system. He
identifies the change agents involved in this process as “an individual [or organization] who
influences clients’ innovation-decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency.”
(2003, 366). The adopters of innovations – i.e. the users – are categorized according to their level
and time of involvement in the diffusion process: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late
majority, and laggards. Among these, early adopters play a key role. Diffusion research identifies
early adopters as the “trendsetters” and leaders of change and adoption of new ways of doing
things in their communities. Early adopters tend to be more capable economically in comparison
to others in the social group (i.e. able to take risks, but not necessarily ‘rich’) and are more
informed and connected; hence well-respected in their communities – enough to be taken
seriously when they promote something new. This is in contrast to innovators, who often are
looked upon as eccentric and too nonconformist to influence a significant number of their peers
(Rogers 2003).
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This research assumed that identifying SE clients who exhibit qualities of early adopters
will be a good sign for the competence of the diffusion activities of the SE. Since some of the
SEs in this field study are relatively young, judging their effectiveness by the quantitative
measure of rates of adoption would not reflect their potential but only their current level of
achievement. Thus, this study resolved to the assumption that if the SEs show good performance
of engaging early adopters, the diffusion literature says that this would be a good indicator for
their potential as good diffusors. Researchers who focus on early adopters have been increasing
in the fields of development, education and business and have been confirming the critical,
possibly decisive role of early adopters in innovation adoption stories (see for example, Brint et
al. 2011; Worthington et al. 2011; Huh & Kim 2008). Early adopters can be expected to play an
important role in technology localization, particularly in diffusion, and sometimes even in
technical adaptation (Ram & Jung 1994; Daberkow & McBride 1998). Hence, effectiveness in
technology localization will be enhanced by identifying and engaging individuals who have the
characteristics of early adopters.
Cooperatives in Tanzania as Exceptional Social Enterprises
In Tanzania, and in East Africa in general, the term ‘social enterprise’ is a new one. The
researcher found that the majority of Tanzanian participants in the research do not use the term,
and many were not aware of it, including some of the staff of the case studies. The participants
who were most casually and comfortably using the term were foreign staff and partners of the
case studies (particularly Western staff). When translating the term ‘social enterprise’ into
Swahili, translators told the research that they could not find a ready term to use. After
consultations they resolved to translate it to ‘shirika la jamii’, a term which is already used in
Tanzania and means ‘community organization’. That was somewhat understandable since social
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enterprises are considered recent in Tanzania in general. However, that statement is true only
with a qualifier—if we accept that cooperatives are generally not considered social enterprises
there, but simply cooperatives.
Cooperatives are quite established in Tanzania and East Africa, and have been so for
decades (Coulson 1982). After political independence, the Tanzanian government initiated and
supported an economic development model that had cooperatives at its centre (Nyerere 1968;
Hyden 1980). Through the Ujamaa policy, Tanzania witnessed a proliferation of cooperatives in
the various sectors of the national economy, but especially in rural and agricultural areas. Many
cooperatives still exist. However, the researcher never heard anyone in Tanzania – native or
foreigner – refer to cooperatives among the Tanzanian social enterprises. That may very well be
the case in the rest of East Africa. This is explainable at even the global scale, since cooperatives
are significantly older in origin than all other forms of social enterprise. The assumption that the
researcher made for the field study was that cooperatives are too big in age, proliferation and
influence to be included in a field study of social enterprises. That is so particularly because
social enterprises (save cooperatives) are generally still a recent phenomenon in developing
societies, contested in theory and yet immature in practice. The contribution of the cooperative
movement to economic and social value creation around the world is independent of whether
cooperatives are considered social enterprises or not, and has been extensively studied. It could
be speculated that old and big, and state-sponsored, cooperatives in Tanzania may have been
active in technology localization activities. This field study did not explore that possibility. A
question may arise to whether such cooperatives could be considered part of the state, which is a
separate agent of technological change from social enterprises. In any case, the inclusion of old,
established cooperatives in Tanzania under the umbrella of social enterprises, and investigating
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their contribution to technology localization, is one of the blind spots of this research. In this
field study, the researcher chose to focus on more recent forms of social enterprises. However,
some of the cases did qualify as cooperatives, but new ones. The Biogas Construction
Enterprises (BCEs), which were part of this field study, can be described as unique, small
cooperatives, in their own right.
RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING TANZANIA
Tanzania has a unique history of special attention to rural development (Nyerere 1968; Hyden
1980; Jennings 2008). There is also a history of pursuit of technological development. For
example, in its national planning there is mention of the concept of technological autonomy. The
Centre for Development and Transfer of Technology (CDTT), a department within the
Commission for Science and Technology of Tanzania, defines ‘technology autonomy’ [sic] as
the capacity “to create […] an enabling environment [for] making independent and correct
decisions on the choice of technology, its evaluation, and internalization, generation of
endogenous capacity for adaptation, innovation and development of sustainable technologies”
(COSTECH nd.). Tanzania is still, nevertheless, a struggling low-income economy. As of 2015,
its HDI (human development index) score was 0.531 ranking 151 in the world, and its IHDI
(inequality-adjusted HDI) was 0.396. Yet it is a promising candidate for successful technological
transformation. In general, it can serve as a relatively good example for the conditions in large
parts of Africa. Now in Tanzania there is an emerging debate on how the state can best support
innovation and technological development. From the Prime Minister’s office (2015), to the
Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2015) to strategic plans of parastatals (SIDO 2014 and
TEMDO 2011), there is broad-based support and enthusiasm for promoting technological
innovation to tackle development problems and promote private sector involvement. These are
56
both challenging and exciting times of for the Tanzanian private sector. Such conditions could
create an important space for social enterprises. The general definition of the private sector in
Tanzania, according to the national private sector policy of 2015, appears to include communal
enterprises of different types, such as women or youth cooperatives, saving and credit
cooperatives, micro businesses and services and other income-generating activities undertaken
by community members (as groups or as individuals). SEs can thus feel comfortably included.
Into the 1980s the Tanzanian government intervened heavily in the market and general economy
of the country creating a form of command economy (Coulson 1982). Then beginning in the
mid-1980s and continuing into the new millennium it started to shift towards a mixed-economy
approach. The provision of goods and services was largely a monopoly of the public sector, but
later the private sector began to be recognized as an engine of economic growth.
The recent five-year national development plan (FYDP-II) highlights industrialization as
a priority, with emphasis on utilizing STI for that purpose. It is aiming to transform Tanzania
into a semi-industrialized middle-income country. It acknowledges that state performance in the
past has not met expectations in terms of supporting industrialization and furnishing an enabling
environment for the contribution of other sectors and it says that this will be rectified (especially
with the new elected government that took power in November 2015). The plan also states that it
intends to approach industrialization in a “business unusual” manner, which means that there will
be “fundamental restructuring and repositioning in government undertakings” (United Republic
of Tanzania 2016, ii).
The Tanzanian private sector is still considered in the infant stage. More than 70% of the
private sector belongs to the informal economy (i.e. businesses that are not formally registered,
regulated or taxed). The private sector is “characterized by low levels of education and skills,
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limited access to technologies and finance, the key drivers of inclusive economic growth in
developing countries”, more especially in rural areas (where 70% of the population reside), as
put by the national private sector development policy (2015). That general situation renders a
private sector with huge untapped potential. Most of the informal private sector is constituted by
micro enterprises. According to the Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSDT) survey of 2012,
Tanzania had a total of 3,162,886 Micro enterprises and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs),
but most of them are informal. Under such conditions large enterprises dominate economic
activity. They dominate the formal economy, they are more visible, more able to promote
themselves, and have more access to trade partners (national, regional or international partners).
Lessons from mature and strongly emerging economies around the world show that SMEs
should have a much higher percentage (above 80%) of national economic activity (Page 2016).
“Finally a large proportion of formal sector SMEs, specifically 54%, operate in the trade sector
and another 34% is engaged in the services. Very few are engaged in the productive sectors and
value addition activities where the largest opportunities for job creation and wealth creation are
located.” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2012).
The Tanzanian government now seeks to nurture the private sector, help it formalize, and
see it supplied with the growing skills, technology and finance needed to make this sector
mature. So, we are currently at a stage in Tanzanian history where the public sector is willing to
positively interact with the private sector (and the third sector) to enable favourable growth for
all, “in addition to selected public interventions to make markets friendly and performing on a
pro-poor manner by simplifying regulations and taxes and de-congesting ports, remove
roadblocks, improve the infrastructure (especially power and roads).” (Prime Minister’s Office
2015). The enabling environment is becoming more conducive for other agents of technological
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change to contribute to development more systematically. Social enterprises could be one of
them. This thesis may contribute to realizing that potential.
In addition to this appropriate policy environment in Tanzania the researcher had
conducted previous research on rural development planning in Tanzania (Sheikheldin 2015)
from which he attained a broad knowledge on the national experience with rural development.
The researcher also had lived in Tanzania for several months in 2013, volunteered in some
technology innovation projects, travelled around the country, and attained elementary
proficiency in Swahili. That familiarity allowed the researcher to follow conversations and be
reasonably aware of events and surroundings while in the field.
Due to limited time and resources, Tanzania was the only country where fieldwork was
undertaken for this study. However, a fair number of the social enterprises that participated in
this research had branches and/or business activities in other East African countries, which made
them able to give the researcher some information and perspective on those other countries.
RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS
The chosen approach for this research was a qualitative comparative case study, with some
limited use of quantitative data. The cases were social enterprises for which historical and
contemporary data were collected. Data were collected to construct narratives of how each social
enterprise performed in the area of technology localization and what were the highlights and
critical factors of its story. The narratives constructed were then used to compare their
experiences and respond to the research questions accordingly. The historical case study
approach was deemed suitable because the study tried to understand a process of change and the
actions of agents seeking to generate change. To understand a change process, it is useful to
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construct a narrative of the process to identify the factors influencing the change. The general
steps through which this research went conform to the conventional version of:
Idea → Literature Review → Data collection and organization → Analysis and findings →Writing
While case studies are known to generally belong to qualitative research approaches,
there are various arguments with regard to what constitutes a case study and distinguishes it from
other qualitative methodologies; i.e. what significant characteristics make it a suitable approach
to certain research questions. Bennett (2004) suggests the following characteristics define a
‘case’ and a ‘case study’: 1) ‘small n’ compared to ‘large N’ of statistical studies; 2) each case
includes potential of many observations and intervening variables, which makes it capable of
being connected with other cases to form broader findings; and 3) even when instances of a
single phenomenon are sufficient for a large N statistical study, case study methods can still
serve useful theory-building purposes. This is by testing the theory against a specific case. A
case can thus be seen as “an instance of a class of events.”
Small (2009) argues that instead of using the term ‘small n’ we should just call data ‘a set
of cases’ in case study research. This will avoid confusion related to generalizability and
replicability of research. Hence, a case is “a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the
researcher selects for analysis” (Bennett 2004, 1513). However, Verschuren (2003) perceives the
case study as a ‘research strategy’ rather than a method. This strategy is differentiated from, and
complementary to, other strategies like the survey, the experiment “and (other) quantitative
approaches.” A strategy means “a coherent set of methods, techniques and procedures for
generating and analyzing the research material, as well as the way the researcher looks at reality
and conceptually designs the research project” (Verschuren 2003, 122). Verschuren suggests that
case study research is a ‘holistic’ approach, which means that it makes no distinction between
research units (e.g. organizations) and observation units (e.g. employees):
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“A case study is a research strategy that can be qualified as holistic in nature, following
an iterative-parallel way of preceding, looking at only a few strategically selected cases,
observed in their natural context in an open-ended way, explicitly avoiding (all variables
of) tunnel vision, making use of analytical comparison of cases or sub-cases, and aimed
at description and explanation of complex and entangled group attributes, patterns,
structures or processes” (Verschuren 2003, 137).
This field study identified with the articulations of Bennett and Verschuren, above, in its
justification for the choice of case study strategy as the methodology for data collection and
analysis. The case studies of this research were a small sample that are not statistically
representative, and each case was studied as a whole unit (including its staff, clients, partners,
products, model of diffusion, etc.).
While generalizable conclusions can be drawn from a largely qualitative case study
research, the knowledge it seeks to gain about the topic it studies is not necessarily generalizable
or replicable (Hesse-Biber et al. 2004; Goodwin and Horowitz 2002; Burawoy 1998). However,
the insights and conclusions learned from such studies enhance scholarly knowledge and
understanding for various practical or theoretical purposes. This qualitative approach is often
suitable for studying complex phenomena or ones that are highly contingent on their social
context. Case studies can create a wealth of in-depth knowledge regarding each case, and this
can be built upon with more cases which may eventually generate quantitative significance
(Jensen and Rodgers (2001).
In this field study both technological and institutional aspects intersected. Flyvbjerg
(2006 and 2011) and Small (2009) argue that one significance of case study methodology is that
it allows for studying multiple variables in each case, even with a mix of qualitative and
quantitative models. Table 3 shows a number of sample studies that addressed topics of
technological change and societal dynamics in mostly developing countries or communities.
They used case study approaches, and mainly qualitative data and analysis, but were also
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relatively successful in including relevant quantitative measures and data that contributed to
illuminating their subject of inquiry. For example, Barry et al. (2008) studied the impact of
rainwater harvesting and soil/water conservation systems through both quantitative and
qualitative data (soil fertility, crop yields, cost-benefit analysis, socio-economic impacts, gender
parity, etc.). They selected a number of sites (cases) in two countries and conducted studies on
each site, then combined and compared results from the different sites. They also showed other
case studies that included factors of participatory appraisal and farmer-to-farmer learning action
research projects. They analyzed results that are related to both technical/quantitative measures
(practices with most yields/benefits) and socio-economic (problems of labour and land tenure as
constraints to implementing techniques, and women’s unfair share in decision making due to
lack of land ownership). Kandji et al. (2006) presented case studies of countries of the West
Sahel and their peculiar challenges and policies in relation to addressing climatic effects on food
security measures, including soil/water conservation. Each country’s peculiar context and
policies are presented after indicating the larger umbrella variables for the entire region (climate
forecasts, shared institutions, shared techniques, etc.). Roy (2002) used both case study research
and mixed data (qualitative and quantitative) analyses to investigate why traditional handloom
weaving technology in India has a unique record of surviving the new mechanized ‘power’
looms.
The aspects that played a role in determining research methodology choice, in the sample
studies, were: a) the research questions, b) the lens of inquiry (or hypotheses), and c) the contexts
of their fields (i.e. where they collected the data). Generally, each sample of case study research
in table 3 had perceived weaknesses or left room for speculation regarding what other
information or perspectives could have been brought to light if a different methodology was
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chosen. Ultimately, however, each study showed why case study strategy was very suitable – if
not the most suitable – for its line of inquiry. Another characteristic that appears to be common
among these sample studies is their interdisciplinary nature. Harriss (2002) suggests that “good
scholarship must involve a tension between ‘discipline’ and ‘anti-discipline”. The reason for that,
he argues, is because discipline, although productive in the sense that it cumulates scientific
knowledge and distinguishes it from opinion, can also be too self-absorbed and isolated from
reality if it is not often challenged by outsider perspectives. Harriss encourages continuous cross-
disciplinary research (both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary), particularly for studies under
the umbrella of international development. Interdisciplinary research allows for continuous
cross-examination of the discipline’s tools and findings, by approaches from other disciplines,
which keeps the discipline in check, evolving and in touch with the questions of the larger
reality. This thesis is interdisciplinary as it links technological and institutional aspects of
development, and integrates multiple scholarly disciplines — development studies, technological
change, and diffusion of innovations.
Table 3 Summary of selected methodology literature reviewed
Author(s), year and title Brief Description Research Strategy
Adeel et al. (ed.) (2008), “What
Makes Traditional Technologies
Tick?”
Several chapter studies of traditional
water management systems around
the world. Focus on promoting
traditional technology as sustainable
development approaches.
Qualitative, case study researches.
Historical and technical description
followed by analysis and/or




Development: The Importance of
Technology Users.”
Arguing for the importance of
including technology users in
development planning and
implementation. Focus is on
showing how policy and
management approach affects
technology-users inclusion.
Qualitative set of case studies.
Historical experiences of
development projects narrated with
emphasis on the benefit of
technology user inclusion in the
process.
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Roy (2002), “Acceptance of
Innovations in early Twentieth-
century Indian weaving.”
Historical analysis of how traditional
weaving technology survived
modern technology introduction in
India. Focus is on explaining the
unique case of traditional weaving.
Qualitative, historical case study
research. Data was collected from
historical documents that provided
mainly quantitative information,
with some opinions of other
scholars.
Mohammed (200?), Low-energy
stoves for Internally Displaced
Peoples (Darfur)
Report investigation and evaluation
of different stove appropriate
technologies. Focus is on
determining which stove design is
the most appropriate to local
conditions.
Qualitative and quantitative (mixed)
action research on one case study.
Data was collected on both the
quantitative performance of the
stoves and the qualitative assessment
of the technology-users. Data from
the technology users was collected
in an active workshop without
structured questionnaires or
interviews.
United Nations (2006), “Gender,
water and sanitation: Case studies on
best practices.”
Stories documenting best practices,
from around the world, of gender
empowerment projects in the




introduced, and their impacts
evaluated.
Qualitative, set of case studies.
Three case study methodologies are
claimed to have been used in the
several studies of the report: The




development of the donkey-drawn
plough in North Darfur, Western
Sudan.”
Report narrating an experience of
participatory technology
development (PTD) research in a
rural context. Focus is on
demonstrating the effective aspects
of PTD.
Qualitative and quantitative (mixed)
methods, case study, participatory
rural appraisal (PRA) and
participatory action research (PAR).
Data was collected from active
workshops and implemented
designs; no structured questionnaires
or interviews.
Ostrom (1990), “Governing the
Commons: The evolution of
institutions for collective action.”
Chapter 3, The case of Valencia,
Spain, communal irrigation systems.
Challenging the administrative
theory of ‘the tragedy of the
commons’ by presenting and
analyzing cases of communal self-
governing of common-pool
resources.
Qualitative, historical case study
research. Data was collected from
both historical documents and
contemporary ethnographic
fieldwork studies by several
researchers under the same umbrella
topic, under the same researcher
supervisor who is the author.
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Barry et al. (2008). “Rainwater
Harvesting Technologies in the
Sahelian Zone of West Africa and
the Potential for Outscaling.”
Studying the impact of rainwater
harvesting and soil/water
conservation systems – customary
and emerging technologies – in the
Western Sahelian Zone of Africa.
Mixed methods (quantitative and
qualitative), sets of case studies
(sites) in two countries and
comparative case study. Data
collected and analyzed included soil
fertility, crop yields, cost-benefit
analysis, socio-economic impacts,
gender parity, etc. Results were
related to both technical/quantitative
and socioeconomic measures.
Kandji et al. (2006). “Climate
Change and Variability in the Sahel
Region: Impacts and Adaptation
Strategies in the Agricultural
Sector.”
Studying countries of the West Sahel
of Africa and their peculiar
challenges and policies in relation to




comparative case studies. Each
country’s peculiar context and
policies discussed in light of the
common regional variables (climate
forecasts, shared institutions, shared
techniques, etc.).
Criteria for Choosing Cases
Type of case: The field study sought cases of business ventures with a primary social or
environmental objective, i.e. social enterprises (as defined in chapter II). Each case’s fulfillment
of this definition was assessed by looking at what they do and their model or structure. Their
activities included providing a critical, under-met service to communities; providing technology
education or training; or innovating and/or promoting new products or systems. Their model or
structure was either a private enterprise, cooperative (or social firm), NGO with revenue-
generating branch/activity, or a public-private partnership initiative (such as a revenue-
generating technology training centre). Criteria in tables V.1 and V.2 (Appendix V) were used in
the selection. For example, table V.1 lists basic criteria that an organization should fulfill to be
considered a social enterprise, such as its social or environmental objective and long-term
mission, along with how the organization itself is structured and how it reinvests a proportionate
amount of its revenues back into its social/environmental mission (rather than distribute most
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revenues to shareholders as profits, for example). As for their involvement in technology
localization, table V.2 represented a pre-assessment of cases for selection, to measure how new
the technological product or service is (to the targeted communities) that the SE is introducing,
and how it relates to the livelihoods of these communities (i.e., the technology’s socioeconomic
and/or environmental value). All the selected cases satisfied the criteria sufficiently.
Process of selection: generally, referrals from primary contacts were used (those that the
researcher and his advisory committee already had communication with in Tanzania), or visits to
social enterprises known through informal contacts. Initial information letters and requests for
participation in the research were sent to potential cases. Also, the researcher used the casual
approach of meeting with the organization’s manager(s) to briefly introduce the research and its
purposes then inquire about whether they will be interested in joining the study. All confirmed
participants eventually went through the formal procedure of receiving official
information/recruitment letters and signing consent forms.
TYPE AND SIZE OF DATA
Key informant feedback: personnel of SEs, users/adopters of their technologies, and partners in
their projects were treated as key informants. They had intimate knowledge of the processes of
technology localization that the SEs were leading, whether as providers, beneficiaries,
facilitators, or as a combination of those (as will be explained in the findings). Data was
collected from them mainly through one-on-one interviews (either in English or in Swahili with
the presence of an interpreter). In these interviews they told their stories with the technologies
and with the process or model of how they engaged with the technologies either as localizers or
as adopters. They also provided their observations and opinions about both the technologies and
66
the processes of localization. Additional data from key informants were collected through field
visits and conversations. Such data were mainly generic (i.e. no personal information collected)
or an elaboration on what was already mentioned in interviews.
There were 108 interviews conducted (out of 100 originally targeted for the entire field
period). The average time of each interview was 40 minutes. Interviews took place between
December 2014 and August 2015. All interviews were conducted in person. Two interviews
were arranged to be in writing – one with a senior staff of GCS Tanzania Ltd. and one with a
retired senior staff at CAMARTEC – but after the researcher met personally with the
interviewees and the two were not able to secure sufficient time to schedule an interview in
person. The Tanzania regions in which the interviews took place were: Arusha, Kilimanjaro,
Manyara, Morogoro, Dar es Salaam, and Mwanza (With multiple districts and villages in each
region). Appendix VI provides a coded list of interviewees (Table 9). Overall, the field study
collected and analyzed data from 6 social enterprises, 8 partner/informant organizations, and
about 15 communities (in 5 different regions).
Field observations: An average of 7 days for each case were spent in their offices with their
staff, and on their field operations. The purpose of the observations was for the researcher to
have an accurate visualization of the technology localization process and its confounding factors.
Additionally, field observations gave the researcher an opportunity to note any dynamics of
interaction between the SEs and the local adopters/users with a fresh, third party perspective,
which has the potential of noticing things others may not readily notice. Additionally, the
researcher organized his own visits to rural communities and areas where technology adopters
and the participant SEs were present. Time was also spent with many partner organizations.
Furthermore, the researcher was invited several times to workshops and events that included
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important discussions and demonstrations of projects. The researcher took notes about interesting
points made, ideas discussed, information reported, and open data/knowledge shared. He also
recorded his own observations while in the field interacting with the communities and observing
the technologies in question. In total, the researcher attended approximately 15 field events with
most of the participant organizations, and took notes. The field events included field visits to
rural communities and projects (other than the interview visits), workshops, and technology
demonstration or testing events. Some of the field events took several days, but the majority of
them consisted of one full day per event.
Relevant literature: Each participant organization (whether a case or a partner/informant)
provided the researcher with documents that relate to their work, their business model,
organizational structure, history of activities and achievements, sales, programs, and other
relevant data. Additionally, the researcher sought and acquired other documents, books and
reports relevant to the general Tanzanian context and specific region or business information. A
collection of books about Tanzania’s policies, capacity and business environment were
purchased by the researcher from Tanzanian bookstores and organizations. Additionally, a
number of statistical reports were acquired from Tanzania’s Bureau of National Statistics, mainly
relevant to rural economic activities, production, population and energy. Approximately 72
documents overall were collected.
While the main research question for the field was about whether social enterprises are
successful agents of technology localization in Tanzania, the data collection from the field was
guided by sub-questions. Table 4 demonstrates the composition of the interview guide—how
questions were grouped, what their descriptions were and what the rationale behind them was.
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Table 4 Composition of Interview Guide
Section in interview guide Description Rationale Targeted
participants*
Background of interviewee (in
relevance to the research topic)
Simple direct questions about job (or trade)
description, years of experience and professional
qualifications (if any)
To seek to understand and contextualize the
interviewee’s answers to the coming questions





Questions combining direct, multiple choice and
opinion-based, about the vision, goals, mandate,
structure and general composition of the
organization
To learn about the general composition and





Multiple choice question about the origins of the
model and its advantages/disadvantages
To learn how the diffusion model is perceived by




Likert-scale questions about the how the
interviewee things of the technology in question, in
terms of: Relative advantage, compatibility,
Complexity, Trialability, Observability**
To learn about how the technologies in question are
perceived in general, favourably or less, by all




Diffusion impact – rates of
adoption
Questions about sales and regions (and
communities) covered in the diffusion process, etc.
To estimate rates of adoption by the measures
available (as not all organizations had clear records
of sales and coverage)
SEs, Partners
Recognition and engagement of
early adopters
Questions about the interviewee’s level of
engagement and influence in the community, as
well as other questions about their technology
adoption story***
To determine whether the individual belongs to




Open and multiple-choice questions about the
internal and external challenges of affairs related to
the diffusion or adoption of the said technology
To learn about the multiple and diverse challenges,
as well to learn how many of them are agreed by
the interviewees to be of priority
SEs, Adopters,
Partners
Business with the social
enterprise(s) and the
products/services involved
Direct, multiple-choice, and ‘fill-form’ questions
about the type of relation and business SE and what
products and services are involved and how
To learn from adopters and SE partners how they





Open and likert-scale questions about assessing the
marketing and communication performance of the
SE in question
To evaluate the marketing and communication
performance of the SE
Adopters, Partners
*i.e. social enterprise staff, technology users/adopters, and/or partners of social enterprise.
**Based on Rogers’ (2003) criteria of innovations that achieve good rates of adoption.
***Based on Rogers’ (ibid) criteria for recognizing early adopters.
(also see appendix VIII: interview guide for technology adopters)
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Interviews were not transcribed verbatim, as they were not recorded. Interviewee
responses were written or typed down by the researcher directly during the interviews. This
way of recording responses was deemed suitable and sufficient for this research as explained
in the research ethics approval process completed with the Research Ethics Board of the
University of Guelph. Without their interviews recorded, the participants were generally
more at ease in expressing their views and elaborating when needed. They also were
comfortable in having the interviews in their workplaces or with some interruptions in the
middle of the interview, which made interview scheduling easier for them. It is the belief of
the researcher that this approach increased the willingness to participate among interviewees
– particularly from rural communities – and it only cost the researcher more work in instant
transcription/summarizing during the interviews (either directly in English or through an
interpreter present at the interview). With some complex questions or elaborate responses,
the researcher often summarized the response recorded back to the interviewee to make sure
they approved of the summary. Interviewees either approved such summaries, made some
corrections, or added emphases to them.
In 2016, the field research was extended. Field findings from 2015 led to expression
of interest from the International Development Research Center (IDRC), and from local
research partners such as the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Research
Organization (STIPRO), to learn more about the experiences and reform possibilities of
parastatal R&D Tanzanian organizations, also known as Public Technology Intermediaries
(PTIs) or Industrial Support Organizations (ISOs). Some of these PTIs participated in the
field study in 2015, and a few others were added in 2016. The extended study sought to hear
more from the PTIs, through interviews and discussions. With the extension of the field
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research, 30 more interviews were conducted with senior personnel from these organizations,
as well from the Tanzania Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Directorate of Science,
Technology and Innovation in the Ministry of Communication.7 Also additional documents
were collected. After the 2016 field research activities were completed, a conclusion was
reached that it would be more appropriate to address the findings of that experience in a
separate research chapter (to be prepared with IDRC) as it will be more relevant to the
national policy level rather than the social enterprise and rural community level of the main
field study. However, the general information and insights learned from the 2016 fieldwork
also partially informed the results and data analysis of the 2015 research data, as they served
to enhance knowledge about the institutional and economic context in Tanzania under which
social enterprises operate and engage in technology localization.
DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS
Data analysis sorted the data using themes of inquiry, variables of categorization (for persons
and organizations, to identify early adopters), categories (such as technology type or model
of diffusion) and spreadsheets (for grouping likert-scale answers).
Two software programs were used for organizing and coding data: one is the
qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo (v.10 for PC) which was used to code data
according to research participants (interviewees and organizations) and according to themes
(See Table 5). This process included importing all the interviews and other documents
collected from or about the participant organizations into one Nvivo file, organizing the data
7 This directorate has since been transferred to the Ministry of Education by the new government.
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into units of reference (organizations and persons) and reading and marking codes according
to themes as the researcher continued reading the data. See appendices I and II.
The other program is MS Excel, which was used to organize a database of
interviewees, assign codes to individual research participants, organize answers to likert-
scale questions from the interviews, and keep track of criteria of cases. See appendices III
and IV.
Table 5 Data Analysis Framework (from Nvivo Software)


















Nvivo software allowed assignment of nodes to each unit (interviewee or participant
organization). Variables were also added to each node. For example, each interviewee had a
role pertaining to their associated organization, gender and location. Some of them had an
added variable or ‘feature’ which was distinct in some way (for example, an early adopter
with a unique story, or a social entrepreneur who has been working in technology
localization efforts for over two decades). As for organizations, their variables consisted of
type (i.e. registered as NGO or private business), sector of work (i.e. types of technology it
diffuses) and orientation (i.e. any unique organizational structure). Using the same software,
the researcher entered the themes of inquiry as nodes (last column in Table 5). While
scanning the data the researcher was able to code any passage of any document to the node or
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nodes that related to it. After scanning all the documents, the researcher could recall any unit,
variable or theme to find all the passages that relate to it from the coded data.
RESEARCH ETHICS
This research received ethics approval from two entities. The first approval was provided by
the Research Ethics Board (REB) of the University of Guelph. The REB considered all issues
and procedures of consent, confidentiality, privacy, risk of participation, etc. as per
information presented by the research team (which includes the student researcher and his
thesis advisor as principal investigator). The REB determined that the methods of data
collection and pursued content pose low risks to participants and are sufficiently mitigated by
the safeguards of confidentiality in the research. Also, as a requirement from the REB, the
researcher completed training in the Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct
for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2).
The second approval was provided by the Tanzania Commission for Science and
Technology (COSTECH), the entity responsible for ethics review for research conducted by
foreign researchers in Tanzania.
The field study observed, with official guidelines and the best of intent, the principles
of informed consent, confidentiality of research participants (to parameters agreed with
them), and respect for local laws and customs in international field research.
DATA COLLECTION SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
Overall, the design and implementation of the field study was satisfactory. The field study
was able to extract patterns that responded to the research question and sub-questions, as will
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be demonstrated in the next chapter. Nonetheless, data collection had some notable successes
and challenges.
Successes
The recruitment and consent process proved to be robust. Most interviewees responded with
ease and had a good understanding of what the research was about. Non-English speaking
participants were generally satisfied with the translated information and consent letters, and
each individual participant kept a copy of the information letter and contact info of the
research team and the university’s REB. Additionally, the planned number of interviews was
achieved and surpassed. However, the distribution of interviews among case studies was not
proportionate. Some organizations required more interviews than others, for various reasons
such as size of organization and its operations, number of staff and currently accessible
customers, etc.
The organizations that agreed to participate covered a good variety of business
models and technology products and services. They also covered various regions in
Tanzania. This variety helps in a comparative study and in examining multiple scenarios in
which SEs can act as agents of technology localization in contexts like Tanzania and East
Africa. Additionally, a number of the participant organizations either operated in more than
one country in East Africa or had strong partnerships with similar organizations in Kenya,
Rwanda and Uganda. That also helped to give a fair East African perspective.
The field visits, for field observations, proved to be very educational. The researcher
was able to see both similarities and differences among rural communities in different
regions of Tanzania. The networking that took place to approach many potential participants
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was relatively successful. Persistence with communication and follow-up rendered
satisfactory results.
Problems and challenges
A number of SEs had reservations about participating in the research. Some of them are
relatively ‘big players’ in the field and it would have been beneficial if they had agreed to
participate. Two SEs officially declined to participate in the research, citing commitment to
other researchers or lack of time as reasons for declining. Two other organizations continued
to delay their response to frequent requests and follow-ups until the end of the field research
period. Fortunately, some of the business and diffusion models and the technologies these
enterprises provided were more or less covered in the research by alternative cases.
Scheduling of interviews and field visits was another persistent challenge in the field,
for both circumstantial and human-related reasons. Often after appointments were secured,
after persistent contact and follow-up, events were cancelled due to absenteeism or road
problems (especially for interviews in remote rural communities). Since the interviews were
based on voluntary participation and without any remuneration, a number of potential
participants (individuals) simply refused to participate or did not show-up for appointments.
In a number of cases the researcher travelled for long distances for scheduled appointments
(often with a Swahili interpreter) only to find out that participants left their homes or farms
for other errands without giving prior notice. In such situations, the researcher had to make
do with fewer interviews, look for other possible interviewees, attempt to reschedule, or just
settle for only taking field observation notes.
Objective and contextual circumstances surrounding data collection did not allow for
uniform or equal representation of individual interviewees from each case study (staff or
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clients). For example, while the core staff of any of the cases did not exceed 8 individuals,
they still varied from 8 in one case to only 2 individuals in another. Additionally, not all core
staff were available for interviews, for logistical and geographical reasons. Additionally,
depending on the size of their operations and networks, as well as their age, the cases varied
in the number of their clients and partners as well as their presence in various communities
across Tanzania’s regions. Accessibility was also an issue, since some SEs kept a good
record of contacts of clients – so the researcher could reach them – while others did not.
The interview guidelines were flexible, but were still not inclusive of the various
cases and experiences. In some situations the interview questions were modified to relate to
the context. This variance in interview questions and answers posed a challenge later with the
detailed analysis and comparison of interview answers. Additionally, a significant number of
participants (individuals and small organizations) could not be neatly placed as ‘social
enterprises’ or ‘technology users’ or ‘partners’, but rather were a combination of these
categories and more. For example, the Biogas Construction Enterprises (BCEs) were
business entities created by masons who were trained and certified in building and marketing
biogas digesters by the Tanzania Domestic Biogas Programme (TDBP). These masons were
recipients of a service, but were also technology adopters and users as they were often small-
scale farmers who eventually built subsidized biogas digesters on their own farms.
Additionally the masons who create the BCEs often work in a unique, small cooperative
model (which makes them SEs) and diffuse biogas technologies in their communities. The
same individuals were customers and technology users on one end, and technology diffusers
with an SE model on the other end. The researcher chose to accommodate their case because
it is quite dynamic and important for responding to the research questions. As much as a
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methodological challenge, they were also a good find. That accommodation also posed
further problems in the data analysis, as they did not fit pre-determined categories. It was a
methodological challenge but a good challenge to have nonetheless. This unexpected find
contributed more information and material for thought than it was a challenge—a common
lesson from qualitative field research.
Furthermore, it was not a simple task to secure one translator/interpreter for the entire
research period. A translator/interpreter could not be employed full-time for this research, as
need was occasional and depended on securing interview appointments with some
participants who prefer to do interviews in Swahili or who are not comfortable enough with
English. Moreover, travelling was a challenge as some translators/interpreters were not able
to travel to other regions with the researcher due to their other commitments (such as their
full-time jobs in Arusha or Dar es Salaam). To mitigate, the researcher contracted three
translators/interpreters and oscillated between them for various Swahili interviews and
translation tasks as their schedules permitted. All translators/interpreters signed a pledge of
confidentiality as agreed with the University of Guelph’s REB.
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CHAPTER IV: FIELD STUDY FINDINGS
As iterated in the previous chapter, the field study attempted to find credible answers to
overarching questions about the viability of the social enterprise (SE) approach to
localizing technology in rural communities in Tanzania. This chapter presents the main
findings. First, a description of all the participant organizations and the technologies they
covered will be presented. Then, to respond to the research question, data findings will be
presented responding to the three main sub-questions set out to determine the
effectiveness of SEs in technology localization:
1) Do social enterprises demonstrate involvement in the three activities of
technology localization, which are diffusion, institutional support, and technical
adaptation?
2) Do social enterprises in their diffusion activities demonstrate success in
identifying and engaging what are described in the diffusion literature as early
adopters of innovations? and
3) Do clients and partners of social enterprises give overall favourable accounts of
the technological change that they experienced through the activities of the social
enterprises?
CASES AND TECHNOLOGIES
Below each participant SE case is described. This is followed by a listing of other
organizations who participated in the research as information sources and partners of SEs
but not as cases themselves. Then the groupings of technologies or technology types
promoted by the research participants are described. Table 6 provides a summary of the
SEs that participated as case studies, as well as the other organizations that participated as
informants but not cases.
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The Cases
These are the organizations that agreed to join the research as cases. Each one of them
was offered the option of keeping their organization’s name confidential. None chose that
option. The cases are:
GCS Tanzania Ltd.:
GCS refers to ‘Global Cycle Solutions’. The acronym is becoming more prominent as the
organization is seeking to diversify its profile from the original idea portrayed in the
name (AS10 interview. See Appendix V for codes of interviews).
GCS is a small-to-medium sized private enterprise that was first established and
registered in Tanzania by an American engineering graduate (currently the CEO), after
she worked in the country on a design project for a bicycle-driven small maize-shelling
machine, then teamed up with a local technology innovator and a few young technicians
to start a small production and sales unit for this product and a few others (AS10, AS06
and CS02 interviews). According to the interviews with the management and staff, GCS
self-identifies as a social enterprise.
GCS currently provides a list of products for rural communities: solar PV light
products, energy-efficient cookstoves, and small agro-processing products. According to
the senior staff, in its early years GCS used to sell both its own products and products not
produced by it, but nowadays it almost exclusively sells products made by others and has
discontinued development and sale of its own products. Whether it will return to
producing and selling its own products remains to be seen.
GCS uses direct sales and sales by some conventional retail distributors, as well
as through a nationwide network of local entrepreneurs. This network was innovated and
built by GCS itself. Its team of office and field staff of close to 40 persons are located in
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various parts of Tanzania, but mainly in Arusha and Morogoro. Most staff are Tanzanian
nationals, with a few non-Tanzanian staff and occasional interns and volunteers. The
network of local entrepreneurs that GCS built is called the Rafiki Network, which
consists of local village entrepreneurs who are both customers and distributors for GCS
(As explained in GCS senior staff interviews, as well as DS01 interviewee who was a
part of the early launch of a software to manage the network). GCS also calls the network
a last-mile distribution model (AS10, AS01 and AS20 interviews).
KAKUTE Projects Co. Ltd.:
KAKUTE is a veteran Tanzanian social enterprise with over 20 years of experience and a
record of successful projects with nationwide impacts (KAKUTE’s profile and
registration under Tanzania Company Act, 1995). The name is made up from the first two
letters from each word in ‘Kampuni ya Kusambaza Teknolojia” (Swahili for ‘company
for technology diffusion’). KAKUTE Projects Co. Ltd. (hereafter ‘Kakute’) was
reincorporated in 2002 as a company “limited by guarantee and not having a share
capital” (company’s re-incorporation certificate, United Republic of Tanzania), which
made even officially closer to a social enterprise than it had been, considering that the
Tanzania Company Act does not yet have an official recognition of the social enterprise
status. A limited by guarantee company with no share capital and no charitable status
comes very close to a legal definition of a social enterprise as defined in chapter II.
Kakute’s activities have been characteristic of a social enterprise since inception and
without being aware of the terminology of social enterprise. Only around the time of re-
incorporation did Kakute start to self-identify as a social enterprise (FS01 and FS02
interviews), particularly in communicating with Western partners and potential partners
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who recognize the term and consider it favourably. The activities of Kakute remained
relatively the same after reincorporation.
Kakute facilitates the development and application of innovative approaches to
diversify and improve technology transfer and information to rural communities and
small scale entrepreneurs who seek to introduce new products or to employ new systems
for sustainable development. It was co-founded by an engineer who became a social
entrepreneur, and who is still the managing director. Years before the term ‘social
enterprise’ reached this part of the world, the co-founder of Kakute embarked on
establishing an organization that could possibly be the oldest Tanzanian SE (save
cooperatives). Kakute has executed and completed many projects since inception. Its
main mission is diffusing good technologies in targeted communities to improve various
aspects of livelihood and push for sustainable development (FS01 interview and company
profile). Kakute does that in multiple ways, which include:
 The introduction of new products or services through revenue-generating schemes
(on access to food security, renewable energy, and good land use).
 Providing business development services (BDS) for micro and small enterprises
and for community based organizations (CBOs).
 The incubation of innovative technology-business solutions.
 Partnering with other local and international organizations to deliver technology
solutions to selected beneficiaries.
Biogas Construction Enterprises and the Tanzanian Domestic Biogas Programme
(TDBP):
TDBP is a nationwide initiative, only a few years old, with the aim of creating a viable
commercial sector for biogas technology in Tanzania. TDBP tries to achieve that by
providing training, advocacy, promotion and temporary subsidies for the construction of
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biogas plants of different sizes across the country; particularly plants suitable for rural
households and small farms. Up to September 2015 well over 12,000 biogas digesters
have been constructed in Tanzania under the programme (TS01 and TS02 interviews).
Since initiation in 2009, TDBP has been hosted by the Centre for Agricultural
Mechanization and Rural Technology (CAMARTEC), a public technology intermediary
(PTI). This hosting arrangement is common among other domestic biogas programs in
Africa as they operate under the same umbrella directive (TDBP Programme
Implementation Document for Phase II, 2013). However TDBP oversees its activities and
budget autonomously through a national coordinating team.
According to interviews with members of the national coordinating team (TS01,
TS02, TS03 and TS04) TDBP carries out the diffusion of biogas digesters by providing
training and certification for masons who, after training and testing, can become
independent contractors constructing certified biogas digesters for any client in Tanzania.
These certified masons are responsible for constructing digesters up to standards and
reporting their work in formal ways that guarantee that clients receive good quality
digesters and follow-up when needed. The masons are also often entitled to some subsidy
schemes through TDBP to support their work and reduce the cost on the clients (thus
making more clients interested). Hundreds of certified masons now exist, with many of
them currently earning a substantial part of their income from biogas construction (and
periodical maintenance) (TS01, TSO2).
Masons are also encouraged, through TDBP and implementing partners, to form
Biogas Construction Enterprises (BCEs) which can be registered as private businesses.
The majority of the owners and co-owners of these BCEs are certified masons. Many of
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these BCEs end up operating technically as cooperatives, with masons being both the
workers and owners of the business. At the time of the field study there were 62
registered BCEs in Tanzania, spread across the country, with many of them formed by a
group of certified masons (TS01 interview). The BCEs are groomed by TDBP to be the
initiators of a growing, nationwide commercial sector for biogas in Tanzania. As a
programme, the TDBP is expected to discontinue once there are many mature and
flourishing BCEs and once there is a stable demand for biogas in the country.
Dorgo Agro-Enterprises:
A fairly new Agro-machinery engineering firm, established, owned and managed by an
engineer who also works in a senior engineer at a parastatal institute (at the time of the
field study) and who has a profile of innovative designs that received international
recognition. Dorgo Agro-enterprises (hereafter Dorgo) designs and builds agro-
machineries, provides accessible payment plans for small farmers, and volunteers
engineering consultancies for organizations that work on agricultural development in
Tanzania and East Africa (GS01 interview).
Although quite a small firm, with a small workshop and very few part-time staff,
this enterprise is active in addressing small farmers’ needs in various ways, some of
which are directly revenue-generating and others are indirectly so. Dorgo does not often
self-identify as an SE, but its owner sees that it fulfills the SE general criteria (GS01
interview). Because it operates mainly locally, with local partners and customers, Dorgo
does not find it beneficial to use the ‘social enterprise’ term as it is not quite known or
distinguished in the Swahili and Tanzanian context. The vision and core work of Dorgo is
credited to its owner, who can be described as a Tanzanian social entrepreneur, based on
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his activities that also include volunteering his technical knowledge, without charge, to
improving agricultural technical training in rural communities through preparing manuals
and giving training workshops (GS01 interview).
AISE-Twende (or Twende8):
This organization is a merger of two smaller organizations. One is AISE, which stands
for ‘Accelerating Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship’ (while the pronunciation of the
acronym sounds like a Swahili word, ‘aisee’, an expression of awe). The other one is
Twende, an appropriate technology NGO in Arusha. Both organizations are fairly new
(the older, Twende, was established in 2007) (Twende Constitution, May 2008). Having
technological innovators on both sides (a Tanzanian inventor/technician and a retired
British engineer) and with both interested in designing and building appropriate
technology products for local low-income communities, the two organizations started
collaborating with each other and shared office space and machine workshop for a few
years. In 2014 a main joint-project made them restructure themselves into one unit, which
later became formalized as a permanent merger (interviews CS01, BS01, CS03 and
CS04). AISE-Twende also shares premises and history with GCS, particularly through
the co-founder of both (CS01 interviewee) who is a Tanzanian technology innovator and
educator.
Twende (the merger) acts mainly as an innovation centre which provides space
for local young innovators with appropriate technology ideas. It also provides training
and incubation services. The same organization produces and sells some products, in
8 The name was changed to just ‘Twende’ during the span of the field research. For the rest of this
manuscript, Twende refers to the merger AISE-Twende.
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limited numbers, such as a small drip irrigation kit, a bicycle juice blender, and solar
water heaters.
RafikiSoft:
RafikiSoft started as a team that was assigned with building a software to facilitate the
communication logistics and financial transactions (via ICTs) of the Rafiki Network
(established by GCS), They are now an independent and new SE operating in East Africa
with expansion plans. “RafikiSoft develops enterprise quality and mobile-friendly IT and
data management solutions for companies operating at the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) in
developing markets.” (Jackson 2015). ICT is a major technology sector with many
stakeholders in Africa, as expressed in the introduction of this manuscript. This is the
smallest and youngest enterprise among the cases of this research, established in 2014
and with only two co-founders who are also the company’s only and part-time staff
(DS01 interview). Its niche is unique however: a social enterprise that provides tailored
ICT services for other social enterprises. In that sense it is different from the other cases
in this field study. It is also significantly smaller than any of them. Being a small and new
ICT service it did not need more than two co-founders to operate, with hopes of growing
in the future. This SE was functioning during the time of the field research, but
afterwards we came to know from the participant co-founder (DS01) that it will not likely
continue.9 Yet its example is important to highlight since it is the only ICT-based social
enterprise in this study and it had a customer for over a year while it was in operation;
that customer being GCS, another major case SE for this study.
9 According to a recent brief update from the co-founder of RafikiSoft (DS01), on March 19, 2017, this SE
is currently not active in business. There are yet possibilities of returning to activity in the near future.
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Informant Organizations
These are organizations that agreed to join the research not as case studies, because they
do not fit the criteria for cases, but as information and informed-opinion providers. They
gave the research access to some of their organizational documents, interview time with
their leading staff, and opportunities for observing their work in the field:
 Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO): This is a Tanzanian public
technology intermediary (PTI). It is mandated to create, promote and sustain
innovative entrepreneurial base by providing SMEs with technical services,
training, market intelligence, and business incubation. It reports to the Ministry of
Industry and Trade.
 Centre for Agricultural Mechanization and Rural Technology (CAMARTEC):
This is a Tanzanian PTI, mandated to function as an innovation centre for testing
and building agricultural machinery and rural technology, disseminate improved
technologies for agricultural and rural development, and support small enterprises
that embark on innovating and marketing agricultural or rural technological
products. It reports to the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
 Tanzania Engineering & Manufacturing Design Organization (TEMDO): This is a
Tanzanian PTI, mandated to research, develop and transfer plants and equipment
for commercial manufacturing and deliver competitive engineering manufacturing
knowhow and R&D services to the industrial sector. It reports to the Ministry of
Industry and Trade.
 Science, Technology & Innovation Policy Research Organization (STIPRO): This
is a Tanzanian NGO that carries out policy research on ST&I policies and
decisions, and undertakes capacity building for conducting ST&I policy research.
 MVIWATA: This is a national coordination and capacity-building organization
for farmer associations and cooperatives across Tanzania. As described by its own
promotional material, Mviwata is "a national farmers organization which brings
together small holder farmers from all regions of Tanzania in order to have a
common voice to defend economic, social, cultural and political interests of
smallholder farmers."
 ECHO East Africa Impact Centre: This is an international NGO that focuses on
extension services for small farmers in East Africa. Their services include
technological support, training, provision of seeds, supporting appropriate
technology projects and hosting relevant conventions.
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 SNV Netherlands Development Organization (Tanzania office): This is a large,
veteran non-profit international development organization from the Netherlands
that was established 1965 under the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 Tanzania Renewable Energy Association (TAREA): This is an association of
NGOs and enterprises that work on promoting renewable energy solutions in
Tanzania. A number of the participant organizations in this research are members
of TAREA, such as Kakute, TDBP, and GCS. TAREA invited the researcher to
its Northern Zone AGM, held in Arusha, May 2015.
A representative sample?
The cases that participated in the study represent a fair sample of the social enterprises in
Tanzania that were involved in rural technology localization activities. Thus, what was
learned from them can represent fair generalizations about such organizations in
Tanzania. That was so due to two considerations. First, the researcher surveyed all the
SEs in Tanzania that he came to know about through various sources (e.g., networks of
development actors in Tanzania that responded to the researcher, networks and contacts
of informant organizations, internet search, asking other researchers in Tanzania with
whom the researcher was acquainted, etc.). It was confirmed by the search that the
number of SEs in Tanzania working in technology diffusion activities is limited (close to
30 at the time) and that most of them have offices or headquarters in Arusha.10 Among
those the researcher narrowed down the list of viable candidates (per criteria of selection)
to about 15 or 16 potential participants.11 Two of them declined to participate after the
researcher approached them, 2 could not be reached as all the attempts of the researcher
to get in touch with them were not successful, and 2 agreed to participate only partially
10 Arusha has a large scene of development organizations, international, regional and local. The researcher
already knew of this beforehand and chose to be based in Arusha because of it.
11 The criteria of case selection was described in chapter III. For example, being a social enterprise active in
Tanzania was not enough. They also had to be involved in activities of providing technological products
and services to rural communities.
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by providing general information through interviews with management but not more.
Another one did not give the researcher a definite answer until the fieldwork time was
over. A few others were in distant regions of Tanzania and the size and type of their
operations did not justify the logistics of spending considerable time solely with them.
However, for the SEs that did not participate, the types of technologies they were active
in localizing, and the business models they used, were fairly represented by other
participant cases in the study. The second consideration is that the researcher conducted a
thorough search to learn about the existing social enterprises in Tanzania, their quantity
and sizes of operations. In that search, the researcher consulted organizations with
thorough knowledge about ventures and activities in Tanzania that could fall under the
umbrella of social enterprise. For example, SNV, TAREA and ECHO, all had
considerable knowledge of the active organizations in their areas of work, which covered
a wide range of development activities in Tanzanian rural communities. For example,
SNV was actively seeking out technological innovators and entrepreneurs who provide
unique development services to Tanzanian communities (e.g., youth employment,
renewable energy diffusion, etc.) to support them with capacity building services as well
as funding. Being a large organization with years of experience in Tanzania, the
researcher sought to learn from them about the size and impact of the social enterprise
sector in Tanzania, particularly SEs involved in technology localization activities
(interview XX02). Based on their list of such organizations, the researcher had identified
most of the significant potential cases in Tanzania, and already recruited some of them
for this research. The same story happened between the researcher and CAMARTEC, as
well as TAREA. The researcher also attended a biennial symposium and exhibition held
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by ECHO which summoned innovative organizations in East Africa (3-5 February, 2015,
Arusha) that introduce a myriad of technological products and services. By attending the
symposium, the researcher was exposed to a variety of these actors. Again, several
significant participants in that symposium were already known to the researcher and
some of them had already been recruited for the research. Given these considerations, the
researcher is confident that the full range of SEs working technology localization in rural
Tanzania have been represented in the sample.
Technology Types
Technology types refer to the categories of technologies that are currently being localized
by the case SEs in Tanzania. In the field we observed that the vast majority of
technologies being diffused currently by SEs can be categorized into a limited number of
groups (or types) by their functions. Generally, there were two major technology types:
Sustainable Energy:
This type includes renewable energy technologies and energy-efficient cookstoves. The
renewable energy technologies include solar-charged lanterns, small solar PV panels and
associated household items (mainly chargers for light and phones and radio), biogas
digesters, and locally-made solar water heaters.
GCS, Kakute, BCEs, and Twende, were involved in the diffusion of sustainable
energy technologies (sources: interviews, company documents and brochures, and field
observations). Through various technology diffusion strategies, sustainable energy
appeared to be a technology type of clear interest for SEs. Interviews with clients of
GCS, Kakute and TDBP showed that sustainable energy technologies have clear demand
in most rural communities in Tanzania.
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Tanzania has one of the lowest electrification levels in the world, with only
approximately 36% national electricity access rate (11% in rural areas) (Renewable
Energy in Africa 2015). Moreover, the households connected to the national grid
experience frequent power outages that can sometimes last for days, something which the
researcher witnessed in Arusha in 2015. Since it is evident that overall socioeconomic
development requires comprehensive access to electricity supply, energy is everyone's
concern. Yet with such crisis an opportunity is presented—Tanzania is a candidate for
alternative, decentralized renewable energy supply. The National Energy Policy of 2015
emphasizes that renewable energy will have more support and proliferation in Tanzania.
Many SEs are already heavily involved in the business of providing off-grid renewable
energy supply to rural households and communities.
To see the how technologies diffused by SEs are perceived, the interview guides
contained questions about the perceived attributes of technology products (i.e. relative
advantage, compatibility with context, triability and observability). As Table 4 in chapter
III shows, these questions about the technologies were asked to most interviewees,
including technology users and partners of SEs (See Table 10: Responses of interviewees
about perceived attributes of technologies, Appendix VII). It was found from the
responses that sustainable energy technologies are generally perceived to be relatively
advantageous compared to existing ones (e.g. solar lanterns vs. kerosene lighting, or
biogas stoves vs. charcoal stoves). These technologies were also found to be generally
not very complex to adopt, with generally favourable value-for-money (or benefit-for-
cost) ratios.
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While solar PV (photovoltaic) lanterns and power systems generally received very
positive feedback from users in this field study, the most positively perceived sustainable
technologies by adopters appeared to be biogas digesters (Table 10). Biogas is a simple
technology that recruits the help of anaerobic bacteria, in the absence of oxygen, to break
down organic matter and produce a mixture of gases in the process. Biogas plants (or
digesters) are fed with organic matter (such as animal manure, plant waste, food waste,
and sometimes human waste) and produce biogas and bio-slurry. The biogas is captured
and can be burned for cooking or lightening, or can be pushed further into an electricity
generation process. According to interviews TS01 and TS02, and the TDBP Programme
Implementation Document (2013), there are numerous reasons for biogas technology to
be quite attractive for agricultural communities:
 Economic: production of a highly-wanted thing from an unwanted thing, i.e.
energy from waste
 Environmental: capturing and using greenhouse gases (such as methane) that are
otherwise released into the atmosphere. For some communities, access to biogas
cooking saves many trees from ending as firewood. It has been estimated (TS01)
that one small biogas plant can save 3 tons of fuelwood per year.
 Agricultural productivity: the bio-slurry, which is the second by-product of the
anaerobic digestion process, is quite a good soil nutrient. It can be used in
multiple ways to improve the quality and quantity of produce (TS01, TS02, and
TDBP Implementation Document 2013). Thus it also provides an organic
substitute to chemical fertilizer.
 Health and hygiene: an efficient way of managing otherwise problematic waste
(such as animal excrement) especially in the absence of modern sewage systems.
Also using the biogas for cooking is a much better alternative to charcoal and
firewood cooking which produces unhealthy smoke. It has also been found that
the bio-slurry is quite a good insect repellent (TSU06, TSU07, TSU14, TSU14,
and others).
 Social: the social impact of having access to energy for some off-grid
communities in developing societies can be a quite significant value for them.
Besides the ability of children to study at night, women also are freed from the
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toils of time and effort spent in collecting firewood for cooking, and can now use
that time in various activities that can enhance their livelihoods and more.
While a biogas digester costs much more than the popular solar lantern, most of
the persons who eventually paid for a digester and reaped its benefits reported that they
were satisfied with their initial investment (most of the ‘TU’ interviews); which is
perhaps due to the larger array of benefits from biogas digesters explained above (and
reiterated by interviewee users of biogas and bio-slurry). The digester design that is used
by BCEs is a local design by CAMARTEC engineers, named the fixed dome Modified
CAMARTEC Design (MCD) Model. This design proved to be robust and popular
enough that it was adopted in other countries as well, such as Brazil (according to
interviews TS01 and XX02).
Agro-machinery:
This technology type includes agro-processing, pre- and post-harvest (but mostly post-
harvest) tools and machines. Examples of the products in this type include maize-shelling
machines (mechanized and human-powered), hay balers (manual, non-mechanized),
seeders, grass choppers (mechanized), and rice/sorghum threshers (mechanized and
human-powered). Although there are other agro-machinery technologies that are in
planning to be diffused by some of the case SEs, they were not officially diffused yet,
such as multi-purpose tractors and small combined-harvesters (operated by power tillers)
which were planned by Dorgo.
One of the cases (Dorgo) was exclusively focused on agro-machinery. However,
both GCS and Twende had some small, non-mechanized agro-machinery products that
they have diffused within limited circles (CS01 and BS01 interviews). For example,
Twende had a pilot product of a small drip-irrigation kit, made locally and from simple
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local materials, and already sold some items of this product to a small list of less than 10
users (BS01 interviewee). According to interviewees CS01 and BS03, there are on-going
plans to improve and then mass produce and distribute the drip irrigation kit.
From the few interviews conducted with the adopters of Dorgo’s technology
(GU01 to GU06 interviews), it was found that agro-machinery technologies are generally
perceived to be relatively advantageous compared to existing ones (i.e. compared to
mostly manual techniques). However, these technologies were also found to be more
complex to adopt than sustainable energy ones, since they require a learning curve to
operate efficiently. Additionally, there was no clear consensus among the adopters that
these technologies had good value-for-money ratios; perhaps because their cost was not
generally small and they require a long time to observe financial benefits above the initial
capital investment.
We had fewer interviewees about agro-machinery technologies than those
interviewed about sustainable energy technologies, particularly because most of the SEs
that participated as cases in this field study worked with sustainable energy products (and
fewer agro-machinery products). Only Dorgo focused its work on agro-machinery
technologies.
Other technologies:
There were other technological products and services provided by SEs that may not
necessarily be considered within the two technology types of sustainable energy and
agro-machinery. Kakute, for instance, produces and sells personal care products made
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from jatropha oil. Also, RafikiSoft launched the service of RafikiNet, a software that
belongs to the ICT technology type. RafikiNet is a product to be sold to small-to-medium
companies and SEs that would like to have a communication network with rural agents
and distributors in developing countries. In that sense, RafikiNet’s targeted market are
not rural communities themselves, as technology adopters, but rather businesses that
work with rural communities and rural entrepreneurs. RafikiSoft considers itself a social
enterprise that serves other social enterprises (Jackson 2015 and DS01 interview).
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Technologies diffused Model(s) of diffusion
GCS Tanzania Ltd. 30-40 employees (excluding the Rafiki Network,
which has about 100 active individuals); multiple
regions in Tanzania and Kenya; 3 offices in 3
regions, including inventory container, workshop;
at least 4 vehicles; over 50,000 households served
between 2011 and 2014.
2009 26 Solar Lantern Family Line
(made in USA); Energy-
efficient cookstoves; Maize-






KAKUTE Projects Co. Ltd. ~10 employees (used to be more, about double, a
few years ago); Northern Zone (3 regions); one
main office on relatively big premises well-
maintained, with warehouse and hosting other
companies (incubatees and partners); one vehicle.
1995 29 Solar Lantern Family Line;
Solar PV panel small
systems; jatropha-based

















TDBP has ~25 employees, nationwide program
with multiple offices and vehicles; main office
hosted by CAMARTEC; BCEs are multiple and
nationwide, with each having between 4 to 20
employees and some with small offices; so far over
12,000 biogas digesters constructed all over
Tanzania.
2009 24 Biogas digesters
construction and
maintenance, with gas pipe






Dorgo Agro-Enterprise 3-4 employees; one small office and small
workshop (yet with access to bigger workshops
when needed); technically serves nationwide but
still currently mostly confined to Northern Zone.
~20 products (agro-machinery) sold so far.
2012 9 Agro-machinery products,
variety of mechanized and
manual products.





Twende (or AISE-Twende) 5-10 employees; one office and workshop; one
vehicle; no estimates of sales over years but not
many, as most work is not commercial yet






projects, school classes for
appropriate technology, etc.
Direct sales; training and
coaching provision (paid
for by NGOs instead of
direct users/adopters).
RafikiSoft 2 co-founders (no employees); no office (virtual
office); so far one main customer (GCS Tanzania
Ltd.), few consultancies and prospects
2014 1 ICT: RafikiNet: ERP
(Enterprise Response













SIDO – Small Industries
Development Organization
Very big, nationwide, parastatal organization;
multiple offices, operations, fleet, etc.
1973 1
CAMARTEC – Centre for
Agricultural Mechanization
and Rural Technology
Big nationwide parastatal organization; one main
large HQs with offices and workshops.
1981 6
MVIWATA – a national
farmers’ organization
Big nationwide NGO, with regional offices, serves







Think Tank NGO, ~10 employees, one office,
serves nationwide and abroad.
2008 1
SNV – a Netherlands’
international development
organization












Big nationwide parastatal organization; one main
large HQs with offices and workshops.
1980 1
*Size of organization considers the following (all or some): number of staff; size of operations (e.g. area covered, sales, etc.); size of assets (e.g. offices, vehicles, workshops and big equipment,
etc.). Some numbers are approximations because accurate numbers were not provided or on record.
**for social enterprises, number of interviews includes interviews with staff, technology adopters, and some partners whose interviews mainly revolved around the products and operations of
the respective social enterprise.
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CASES AND LOCALIZATION ACTIVITIES
The first question regarding the effectiveness of social enterprises as agents of technological
change was to determine whether social enterprises demonstrate involvement in the three
activities of technology localization—diffusion, institutional support, and technical adaptation.
Diffusion requires communication about and promotion of new technological innovations.
Institutional support includes policy advocacy, resource mobilization, and logistical assistance
for chosen technologies. Technical adaptation includes incremental, technical modifications to
technologies in ways that add value and increase local utility of the technologies. It was found
that as a group the case SEs were involved in these activities but no case was thoroughly
involved in all three activities.
Diffusion
The cases that were clearly involved in diffusion were GCS, Kakute and TDBP. GCS innovated
a nationwide diffusion network that it called the rafiki network. Rafiki in Swahili means ‘friend’,
and the network is based on a group of independent sales representatives and distributors who
are trained by GCS in handling and marketing their products. Each individual
representative/distributor is called a rafiki. Most of them are both users of GCS merchandize –
mainly the solar PV lanterns, some solar cookstoves, and a few manual maize shellers – as well
as local entrepreneurs who distribute these technologies locally. However, they are also free
agents who made the voluntary choice of partnering with GCS locally because of the potential
they saw for the technology products after trying them as users. There were interviews with 16
rafikis from various parts of Tanzania, and they generally revealed GCS’ comprehensive
approach to diffusing their products (interviews AU01 to AU16, Appendix VI). The diffusion
generally proceeds along the following line: the GCS field officers seek out and recruit rafikis,
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through persuasion, marketing and selection, and then the rafikis use similar diffusion techniques
to market and sell GCS products to their communities. This approach has been called
‘microfrachising’. According to GCS staff (AS01 and AS11) in 2015 the rafikis in the network
were about 120 individuals spread across Tanzania (and a few in Kenya).
The GCS products sold by rafikis are generally the solar-charged lanterns of various sizes
(small, medium, and large) with additional features such as outlets for mobile phone charging –
including USB charging outlets for smart mobile phones – as well as multiple-lantern systems
with a battery that can charge more than one mobile device. Other products include small
energy-efficient cookstoves and a bicycle-attached small maize sheller. One can see that these
products generally target communities with limited or no access to the electric grid, many of
whom also happen to be involved in small-scale farming with mostly manual labour. As
described earlier, rafikis are chosen through a recruitment and screening process. Typically, GCS
field officers make first contacts with the targeted communities by introducing themselves to the
district officers and village councils of those communities, or to community-based organizations
like churches or SACCOs (Small Saving and Credit Cooperatives). After that they secure an
occasion allowing them to introduce themselves to the general membership of the community, as
well as introduce their products and announce their interest in finding local partners in the
community to be rafikis. If the work of marketing the products, the company’s brand, and the
microfranchising idea succeeds, a number of community members will express interest in
becoming rafikis. From that point GCS will collect applications of interested community
members, make a selection of a few, and provide training for the selected individuals on the
products and the sales system after which they may be ready to take initiative and start marketing
and selling the products (AS01, AS03 and AS10 interviews). How the rafikis perform afterwards
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– after selection and training – determines whether they grow to become established rafikis or
eventually fall out of the network, or, in some cases, remain in the network but as casual sales
representatives who are not very active but also make sales from time to time.12
Kakute, on the other hand, engages in diffusing multiple technology products that are not
necessarily their own commodities (i.e. the sales revenues do not go to Kakute directly). For
example, the researcher conducted a number of interviews with technology adopters of solar PV
home systems that belong to another SE, Mobisol, but were diffused by Kakute (interviews
FU01-FU05, and FU09-FU10). The relation is that at the time Kakute incubated this SE and
championed the diffusion of its products to Tanzanian rural and per-urban communities. Kakute
used its knowledge of community needs and networks to diffuse these technologies, as it did in
other projects (interview FS01). Another group of technology users associated with Kakute was a
church group running a small hospital in a rural community in a rural district of Arusha region.
The hospital is run by the local catholic church team, consisting of the parish priest (who is also
the hospital director) and the church nuns, with additional physicians and nurses hired by the
church. The entire hospital premises and equipment were run by a solar PV array with a large
battery system, with the capacity of ~5 Kilowatts. The solar PV system was installed in the
hospital by a German NGO through the active promotion and communication efforts of Kakute.
As the parish priest tells the story (FU08, not verbatim):
My initial contact with Kakute came through my need for energy in the hospital. We had
a small generator and were still developing, so we needed something more…So I wrote a
proposal for TANESCO and REA.13 I was looking for a way and a place to submit the
proposal, so I met director of Kakute (FS01), whom I knew. He introduced me to an
12 The description of the rafiki network here is according to how it functioned up to the conclusion of the field
research activities. The network underwent some changes afterwards, but were not reflected in the data collected
from the field.
13 Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd. (TANESCO), and Rural Energy Agency (REA).
99
engineer from REA, and they both connected me to a German company which then
supplied us with the solar system for the hospital [as a development aid project].
Soon afterwards, Kakute’s director and the parish priest became interested in bringing
solar home systems to the village households, since the village was still off the grid. Kakute
teamed up again with the local church and introduced the community to the home solar PV
systems that are offered by Kakute’s partner and former incubatee, Mobisol. Through Kakute’s
promotion efforts and partnership they eventually succeeded in introducing the solar home
systems to many households – estimated over 200 – in that community and the surrounding
communities in Longido district (FU08).
As for TDBP, its diffusion activities consist of promoting biogas usage nationwide (but
particularly to rural and agricultural communities) (interviews TS01-TS04, and KP05). For that it
conducts a variety of activities (TDBP 2009) that include reaching out to regional governments,
village committees and farmer associations, as well promoting biogas via national media
(particularly radio). They also actively document experiences of biogas users to use as
promotional material (TU01 and TU02). Additionally, TDBP partners with community and faith-
based organizations to promote biogas among their memberships. The interviewees TS03 and
TS04 represented two organizations, one faith-based and the other a local development NGO,
that were partners of TDBP in promoting biogas and recruiting people to be trained as biogas
digester masons.
Additionally, Biogas Construction Enterprises (BCEs) vary in their own diffusion
activities. Each BCE is generally an independent business with its own possibilities. One BCE
from Ngaramtoni (district in Arusha region) consisted of four certified masons who registered a
company as co-owners. They run the company like a small cooperative, as they work on
construction together and share revenues (interviews TSU07, TSU13, and TSU14). TSU07 said
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about this arrangement (not verbatim), “We have a constitution, clear distribution of tasks and
responsibilities. We work together and share the proceedings together…We like working
together in this structure and don't see each other breaking up any time soon.” This BCE has
been in operation since the early patch of certified masons by the TDBP (2009), and has
constructed about 200 biogas digesters up to June 2015. Interviewee TSU07 is also a biogas
technology user himself, as most certified masons are, and has a 6-cubic meter digester at his
house, which the researcher saw in person. By TDBP standards in Tanzania, this BCE is one of
the successful ones with potential for growth, but that does not particularly translate into it being
currently thriving economically. Yet this BCE is generally positive about its future in the biogas
sector, provided that the sector will continue to grow in Tanzania. This BCE’s diffusion style is
through the community network of the masons themselves and the word-of-mouth reputation
they enjoy about their product and work by satisfied customers. On the other hand, a BCE in
Same town, in Kilimanjaro region, has been more serious in promotional and marketing efforts
(interview TSU09), which resulted in them constructing about 432 digesters so far, with larger
sizes (such as the one that belongs to interviewee TU17 who purchased a 13 cubic-meter digester
for her 300-pig farm). This BCE employs more masons (but only some of them are co-owners)
and uses and pays promoters in the nearby villages and towns who get commissions for every
customer they bring. Economically this BCE is stable but still needs to fight to maintain stability,
since it needs to continue constructing and even increase construction rates. It however chose to
register itself as a company limited by guarantee (similar to Kakute), which makes it technically
closer to an SE than a conventional private business (TSU01, TSU10). Another BCE based in
Mwanza, in the Lake Zone, is an outstanding example of aggressive promotion. This BCE
constructed over 450 biogas digesters since 2012, and its manager, interviewee TSU08, is also a
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biogas user at home (9 cubic-meter) and a certified mason. According to TSU08, this BCE is not
a cooperative structure, has few co-owners and about 15 masons employed in total, in addition to
6 mobilizers (i.e. marketing fleet) and an advisor who takes care of strategic planning and
accounting. This BCE extended its marketing approach to the point of producing video
advertisements, putting them in DVDs, and paying local travel bus companies to play them on
their screens while on the road. There are other BCEs that are not yet as active or successful in
diffusing and constructing biogas digesters (such as TSU06 and TSU20, who have their BCE in
the Manyara region, and TSU11-12 who have theirs in Arusha). These BCEs are active from
time to time, and they have registered businesses, but they run other businesses and construction
activities besides biogas construction since they cannot yet rely on revenue coming from biogas
construction alone. However, these masons themselves are examples of users of biogas, most of
them have their own digester at home and they are clearly glad that they have one.
Another case SE, Dorgo, focuses on diffusing their technologies through sales and
partnership projects with agricultural R&D institutes (interview GS01, GSU02). In these projects
Dorgo meets and consults with small-scale farmers about their technological needs and what
Dorgo can offer them in terms of products and training. Some of the work that Dorgo does on
promotion is voluntary (i.e. free of charge) and the other is direct sales or technical
consultancies. Another case SE, Twende, hosts an innovation centre it uses to hold training
workshops on appropriate technology for schoolchildren and young-adult innovators. The
researcher witnessed some of these training workshops that Twende holds for schoolchildren, in
which one of the co-founders (interviewee CS01) introduces them to basic principles of
appropriate technology innovation, demonstrates some examples, and guides them into building
their own projects or thinking of new ideas. Additionally, the researcher witnessed collaboration
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between Twende and ECHO East Africa Impact Center in supporting young technology
innovators who had ideas for developing and building appropriate technology products. Twende
hosts these young innovators and allows them access to its machine workshop while the expert
technicians of Twende coach them on various aspects of their design and fabrication. The
researcher learned that this kind of training and collaboration is part of a multi-year agreement
between the two organizations (interviews CU01, BS01 and BS03).
Institutional Support
Two case SEs were involved in institutional support activities: TDBP and Kakute. These
activities included advocacy, resource mobilization and logistical and training assistance. For
TDBP, its work on institutional support comes with its position as a nationwide initiative that has
a commitment to both the public sector and large international donor agencies. TDBP works with
national and regional governments to furnish an enabling environment for adopting biogas at a
large scale and encouraging Biogas Construction Enterprises (BCEs), which are the social
enterprise component of TDBP. It advocates and disseminates subsidies for BCEs based on their
work, helps them register their businesses, and holds demonstrations and workshops for farmers
and village residents about the benefits of biogas. It also lobbies regional governments to build
pilot projects of biogas digesters in selected villages and public facilities (e.g. schools or
hospitals). Additionally, TDBP works on resource mobilization to support BCEs and train and
certify biogas masons. As described by the national programme coordinator, for carrying out the
construction activities TDBP provides training and certification for masons who, after training
and testing, can become independent contractors who provide the service of constructing
certified biogas digesters for clients. These certified masons are responsible for constructing
digesters up to standards and reporting their work in formal ways to TDBP testing teams (for
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approval of quality) that guarantee clients good quality digesters and follow-up when needed.
The masons are also entitled to some subsidy schemes to support their work and reduce the cost
to the clients (thus making more clients interested). Masons are also encouraged, through TDBP
and implementing partners (such as TS03 and TS04) to form biogas construction enterprises
(BCEs) which can be registered as independent businesses that are in the trade of construction of
biogas digesters. While the ownership (or management membership) of these BCEs is not
necessarily restricted to certified masons, it happens to be the case that the majority of them are
so (thus far) (TS01 interview). Being hands-on implementers, many of these BCEs end up
operating technically as cooperatives, with co-owner masons being both equally the workers and
owners of the business (such as the case of TSU07, TSU13 and TSU14 who together co-own a
BCE). As a result, these BCEs are typically established and run by Tanzanians with technical
certification and training in building and running a viable business. All in all, it is quite evident
that the possibility of creating a viable commercial sector for biogas in Tanzania rests on the
success of BCEs. They are the ultimate fruit of TDBP and it seems that the future of biogas in
Tanzania will be as sustainable as BCEs will be. The small cooperative model of BCEs is a
unique social enterprise experiment. As explained by the national programme coordinator, most
BCE masons start by building their own biogas digester at their home, and so they are intimately
connected to their product (i.e. both users and diffusers of the technology). The subsidy that
TDBP provided BCEs (often per digester constructed) was decreased in 2014, and that decrease
was felt by the BCEs – who mostly operate in rural areas – because, as many of them mentioned
in their interviews, the usual clientele who are small farmers become reluctant to build a biogas
digester in their farm since the capital investment cost is prohibitive for many of them. In an
attempt to rectify, TDBP recently joined a carbon-offsetting scheme, in which European
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businesses pay TDBP as a way to offset their carbon caps (i.e. paying for renewable energy
production). Since TDBP has claim to over 12,000 biogas digesters nationwide (mostly small
ones), through its network of BCEs, it is embarking on collecting data from all these digesters to
account for their total contribution to carbon emissions’ reduction to show credible
documentation of renewable energy produced. It started in 2015 to develop a more detailed
documentation system, and it is currently well on its way (interviews TS01, TS02 and XX02).
The payments received from the businesses paying TDBP for carbon offsets are going to be used
to improve the biogas commercial sector, including the continuation of some subsidies for BCEs
to help them achieve financial viability over time. In other words, TDBP is providing a whole
package of institutional support for BCEs: training assistance, resource mobilization,
organizational development, and international networking.
On the other hand, Kakute has been strongly involved with TAREA to represent the
growing renewable energy actors at the national policy arena. TAREA currently includes
commercial businesses, SEs, NGOs and initiatives that seek to promote a supportive policy and
infrastructure for renewable energy technologies in Tanzania in general. Their work involves
lobbying the government and working with REA (Rural Energy Agency) to support and promote
renewable energy solutions and foster a larger commercial sector for them, as a method of
bringing energy to many parts of Tanzania (FS01 interview). The researcher witnessed
TAREA’s annual general meeting for the Northern Zone (Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Manyara
regions) for 2015. Kakute hosted the office of TAREA in the Northern Zone, and the executive
director of Kakute held the chair of the Northern Zone (i.e. regional representative and chair of
Northern Zone general meetings). Additionally, Kakute performs other services for the
renewable energy commercial sector, particularly in market intelligence and logistical solutions.
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The researcher attended two workshops, one in Arusha city and one in the village of Terrat,
Arusha, in which Kakute attended and presented as a renewable energy market intelligence
expert in Tanzania. During the time of the field study Kakute was also active in training a
number of certified biogas masons, in collaboration with TDBP, to coach them on establishing
and maintaining their own BCEs, and was running a renewable energy market intelligence
survey in the Northern Zone of Tanzania on contract with SNV and TAREA. So, Kakute’s
institutional support activities include advocacy, training assistance, and resource mobilization.
Overall, across the cases of this field study, all institutional support activities were
present: advocacy, resource mobilization, and logistical and training assistance.
Technical Adaptation
Dorgo, GCS, Twende, Kakute and RafikiSoft demonstrated technical adaptation activities in
their histories. Twende, for instance, works mostly with designing and building appropriate
technology solutions to local challenges. Some involve adapting an idea of a machine or product
and simplifying it for local affordability and utility. For example, a simple drip-irrigation kit, a
small solar water heater, and bicycle-attached tools that use the pedalling mechanism, such as
juice blenders.
GCS, on the other hand, was more involved in technical adaptation in its earlier years
than it is now (AS10, AS20, AS06). In the beginning it used to produce and promote simple
maize shellers and bicycle-mounted maize shellers, which were GCS’ own design. The bicycle-
mounted maize shelter made a good name for GCS for a while, but when the researcher was in
the field GCS decided to discontinue selling the product, with the explanation that it was
working on improving its quality so that they may introduce a better version in the future. No
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specific numbers were given but a rough estimate of 200-300 of the these maize shellers were
sold before discontinuation (AS20, AS01).
As for RafikiSoft, its flagship product was an ICT program and phone application that
aids the rafiki network. This ICT product was modified to suit what a network of distributors in a
developing country would need (DS01 interview).
Kakute received national awards in the late 1990s for its work on innovating and
diffusing a number of agricultural technologies, including building a personal care products’
industry from jatropha seeds (Kakute Ltd. 2007). Jatropha is a plant that is abundant in Tanzania,
and Kakute was a leader in using it for making oils and shower soaps as well as generating
biofuel from it (FS01 interview). Kakute’s approach, as was explained to the researcher, was to
help build a local supply chain for an industry that supports local farmers and manufacturers
together, while also creating a local and regional market for natural personal care products. Later
on, Kakute supported its former incubatee, Mobisol, to adapt solar home systems to make
products suitable and affordable for Tanzanian households in rural and peri-urban areas. Such
products included a system package that consists of a solar panel, balance-of-system components
of a photovoltaic panel (wiring, switches, and a mounting system), a battery and power charger
for household items. Additional optional items offered include LED light bulbs, portable lantern,
and mobile phone charger. Kakute designed and co-conducted extensive field research to engage
local communities in the technical adaptation process. Kakute’s leadership explained to the
researcher that they were confident that without community participation in the technical
adaptation, the solar systems would not have been the success they have become (interview
GS01, and field conversations with Kakute’s leadership and clients).
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By far, Dorgo seemed to be the most serious case of technical adaptation. Founded and
headed by an agricultural engineer who has a talent for design, Dorgo started as a company that
sells its own designs of agro-machinery products, modified to suit local Tanzanian conditions.
Overall, Dorgo produced a variety of agricultural machines (GS01): 5 multi-crop and multi-
operation machine (operated by a power tiller), a tractor-operated maize sheller, 3 forage
choppers, 4 ‘mini maize shellers’ (motorized with small engines), and 7 Cinva-ram Machines
(soil cement block-making machines). Dorgo’s power-tiller operated multi-crop processor
(POMP) machine received an international award for innovation for development (GS01, GS02).
It uses power from an imported power-tiller machine (powered by a generator) to make an
attachment machine that uses the same generator, and the mobility of the power-tiller, to perform
other functions, such as cutting grass and shelling and threshing crops (maize, rice, sorghum,
etc.). The design was robust and efficient for smallholder farmers.
Additionally, Dorgo engages in innovation projects to improve and disseminate some
traditional technologies and best practices in agriculture and agro-processing learned from
various local communities. For example, Dorgo was involved in fabricating and modifying 45
low-land weeders, 10 oil-press machines, and doing some repair works for customers (GS01).
Other projects combine improved local tools and modern techniques. As the head of Dorgo
explained to the researcher, his knowledge and experience as a Tanzanian agricultural engineer
allowed him to recognize how some existing local tools and techniques in agriculture are worthy
of support and transfer from one region to another, or one community to another, as well as
improving upon them instead of seeking to replace them with new machinery.
As for TDBP and the BCEs, and as explained earlier, their entire business was based on a
biogas digester design that was modified locally, by CAMARTEC engineers, to suit Tanzanian
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conditions. They developed a simple-yet-efficient design that requires no more than local
building materials and a clear blueprint.
So, overall, the cases demonstrated involvement in the variety of technology localization
activities: diffusion, institutional support, and technical adaptation.
ENGAGING EARLY ADOPTERS
The second question relating to the effectiveness of social enterprises as change agents asks
whether in their diffusion activities, social enterprises demonstrate success in identifying and
engaging individuals with the characteristics of early adopters of innovations. A set of questions
in the interview guidelines served to capture this aspect. The clients of the SEs were asked how
early and how in relation to the rest of their community or area, they adopted the technology in
question.  They were also asked if they held leadership or influential roles in their communities,
and how they use those roles. Finally they were asked about their general experience with using
the product and communicating its value to other community members, as well as their relation
with the SE that diffused the technology and how they value that relation.
As discussed in chapter III, the literature on diffusion of innovations suggests that early
adopters often happen to be persons of leadership in their community. Using their influence and
communication networks in their communities, they introduce others to the technology(ies) they
adopted, and persuaded some of them to adopt. Their levels of income are such that they were
viewed as economically successful but not exceptionally wealthy in the eyes of the community.
They also have sufficient resources to try new products or services beyond the basic necessities
for the average household of the community. They could afford to take the risk of adopting a
new technology with uncertain returns. Finally, they often – but not always – did not only adopt
one form of technology that was uncommon in their community, but more than one (Rogers
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2003; Ram & Jung 1994; Daberkow et al. 1998). The field data collected used these criteria to
identify SE clients who relatively demonstrated such qualities, then reviewed how the SEs
approached them and, then, what role they played in the diffusion process after they adopted the
technologies.
Among all the staff of the SEs in this field study, only three individuals knew about the
category of early adopters from Rogers’ work. Two were GCS staff (AS10 and AS20). One of
them, AS10, was cognizant of Rogers’ work on diffusion of innovations, and the other learned
about early adopters from the researcher in 2013, when the researcher was in Arusha for non-
academic work. Similarly, the lead staff of Rafikisoft, DS01, was also relatively aware of
Rogers’ work and heard about early adopters from the researcher back in 2013. It might be
reasonable to speculate that the AS10 lead staff of GCS may have benefited from Rogers’
framework in the formulation of the rafiki network recruitment strategy; however she herself did
not mention Roger’s framework when interviewed. Therefore, generally speaking, the case SEs
did not have a particular strategy that overtly specified targeting ‘early adopters’. Their diffusion
models were not designed literally that way. That however did not mean that they were not
effective in engaging early adopters in reality. The field data indicated that notable clients of SEs
who were among the first adopters of their products and services also demonstrated qualities of
early adopters described in the diffusion literature. For example, they held positions of
community leadership, i.e. played a leading role in village council, farmers’ association, women
association, church or mosque, commerce, etc. Additionally, a number of adopters that were
interviewed initially for their adoption of agro-processing machinery turned out to be also early
adopters of biogas digesters and solar PV energy home systems, or vice-versa (such as GU02,
TSU11, GU05, AU06 and FU08). Additionally, a number of such interviewees told us about
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their future plans of adopting or improving more technologies – not necessarily provided by the
case SEs – that aid their livelihoods (such GU02, GU05, and AU06).
As shown earlier, GCS has a routine approach to introducing themselves and their
products to new communities and recruiting potential rafikis: they speak to the leadership of
communities first. GCS approaches each new community by either speaking to the village
council or chairman first, or introducing themselves to the leaderships of established community
associations (e.g. SACCOs, farmers’ associations, etc.). In such communities some of those same
leaders become interested not only in being among the first to try the new technologies offered
by GCS, but also in taking the route of training and commissioning to become a rafiki. Given the
criteria of early adopters, it is likely that there exist early adopters among such individuals from
communities. Some of the clients who were interviewed fit the description (such as AU03 and
AU06). For example, AU03 is a lady who is a rafiki with GCS. She joined the rafiki network
when she was nominated by her local SACCO (Small Saving and Credit Cooperative) in
Ngaramtoni, Arusha, where she was a leading member. She was among the first in her
community to adopt the products of GCS and she also sold them by demonstrating their use to
her neighbours in her own household. Within a year she was influential enough to make many
members of her community adopt the new technology (solar lanterns). Another examples is
AU11, a lady who resides in the Morogoro region who joined the GCS microfranchising network
(as a rafiki) after she herself adopted the solar lantern products for her home. She is also
schoolteacher and businessperson. She used her own network (i.e. school teachers and parents) to
promote the products.
Most technology users explained that the way they heard about GCS for the first time
was through either their own village chairman calling a meeting or through some of their
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community organizations such as women or village SACCOs spread all over Tanzania. For
example, interviewee AU03 heard about GCS for the first time when she was invited by her local
SACCO in a village near Arusha town, in which a field officer from GCS introduced the
company and its products, with some demonstration of the agility and multiple uses of the solar
lanterns (the researcher has attended some of these introductions). The field officer would
explain the benefits of the product as well as the financial returns (such as the payback from
paying monthly for kerosene lamps while a 3-month payment for a solar lantern will last for
more than a year of a good and portable product to provide light). Interviewee AU03 also said
that the field officer explained to the audience that the company is looking for local partners as
rafikis who will be given training and advances to sell the products to their neighbours and
communities. She became interested in the product itself and saw the potential of selling it to her
neighbours. She bought one of the solar lanterns, and over time ended up buying several of them
(all functioning at the same time), and she also became one of the rafikis with good sales. Others,
such as AU06, said that he was introduced to GCS products and the rafiki network in a similar
way but through a village meeting – i.e. by GCS holding a village meeting in coordination with
the village chairman or council. Others, such as interviewee AU04 said she was introduced to the
solar lantern product directly through a door-to-door field visit by GCS staff. In these visits –
which used to be more frequent in the earlier period of 2013 – GCS staff spend time with smaller
groups in communities to simply introduce the products, their benefits, the warranties and the
installment payment possibilities. AU04 said she liked the product, purchased one, and after
some time she became interested in becoming a rafiki herself.
Kakute uses a similar approach to GCS, with regards to introducing themselves first to
the community leaderships, such as the village councils and district governments. But Kakute
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has been diffusing technologies for a longer time and the leadership of Kakute have a larger
network of acquaintances and friends in communities, district governments, village councils and
community organizations. In that sense one can say that Kakute’s social capital is larger, and it
uses it often to promote technologies effectively. Not surprisingly, some of Kakute’s clients who
were interviewed also displayed characteristics of early adopters (such as FU01, FU03 and
FU04) as well as one case of an influential innovator (FU08). For example, FU08 is a catholic
priest that the researcher met in a completely off-grid community, located within the borders of a
national park. He successfully partnered with Kakute and mobilized his church community, and
the surrounding community, to do as he did and adopt solar PV home systems with rent-to-own
payment schemes. Also, and more as an innovator than an early adopter, he also succeeded in
securing support and funds to supply a small solar PV array system to provide energy to a local
health centre, which later grew into a small hospital, administered by the church. This priest is a
highly educated person (with doctorate of philosophy from a western university) whose work
revolves around rural communities in which he lives for years at a time and builds communities
of faith.
As for Dorgo, it currently has very little communication and marketing activities, which
can explain why most of the Dorgo clients we interviewed (4 out of 6) are highly educated
individuals with agricultural expertise. Among Dorgo’s few clients there appeared to be at least
two outstanding early adopters (who also exhibited characteristics of innovators to some degree,
as they were also outstandingly passionate about various innovations, even ones that the rest of
their communities never experimented with): GU02 and GU05. However one cannot say that
Dorgo identified and engaged them, but rather they approached Dorgo with clear demands. For
example, GU02 is a retired veterinary doctor, who also used to be a senior official at the
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agricultural department of one district in Kilimanjaro, was interviewed as one of the technology
adopters of agro-machinery products from Dorgo. We discovered that he was also an early
adopter of many new technologies to his community, and has been actively influencing others to
adopt them, such as biogas digesters and solar energy systems. Additionally, as innovator, he
was the first in his community to adopt modern, simple horticultural technologies that he learned
from Israeli agricultural and water management innovations.
As for Twende and Rafikisoft, they did not appear appropriate for this line of inquiry –
the aspect of identifying and engaging early adopters. Twende did not yet have an established list
of adopters of its technologies, as explained earlier, and Rafikisoft had no more than two clients,
one of which is GCS itself.
Some of the BCEs are quite active in marketing and promoting biogas digesters, with
degrees of success. However most of the initial work of promotion and education about biogas in
most communities around Tanzania is carried out by the TDBP, which in turn identifies the first
clients. As for TDBP and how it approaches biogas diffusion, the national programme
coordinator gave an elaborate description in his interview (TS01):14 They use awareness
campaigns (flyers, live demonstrations, PowerPoint demonstrations, gatherings, TV and radio,
etc.). They make announcements that we are now a team of biogas technicians coming to the
village to introduce the technology. They also arrange to build a demonstration plant with one of
the innovative farmers (identified by the local leadership). Once the plant is ready, they use it to
demonstrate to others the usefulness of the plant. They share the cost with the farmer (we share
about 1/3rd of the total cost of the digester). The innovative farmer himself/herself has to be
14 As explained in the methodology chapter, there were virtually very few and short direct quotes from the
interviews, since they were not recorded in audio or video but written down by the researcher during interviews.
This method of interview was deemed safer for the participants to avoid the risk of existing records of them
speaking directly about their supervisors or community leaders.
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willing to invest in this. He/she is given a bill of quantity and once he gets them and the pit is
dug by him, a technical building team comes and constructs the plant. Then the farmer is trained
on how to manage it and is monitored and supported. Once the plant starts producing, TDBP
calls on other farmers to come and see for themselves…. [As for the biogas mason] he/she goes
through a certification process, in which after he is trained he must build his own biogas plant (in
his/her home, but if he/she does not have cows it can build for a neighbour for example). After it
is finished the technical team comes and assesses—if it is well done it is certified, and then the
mason is required to build another biogas plant for surety (usually built for a politician in the
region or something). Once that second plant is built and assessed, and passes the certification,
the mason himself becomes a certified biogas mason. This way TDBP and the certified mason
are quite sure of his/her abilities to construct plants. These are usually masons by skill, so TDBP
upgrades their skills for biogas plants. The mason then becomes a running business and can
make money by constructing plants for others and having them certified by TDBP. Still the
technical team of TDBP checks the quality of all plants. All plants in the country are assessed by
the program's technical unit and accounted for, so every single plant is known and TDBP has a
GPS map for them.
It seems that, without naming them ‘early adopters’ or ‘innovators’ per Rogers’
terminology, TDBP is seeking to attract innovators and early adopters in communities and
nationwide. Some of the interviewed BCE co-owners fit the signs of early adopters, such as
TSU08 and TSU11. For example, TSU11 is a certified biogas mason who co-founded a BCE in
Mwanza. After joining the biogas mason certification program, and constructing his own biogas
digester at home, he co-founded a biogas business with another certified mason and then widely
promoted biogas technology and completed the construction of over 450 digesters in 3 years. In
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his promotion of biogas he used video advertisements produced by his BCE. His company
diversified its activities in promoting other emerging technologies, such as water harvesting
systems, and remained financially profitable.
Not all the early adopter characteristics were found in each adopter, but a sufficient
combination of them, when applicable to individuals, were found among the adopters
interviewed. It was found that communities covered by this field study (see Appendix V) in
which many demonstrated common characteristics of early adopters, had rates of adoption that
were considered relatively high by both the community and the SE staff. Particularly, if the early
adopters themselves were satisfied with the product and with the SE in question, they reported
that they persuaded a large number of other community members to adopt it. Those were
communities such as Longido district (Arusha), Ngaramtoni (Arusha) and Turiani (Morogoro),
in which technologies of solar power home systems and solar lanterns were introduced by
Kakute and GCS.
Early adopters in many communities played an important role in the diffusion process.
Some of them were targeted and recruited early by the SEs. Others became interested and
involved due to peculiar circumstances, such as hearing about the new products and services and
seeking to try them (such as GU03 and GU05 with Dorgo and FU08 with Kakute), or being
introduced to the social enterprise and their products or services due to their official title (such as
being the village chairman, district officer, known merchant or farmer in the area, etc., such as
FU01 and AU12).
In summary to this section: according to the sample of SE clients we interviewed, a
number of people with the characteristics of early adopters were engaged in the diffusion process
at earlier stages, in most of the case SEs (GCS, Kakute, TDBP and Dorgo). They have shown to
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be influential in increasing the rate of adoption in their respective communities. However, it was
not generally clear whether the case SEs actually consciously targeted early adopters and
recruited them based on an intentional strategy of identifying and engaging early adopters.
The data from this study demonstrates that SEs do engage early adopters but it is not
clear that they do so consciously – i.e. by intentionally targeting such individuals. If we apply
Rogers’ terminology rigidly, it will be difficult to say that any of the case SEs had an intentional
strategy engaging early adopters. However, we can see from the data demonstrated earlier, that
SEs have learned over time that certain community members are potential assets to their teams.
They are more likely to adopt the technologies earlier than the rest, and some of them are quite
influential in their communities if they are persuaded to adopt and become satisfied with the
experience. The SEs of GCS and Kakute, as well as some BCEs and the TDBP itself, have
shown that they think in such ways and that such approaches bring some favourable results to
them.
SATISFACTION OF RESPONDENTS WITH THEIR TECHNOLOGY
The third question related to the effectiveness of social enterprises as change agents asks whether
clients and partners of social enterprises give overall favourable accounts of the technological
change that they experienced.
Out of the 108 interviews, the majority were asked to respond to likert-scale questions
(besides other qualitative elaborations) about their experience with the technologies they adopted
or promoted. Seventy-seven of the total number of interviewees responded to those questions.
Table 7 shows a summary of their responses (with more details in appendix VII). The questions
examined perceived qualities of the new technological products and services, namely: their
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relative advantage (compared to locally existing alternatives), compatibility with existing values
and practices, simplicity and ease of use, trialability and observable results (Rogers 2003).




Relative advantage 73 (out of 77 responses) 3 1
Compatibility (~)** 70 (out of 77) 3 4
Simplicity 66 (out of 77) 7 4
Trialability 55 (out of 77) 11 11
Observability Majority observed benefits of technologies within a few
months. Few observed benefits over years or immediately.
*Measures of satisfaction are elaborated in appendix VII.
**estimated average of 3 questions. See appendix VII.
Interviewees, especially the clients and partners of SEs, were asked about their relative
satisfaction with the technologies and the way they are diffused in their communities through the
efforts of the social enterprises. As a second measure the researcher made an independent
assessment of the general economic and marketing performance of the case SEs. In the
interviews technology users were asked questions about the performance of the SEs particularly
regarding how they introduce the technology and engage the target communities to spread the
product. The questions generally were the following (with variations): “how did you first hear
about the social enterprise and its products/services?”, “can you describe the marketing approach
of the social enterprise, as you understand it?” and “from your perspective, recount the
advantages and disadvantages of the communication and marketing approach of the social
enterprise.”
One fundamental factor that is essential to the success of the diffusion effort is the
technology itself. If the technology product or service itself does not prove to be effective, in
good quality and meeting serious demands in the community, it is highly unlikely to be adopted.
In the interviews with adopters, some of them had unsatisfactory experiences with some products
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or services (not necessarily those of the case SEs), and they communicated their dissatisfaction
to other members in their communities. For example, in interviews with GCS clients and rafikis
in the Morogoro region, they spoke about another brand of solar lantern that was already in the
market before GCS opened its Morogoro branch (especially AU11 interview). Apparently, those
lanterns were of lower quality, durability and warranty than the ones GCS provided, so users
were not generally satisfied with them. When GCS lanterns were diffused in Morogoro initially,
people were suspicious, but the demonstrated quality, and the warranty guarantee, eventually
persuaded many. However, the competitor lanterns are lower in price than the ones marketed by
GCS, so some people still buy them because of affordability (AU11 interview).
The responses of the technology users who were interviewed though GCS – AU01 to
AU16, (see Appendix VI) – were generally consistent. Their peculiar status as rafikis should be
considered however, as they did not necessarily speak only as users of technology but also as
business partners of GCS. That role may make them partial in some ways, as they have vested
interest in the good reputation of the technology products. The users of the GCS products
generally agreed that the diffusion efforts of GCS had good results, and that generally due to
GCS the community now knows about the products and many have adopted them, especially
those who could afford them (as for some community members they were still unaffordable).
However, there was a consistent criticism by most of the users interviewed – AU01 to AU16 –
regarding the price of the products, particularly the solar lanterns, and the pace of GCS logistical
operations. They said that the prices of the products are still unaffordable to many members of
their communities, and they also said that GCS field officers take a long time to respond to their
demands for more products to sell or to receive and fix some recalls as per the warranty. From
their side, GCS staff explain that running a fast-response logistical operation is very difficult,
119
particularly with the limited resources they have (e.g. limited car fleet and field officers with vast
distances and difficult terrains to cover). Nonetheless, when asked to rate the impact of GCS in
their community as far as introducing a technology with perceived advantages, the respondents
were generally quite positive. They were satisfied with most products (especially the solar
lanterns) and confident that they will remain popular in their communities.
There were some criticisms among the adopters about the performance of GCS. Some
early adopters reportedly pulled back support for the products or services or the diffusion efforts.
This study could not make contact with those former clients because their connection with GCS
was severed and the researcher did not know how to locate and contact them, but they were
generally acknowledged by the GCS staff. Some active clients of GCS also have some
grievances that they openly shared with GCS and the researcher. Interviewees AU11, AU13 and
AU16 summarized the essential criticisms of many rafikis. They contended that rafiki
commissions are generally low and discouraging, especially that the sales are also relatively low
in volume. The low rate of sales for each rafiki is sometimes due to the policy of GCS of having
multiple rafikis per community, or in close proximity to each other, which may help the
proliferation of GCS products in such communities but also makes rafikis compete with each
other and have a smaller potential market. Additionally, the interviewees addressed some
problems with product replacement costs. When a customer calls a rafiki to report a defective
product, the rafiki is expected to get that product and exchange it or fix it with GCS, according to
the warranty, then return it to the customer. The rafiki bears the cost of following up with that
customer, getting the product, taking it back and bringing a replacement, but without any change
to their commission of sale (per product). There is a cost of time and money spent in this process
that is born by the rafiki alone, which is seen as unfair by many rafikis. The inability of the SE to
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follow up on complaints promptly, due to shortage of resources, eventually renders dissatisfied
clients, and those speak to their neighbours. There were also complaints about products such as
the bicycle maize shellers that led to a general discontinuation of sales until the recurrent
technical problems are fixed. There were also complaints about the functioning of a solar
lighting system (4 lights and phone chargers, one solar PV panel). Some users complained that
their systems after being fully charged sometimes operate for far less hours than advertised.
Also, a new version of a popular solar lantern received multiple complaints about energy
inefficiency.
The technology users who were associated with Kakute varied in their responses because
their experience with Kakute was not as uniform (FU01 to FU10 interviews). The users of
Kakute were not all direct recipients of technology products or services from Kakute, since
Kakute’s profile, unlike GCS’ or Dorgo’s profile, is not dominated by direct sales of products to
communities (as explained above). Therefore, the users of technology associated with Kakute
who were interviewed were a combination of direct beneficiaries of a renewable energy project
of Kakute and members of communities where Kakute conducted promotional work for the
products of one of its incubatees. Despite the variety of users associated with Kakute it is the SE
that received the highest collective praise from technology users. The researcher met 15 of those
technology users in the first group (FU06-FU08, and FU09 and FU10 as group interviews). In
their interviews, the first group of adopters described how they were hesitant about trying solar
home systems, but with the persuasion of Kakute and the church they decided to try them.
Currently they say that they look back to their lives before solar power and they see big
differences. Some of the benefits they mentioned were (FU09): a) Some house-shops can remain
open after sunset for more hours, and that helped improve their businesses; b) School kids have
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more time to do their homework in the evenings; and c) Since this area is close to a national
park, they used to have problems with animals, such as elephants and hyenas, crossing their
communities, especially at night, which was obviously a problem. Solar lights in households at
night reduced these occurrences.
The second groups of Kakute clients (FU01 to FU05), who were from another district
closer to Arusha town, expressed a particular appreciation for the sensitization work that Kakute
did in their community to introduce the solar home systems. Kakute’s approach in this
community was to approach the village council and chairman, persuade them with the potential
benefits of solar energy, and convince them to hold a village meeting in which Kakute’s director
spoke directly to the community members about the product and the rent-to-own scheme.
Eventually, the village chairman was among the first to adopt the system in his own house (FU01
interview), and he continued to be appreciative of the work Kakute did in diffusing the new solar
power technology in his community long after Kakute was no longer active there. Overall it was
easy to conclude that Kakute enjoys a solid reputation among its clients and partners. However
the one thing that a number of its clients pointed out (particularly FU01, FU05 and FU08) was
that Kakute is under-funded and its own resources are quite limited, which affects their capacity
for delivering higher quality services.
The researcher did not have sufficient access to the technology users and clients of either
Twende or Rafikisoft, to know their assessment of the technologies and the performance of the
SE. The reasons for that are that Twende was not yet active in selling or diffusing products or
services to communities (as it dealt more with training and innovation support during the time of
the field study), while Rafikisoft only had one accessible client, GCS, which could only provide
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a one-client perspective (however, GCS has been intimately involved in this ICT product since it
was originally designed for its rafiki network).
The last SE for which the researcher was able to speak to a representative sample of
clients was Dorgo. Dorgo is one of two smaller SEs (the other is Rafikisoft) but it is significantly
productive, and it also focuses on agro-machinery technologies (while the others mostly focus on
sustainable energy or appropriate technologies). Six clients of Dorgo, located within the two
regions of Arusha and Kilimanjaro, were interviewed (interviews GU01 to GU06). All of them
were quite comfortable in saying that the technologies they used from Dorgo are of good quality
and even comparing them favourably to machines imported from China, India or Brazil. Four of
Dorgo’s clients were agricultural experts: an engineer with an agricultural institute (GU01), a
retired veterinary doctor and head of agricultural department in his district (GU02), an
emeritus professor of Agricultural science (GU06), and a manager/trainer in forestry at another
university (GU05). Each one of these Dorgo clients knows agricultural technology well, besides
having qualities of early adopters or innovators, hence their feedback carries more weight than
the ‘regular’ clients. Almost all four clients agreed on three things: that the quality of Dorgo
products is praise-worthy (albeit there’s room sometimes for improvement or modification); that
the prices of its products are generally not accessible to the average farmer household (unless
with alternative payment methods or with sharing schemes among multiple farmers); and that
Dorgo’s clear weak points, that require immediate attention, are its communication and
marketing. They even requested the researcher to relay to Dorgo that they could do much better
if they improve their communication with clients and potential clients (starting from being more
prompt in responding to clients) and implement a marketing technique. All four clients said that
the way they heard about Dorgo was through coincidental conversations with friends or
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colleagues who happened to know about the business activities and engineering skills of Dorgo’s
manager. Dorgo itself responded to these concerns (as the researcher relayed them) by assuring
that they are planning to have communication and marketing that is more proper in the near
future as the company becomes more stable. However, it is worth noting that in another example
(interview GU03) Dorgo took the initiative to lend one of its machines to a rural community
association so that its multiple members can use the machine on their small farms, in hopes that
they will give feedback to Dorgo later or become interested in collectively purchasing the
machine.
Overall, although the sample is not robust or conclusive for descriptive statistics, a trend
can be reasonably assumed that clients of the case SEs had generally positive feedback about
their experiences with the technological change brought by the SEs. Their satisfaction was not
complete, but they were more satisfied than dissatisfied. They suggested ways of making their
experiences better but had no regrets about the experiences.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
Table 8 summarizes the results of this research regarding the three sub-questions assessing the
relative effectiveness of the case studies in technology localization. As indicated, activities of
technology localization seem to be evident among the cases in general, but without each one
being active on all localization activities equally. With regards to engaging early adopters, a
visible number of the cases demonstrated that they have early adopters among their clients. As
for satisfaction of clients with the technological change experience, the results are favourable in
general.
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GCS a b b a a
Kakute a a a a a
TDBP (& BCEs) a a b a a
Dorgo b ••• a b a
Twende ••• n/a a ••• b
Rafikisoft b n/a a ••• •••
Legend: a = active involvement; b = somewhat involved; n/a = not applicable; ••• = indistinct/inconclusive info.
Tanzania has a vibrant scene of emerging social enterprises as agents of technology
localization, with relative successes and setbacks but a persistent presence. Interviews with
adopters of new technologies provided by the case SEs revealed variations and similarities in
their stories in terms of how they adopted the technologies.
Two main technology types are the focus of the case SEs in their technology localization
activities in rural Tanzania: sustainable energy technologies and agro-machinery. Sustainable
energy technologies include solar PV, biogas, and biofuel efficiency. Satisfying technologies
may not guarantee successful adoption, but unsatisfying technologies are very unlikely to be
successfully adopted.
The findings demonstrate that SEs can be effective agents of technology localization in
Tanzania. The cases demonstrated involvement in the three activities of localization: diffusion,
institutional support and technical adaptation. Through their diffusion activities, most of the case
SEs were able to engage early adopters in diffusion activities. Early adopters in such cases
played key roles in diffusing the technologies in their respective communities. And, finally,
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technology users – the clients of the SEs – generally had few complaints about the technological
products themselves. Most of them viewed the technologies positively and acknowledged the
convenience they brought to their lives. There was less consistency in opinions of technology
users about their relationship with the SEs, but these were also balanced and generally positive.
Are the findings of this research applicable to other East African countries? The response
is a conditional “yes”. Some of the SEs explored in this study also operate in some capacity in
other East African countries (such as GCS in Kenya, and Kakute in Rwanda for some
consultancy work), or have counterparts there (such the TDBP equivalents and partners in
Uganda and Kenya). Rural conditions in East Africa are often comparable across national
borders. Ultimately however it would depend on the national policy and attitude towards the
private sector. Overall, there are legitimate prospects for SEs to contribute to development
efforts in African societies, where possible, including technological change efforts. Due to their
inclination for innovation, their decentralized nature (compared to corporate businesses for
example), and their social-economic balance and perceived ‘realism in idealism’, SEs might
succeed where the conventional private sector has failed.
The big differences in socioeconomic and environmental contexts between East Africa
and North America (and Western Europe) makes the use of the term ‘social enterprise’ very
different or almost irrelevant in Tanzania, while social enterprise models – i.e. social mission
with business model – exist and will likely continue. In Swahili there is not even an adequate
translation of the term social enterprise (yet) despite the proliferating number of SEs and the
continuing use of the term in English and in international communication (between SEs in
Tanzania and the outside world). Local SEs are also either officially registered as private
businesses or NGOs (i.e. no legal category of SE).
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CHAPTER V: ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
This chapter deals with the additional and incidental findings from the field study related to the
activity of social enterprises as change agents. These findings were either complementary to the
main questions (i.e. non-incidental but secondary) or were not anticipated in the original research
design and literature review but were observed and recorded by the researcher and are included
here as extensions of the research findings.
MODELS OF DIFFUSION
During ten months of field research, the researcher observed that there were different models of
diffusion being practiced. Models of diffusion describe how SEs introduce the technology to the
market and make it possible to find adopters in the targeted rural communities. This observation
could not have been reached before having an intimate look at how the case SEs work in
Tanzania. Being unconventional to their contexts, these models show a side of SEs’
innovativeness and flexibility in fulfilling their missions. Such observation could be used as
additional empirical support to the argument for the potential of SEs as effective in filling gaps in
development that other agents of technological change did not fill. The innovative use of these
unique models of diffusion may differentiate SEs’ approach to technology localization from the
classical development actors such as NGOs, CBOs and state sponsored agricultural extension
services. Three diffusion models currently used by the case SEs can be identified.
The Microfranchising Model
Microfranchising means that companies and organizations team up with local community
members or groups with entrepreneurial tendencies, to reach far and wide into remote areas,
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where their products (and services) are most needed (such as off-grid energy technologies, agro-
business services and machinery, microfinancing, etc.). Instead of establishing branches
everywhere, SEs 'franchise' their brand and products or services to local individuals (or groups)
in the villages and districts. It is called microfranchising because it follows the traditional
business franchizing protocol but is more limited in size and representation, and more flexible in
contract of partnership. Microfranchising has been defined as "a development tool that leverages
the basic concepts of traditional franchising, but it is especially focused on creating opportunities
for the world’s poorest people to own and manage their own businesses" (Lehr 2008, 3).
Local entrepreneurs become business partners who have access to training, guidance,
product advances, and commissions by the larger partner company (in this case the SE). The
incentives for local micro-entrepreneurs are often doubled in such deals: they are able to
diversify their own businesses and they also gain access to professional training and association
with larger business entities with expected wider networks, knowledge and relatively higher
standards of commodities and service. The SEs, on the other hand, expand their market
significantly and become accessible to consumers wherever they are. This approach is effective
for last-mile distribution of small products with minimum technical maintenance requirements.
This is how GCS is using the rafiki network in its last-mile distribution model. In this model,
microfranchising seeks to overcome two obstacles. The first is the infrastructure obstacle: the
deficiency of transportation and communication infrastructure in a country such as Tanzania –
especially in rural areas – makes last-mile distribution very difficult. Yet, such conditions also
make last-mile distribution very critical for the success of businesses that target rural clients. The
second obstacle is the marketing obstacle. It is a huge task for a company to introduce itself and
its products to the entire region or country given financial and logistical limitations. It is more
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efficient marketing for companies (or SEs) to focus on targeting and properly-training selected
individuals (and entities) who have initial interest and capabilities, and who will then carry out
the marketing activities within their own communities.
Besides overcoming the obstacles above, two good 'triple bottom line' values can be
created by the microfranchising model. According to Lehr (2008) and GCS staff interviews,
microfranchising fosters two important values. The first is sharing economic gains: the local
micro-entrepreneurs get margins from sales, so there is a level of immediate profit sharing with
local community members. The 'brand sharing' between the company and local entrepreneurs
also makes the brand more organically familiar to communities (i.e. they associate the brand with
some of their own members). The second is increasing local business capacity: through training
the local entrepreneurs learn not only how to market and sell the new products, but also
techniques of managing and improving their businesses. Valuable knowledge and skills are
gently deposited in the communities. For example, most of the rafikis of GCS interviewed in this
study said that they gained general business and marketing skills that they can use in running
their own business ventures regardless of the products they sell.
As mentioned, an example of microfranchising in Tanzania is the rafiki network of GCS.
The rafiki network consists of local village entrepreneurs who are both customers and
distributors for GCS. Some of the rafikis registered in the network were not necessarily ‘active’
because they had discontinued making sales for a considerable period of time. An entrepreneur
in this network is referred to as a rafiki and they are effectively a representative of GCS in their
respective community. Rafikis can make sales on behalf of GCS, market products of GCS, and
communicate with GCS regarding any customer inquiries (including fixing or replacing some
products according to their warranties). All the GCS products a rafiki sells have a margin for
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them as well, and they also get the products from GCS at reduced prices. Another noteworthy
feature of rafikis is that they are often both users and distributors of the technologies diffused by
GCS. Many of them purchase solar lanterns and other products for their own households, and
they are often among the first purchasers in their communities. Many of them choose to become
rafikis when they recognize a good opportunity for diffusing new technologies in their
community and benefiting from that; i.e. they tend to be entrepreneurial. To some extent this
observation may further confirm one of the main findings of the research: many rafikis tend to be
early adopters not just of the technology but also of the microfranchising model. So there are
multiple innovations diffusing at the same time.
Sector-Enterprise Cultivation
The sector-enterprise cultivation model of diffusion was embraced by the TDBP for enhancing
the biogas sector all over Tanzania. The name and the description of the model are a result of
synthesis from field observations and information provided in interviews and program
documents, such as interview TS01 and the TDBP Programme Implementation Document for
Phase II (2013). With this model, a new technology is introduced together with the technical
standards and support for the creation of micro and small enterprises. Biogas Construction
Enterprises (BCEs) are a result.
In this model of diffusion the entire biogas technology sector is diffused to rural
communities in conjunction with many home-grown SEs: the BCEs; particularly the
cooperatively mason-owned ones. While the umbrella organization is a nation-wide program, a
national initiative with both international and local funding, the proliferation of the biogas
technology in rural Tanzania rests on masons who joined the training course, graduated and
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started their BCEs. Also, as shown earlier, the masons also have a peculiar position being often
both users and active diffusors of the technology; with a number of them fulfilling the early
adopter criteria (similar, in ways, to the rafikis of GCS).
Business-Technology Incubation
Business incubators are not new anywhere in the world. Incubators are known to take infant
ventures (or business ideas) and provide space, coaching, linkages, market intelligence, and a
path to graduation as free-standing firms. Incubators around the world have a record of good
business support and job creation in their communities. Overall, data says that incubated
enterprises are more likely to succeed in the market after graduation than nonincubated
enterprises. According to the Adrian Innovation Center (2015):
“As of October 2012, there were over 1,250 incubators in the United States, up from only
12 in 1980. [There are] estimates that there are about 7,000 business incubators worldwide.
The incubation model has been adapted to meet a variety of needs, from fostering
commercialization of university technologies to increasing employment in economically
distressed communities to serving as an investment vehicle.”
In Tanzania, the incubation approach to support early-stage enterprises seems to have
recently started to draw more attention, and most of the organizations that offer incubation
services currently are public education and PTIs (such as universities, SIDO, CAMARTEC,
etc.). In Tanzania business-technology incubation is a mechanism for technology diffusion by
SEs. An example of business-technology incubation in Tanzania is Kakute as incubator of solar
PV enterprises. For 2 years Kakute successfully incubated a younger SE, Mobisol, which
delivers small solar PV power systems for average Tanzanian households (especially in rural and
off-grid areas) on a rent-to-own program, a program which, in its own right, could be described
as another social enterprise strategy (not a strategy of Kakute itself however, but the incubatee of
Kakute which was not a research participant). Clients pay for the solar power service on monthly
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basis in installments, and after payment of the system's full price over time they become owners.
Kakute used its established network and its social and technical expertise of promoting new
innovations to build a good customer base and brand awareness for its incubatee (FS01
interview). According to their website (2017), “Since its creation in 2010, Mobisol has installed
over 70,000 solar home systems on households in Tanzania and Rwanda.” This is not the first
project Kakute has incubated with nationwide impacts. An older project with a nationwide
impact involved the establishment of multi-businesses that were based on the agro-processing of
jatropha plants in Tanzania (e.g. oil, seed, and soap products from the plants) (FS01 and FS02
interviews, VCD Training 2004, and Kakute 2007). Given Kakute’s experience, and unique
place as one of the oldest Tanzanian SEs, its incubation ventures seem to be a noteworthy
approach to technology diffusion by an SE; particularly since this model of diffusion was key to
the popularization of jatropha oil soaps and biofuel, and the emergence of one of the largest
renewable energy SEs currently in Tanzania. It can be concluded that Kakute played a large role
nationally as an agent of technology diffusion (and localization in general) through the
incubation model.
These three models of diffusion were identified in the cases included in this research.
There could be other models that this study did not uncover. There were also, of course, as
mentioned earlier, other conventional models that were used, such as direct sales and marketing,
using local retail stores as distributors, and general educational and promotion activities.
OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING EFFECTIVENESS
In the field, additional factors were found to influence the effectiveness of SEs as agents of
technology localization in Tanzania. While these factors did not directly affect the activities of
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technology localization, per se, they were nonetheless important for the survival and growth of
the SEs themselves so that they could continue their localization work.
Economic and Organizational Survival
Surviving economically is one of the challenges our cases are generally facing (except for some
BCEs which seemed to be thriving at the time of the field study). During the time of the field
study most cases were surviving by various means, and neither they nor their clientele were
pessimistic about the future.
GCS staff, for example, were consistent in their expressions of confidence that their SE is
well on its way to growing and expanding to more regions in Tanzania, and perhaps someday
reaching outside Tanzania. Currently they have a few operations in Kenya, even some rafikis.
The CEO of GCS described its mission concisely as “To improve the lives of one million
households through quality, affordable technology”. Kakute’s staff is also convinced that there is
much work to be done, particularly in the efforts of localizing sustainable energy technologies,
and Kakute has tremendous experience in doing that in Tanzania (FS01 and FS02 interviews).
The TDBP coordinating team and the BCEs are also optimistic that biogas and bioenergy is on
the way to becoming a large commercial sector in Tanzania (TS01 interview). Dorgo also sees
the future of agro-machinery strongly tied to any possible genuine development and economic
growth in Tanzania.
Organizationally, these SEs appear to cultivate a visible sense of belonging among their
staff. We have seen cases where the staff of one organization have a significantly active social
network among themselves (such as the case of GCS) and in which they take pride. In interviews
with AS01, AS04, AS06, AS20, they specifically mentioned the friendship and social
camaraderie among the staff of GCS as one of the advantages they feel about their work. As for
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Kakute, the researcher observed that the staff act with each other like family, with the director as
an easy-going parent figure. There are however signs that some staff face morale fatigue and
exhibit levels of work discipline that would not be generally acceptable in for-profit conventional
business organizations (no reference to interviews will be mentioned to minimize social risks on
participants). Such are perhaps partially explained by the lower salaries and career prospects in
these SEs compared to expectations on the conventional business side. Both GCS and Kakute
managements expressed frustration with the difficulty of recruiting and retaining qualified staff
for critical technical and managerial positions. They appreciate most of their current staff, but
they have stories of losing qualified staff to more promising job offers as well not being able to
replace them with equally qualified ones.
Another challenge to the success of social enterprises in Tanzania is start-up financing
and its effect on long-term sustainability. The cases of this study, and the other SEs that we were
made aware of but which did not officially participate in the research (such as M-KOPA, Off-
Grid Electric, and others), suggest that a majority of the SEs that achieve a reasonable level of
economic and organizational vitality are, or have been, financed by either foreign capital or
donors. The financial support received by SEs has been often in the form of start-up funding and
with expectations that the recipient SE will eventually be financially self-reliant based on its own
core activities. However, when this field study took place (2015) most case SEs were not yet
self-reliant, although some of them were established since 2009. The only two SEs that could be
described as financially self-reliant were Kakute and Dorgo. And while RafikiSoft is also self-
reliant it is mostly due to the personal pockets of its co-founders and the relatively low-capital
type of work it does. Yet an explanation is warranted here: Kakute and Dorto did not have more
financial resources than the other SEs. In reality, these two seemed to be the ones with the least
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financial resources. Nonetheless, they were surviving autonomously, without external core
funding or capital contributions. Kakute has seen better days, financially speaking, but it is a
veteran SE that has been operating since 1995. Compared to the other case SEs, Kakute is by far
the oldest one and has no direct ties to any foreign donors or investors. Kakute’s resources
consist of a relatively spacious headquarters in which they hosted at least two partners (other SEs
who also were incubatees of Kakute) for reasonable rent, project contracts, and the contributions
of the company’s guarantors (or co-owners) who are not many or wealthy. For these reasons,
despite their busy profile and visible impact as technology diffusors, Kakute itself is not thriving
economically. Dorgo, on the other hand, is significantly younger (about 2 years old) and smaller
in capital and staff, but it is also surviving by returns from its own products and services. Yet
these two SEs do not think that they no longer need external financing. In interviews and
conversations with their managements (particularly FS01 and GS01) they still contemplated
possibilities of receiving investment or funding that could allow them to significantly improve
their current business status.
On the other hand, it was expressed a number of times by the GCS staff that technically
their company is currently at the break-even scale (AS01, AS03 and AS10 interview), which
means, according to them, that GCS is technically capable of maintaining its own operations
through its own generated revenues from sales. However, GCS has effectively been engaged in
long-term financial support schemes from business-support programs by larger development
donors and investors who took interest in its last mile distribution model (to which the
microfranchizing rafiki network belongs) (XX02 interview).
Another situation is found with the BCEs. BCEs were initiated by TDBP, but they are
essentially independent enterprises. Up to the time of the field study, many BCEs received
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financial and technical support from TDBP, but they varied in terms of their commercial success,
as explained earlier. Some co-founders of BCEs that were interviewed were quite aggressive
marketers and shrewd businesspersons dedicated to their ventures. Eventually a number of them
reaped the fruit of their persistence.
Overall, long-term financial viability seemed to be a challenge that all the case SEs
grappled with. None of them had a definitive solution to that challenge, but each one is working
towards it.
Social Enterprise Clusters
In Arusha, Tanzania, there is what may be described as an experimental social enterprise cluster,
in a location called TASO grounds (belonging to the Tanzania Agricultural Support
Organization). A group of SEs in that location work with each other in multiple ways. For
example, Kakute – the oldest SE on the grounds – incubated a start-up SE which came in from
Germany with investments to provide affordable solar PV systems for average households in
rural and urban Tanzania. By the end of the incubation period (about 2 years), Mobisol became a
brand name in the region. Currently both SEs still share some office space and work as partners
although they are autonomous. Additionally, in 2013, two organizations, GCS and another SE,
shared market intelligence for mobile solar PV lanterns in the Tanzania Northern Zone, and also
shared some logistical expenses (such as sharing a 4x4 rental car for field operations for a few
months). Moreover, GCS and Twende decided that it would be cost-effective to build office
space together on an available small piece of land at the TASO grounds. In the shared building
they also share a machine shop, internet subscription, office appliances, and sometimes vehicles.
They also shared contacts, information and efforts about innovating particular agricultural
machines for the local market. Their staff casually lend a hand to each other on need basis. AISE
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was more or less born from the cooperation of the GCS and Twende (before the merger of AISE-
Twende), then started to have its own flavour as an innovation lab and educational centre for
school students who like to learn more about appropriate technologies and their creation. AISE
was part of the vision and work of a Tanzanian technology innovator (SC01 interviewee) who
has been active in both GCS and Twende. In 2014 AISE merged with Twende to form AISE-
Twende (now simply called Twende). Additionally, as detailed earlier, the software project that
was launched to keep the rafiki network connected eventually gave birth to another SE,
RafikiSoft, which provides customized ICT products and services to companies with rural
distribution networks. RafikiSoft then continued to have strong ties with GCS – being its first
and largest customer to date – while seeking new clientele. Due to proximity and related
expertise, each of the boards of directors of GCS, Twende and Kakute have members from the
leadership of at least one neighboring organization. Overall, collaborative efforts are continuing
between these SEs as they are located in close proximity to each other. The leading staff of all
these organizations know each other well and have relatively easy access to each other as
needed.
What we see in Arusha’s TASO grounds could be described as a small SE cluster. If a
network of SEs can be established and they can work in collaboration with each other, there
seems to be an opportunity for mutual benefits and for enhancing the SE sector in the region.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITES OF LOCALIZATION
Besides the responses to the research questions there appeared to be challenges and opportunities




The problem of seasonality:
The majority of the SEs’ staff who participated in this field study mentioned the challenge of
seasonality as a recurrent and persisting challenge for them. Staff of GCS, BCEs, Dorgo and
Kakute highlighted this challenge in their interviews. Moreover, a significant number of the
technology adopters interviewed – from rural communities – spoke about seasonality in similar
ways (interviewees AU06, AU15, TSU06 and TSU07). The rural entrepreneurs interviewed –
rafikis with GCS and masons of the BCEs – appeared to be the most affected by seasonality,
since they more than others depend on the purchasing power in their communities.
The problem we can call seasonality is not difficult to observe in rural Tanzanian
communities, and affects the possibilities for technology adoption in rural communities. Since
the main rural economic activity in Tanzania is agriculture, it is not a surprise that rural
economic vitality depends heavily on a good agricultural economy (i.e. production and sales).
The quality and quantity of the crops being cultivated, the level of demand for them in the
market, and their pricing, all affect the entire economy of rural-agricultural communities. Crops
however are primarily seasonal. They only start to generate revenue for agricultural producers
after harvest. Before the harvest of high-demand crops the rural-agricultural community is cash-
poor. When the community members have little cash to spend, their purchasing activities are
restricted to essentials. Spending is restrained on products and services that may improve quality
of living but which are not immediately necessary. Therefore, businesses that provide such
products and services can only perform well in rural markets during harvest seasons and a little
afterwards when rural households have some surplus cash. But rural businesses like that tend to
be often small, with small capital, and therefore quite vulnerable to seasonality, because they are
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expected to operate year-long but only make good revenue in a window of about 3 to 5 months a
year. It becomes a challenge of survival for small rural businesses, and similarly for emerging
rural-oriented social enterprises. Bigger businesses - such as established companies and
transnational corporations - can sometimes handle seasonality because they are stronger and
more resilient in the face of market fluctuations, and they can plan for seasons more capably. But
seasonality can be fatal for small businesses and young SEs. This problem is amplified when
some harvest seasons do not deliver the expected yield of crops, or they do but the market does
not perform as vibrantly as expected that year for one reason or another. Small businesses may
not be able to survive a year like that.
This problem has no immediate local solutions in the present time, but it surely has a
domino effect. Because seasonality is a consistent problem for rural Tanzania, fewer people are
interested in establishing businesses that can provide various products and services in rural
communities. Between those who fail in running their rural-based businesses and those who
decide against taking the risk of establishing ones, the main losers often happen to be the rural
communities overall.
While sustainable energy technologies such as solar lanterns, biogas energy and energy-
efficient cookstoves, are important things to have for rural households, they can be deemed non-
essential in times of shortage of cash. The same applies to agricultural equipment that can
improve productivity and convenience but requires initial investment in cash. Seasonality is thus
a challenge for all businesses involved in marketing these technologies to rural communities,
including SEs for whom a break-even operation is necessary.
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Infrastructure:
A common challenge for all actors in technological change is the country’s infrastructure. SE
staff complained, in their interviews, that the status of the network of roads in the country makes
it a difficult and costly process to reach rural communities in various regions of Tanzania,
whether to promote products and services or to distribute them. For example, GCS management
claims to spend a fortune to keep a few SUV vehicles on the road as field officers use them to go
nationwide promoting and distributing GCS merchandize (AS10, AS01, AS20). The cost of
continuous maintenance and fixing of these vehicles can be high due to the types of unpaved and
unfriendly roads they continuously take on their missions.
Yet, as some SE staff also pointed out (such as AS01 and AS03), if the infrastructure
improves, that will render many of the current activities and approaches of SEs to technology
diffusion in rural areas obsolete. If the roads get better then probably GCS’ last-mile distribution
model will not be as important as it is now for many rural communities, because they can then
reach markets in towns and cities more easily. Also, infrastructure improvement usually comes
in packages, so more roads will probably also accompany an extension of the national electric
grid. That would be good news for the rural communities but will make them less interested in
the solar lanterns and home systems marketed by SEs. Ultimately many of these SEs provide
solutions to problems that would not have existed if the status of the national infrastructure was
better than it currently is. As the infrastructure improves, eventually, it will require SEs to
reinvent themselves to address other development issues, in both their models of diffusion and




There are a number of Tanzanian parastatal organizations whose main mandate is to provoke and
foster innovation in technology and engineering. They are also called Public Technology
Intermediaries (PTIs). Most of them were established in the seventies and early eighties and have
a record of innovative projects of technology and engineering solutions in their fields (Diyamett
& Risha 2015). They foster innovation through technical assistance, design and incubation for
innovative technology ideas. Some of those ideas come from their staff engineers and
technicians; others come from the communities, and others come from local innovators and
entrepreneurs. According to interviews conducted with some representatives of these PTIs
(Interviews SP01, KP05 and KP01), few SEs collaborate wisely with these PTIs as partners in
some technological projects. GCS and Kakute have collaborations with the Centre for
Agricultural Mechanization and Rural Technology (CAMARTEC) and with the Small Industries
Development Organization (SIDO). TDBP is hosted by CAMARTEC. There are good
opportunities for more and enhanced collaborations of this sort if the policy environment
facilitates the realization of that potential.
Flexibility of the social enterprise business model:
The identity of some SEs, such as the case SEs of this field study, seem to be flexible. Kakute
was registered as a private business, and it had two spin-offs in the past that were direct private
businesses (FS01 interview). GCS has been identifying as a social enterprise since inception but
is aspiring “to get rid of the “social” eventually and become just ‘an enterprise’” with more
rigorous business structure and operations (AS10 interview). The TDBP’s aim is to eventually
make biogas a viable commercial sector and for BCEs to become viable free-standing businesses
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in the Tanzanian market (not necessarily as cooperatives of certified masons). Dorgo as well may
become a conventional private firm that produces agro-machineries in the future, and that may
make it more effective in production, distribution and responding to the demand of rural
communities (i.e. through mass-production and sale which lowers prices of products and assures
standardization of quality in addition to product warranties). The flexibility of SEs in changing
their status may be an advantage of the social enterprise approach—that it can transform from
one organizational identity to another, under appropriate circumstances, if that serves its goals,
and technology localization, more.
PARTICIPANTS’ PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATIONAL CHALLENGES
The interviews of the field study also sought to learn the opinion of all interviewees about what
they perceive as the most eminent challenges to technological change in Tanzania. The question
sought to survey perspectives of the research participants about the national context within which
they are active. The interviews were an opportunity to gather such opinion-based data that may
be helpful in understanding how the perception of the general national context relates to the
priorities of technology diffusion by SEs. Figure 2 shows the results of the answers to that
question—statements with the larger scores were perceived the bigger challenges in terms of
importance.
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Figure 2 Interview responses: challenges to technological development in Tanzania*
*The question was: Mark the major challenges to technological development in this country/region (prompt: rank the top 4 challenges in your opinion)
0 50 100 150 200 250
The types of technologies introduced are not suitable for the majority of the
population
The state regulation of the technology market inhibits diffusion
There are limited incentives for technological innovation
Technological education is not sufficient (shortage of engineers and technicians)
Technological change is costly, beyond the means of the majority of communities
There is a general cultural resistance to adopting new technologies




CHAPTER VI: CONCLUDING REMARKS
This manuscript began with a proposed framework for technological autonomy that pointed to
the importance of technology localization and identified the role of agents of technological
change in the pursuit of localization. The field study narrowed the focus to social enterprises in
the process of technology localization by studying the role of social enterprises as agents of
localization in rural Tanzania. The results suggest that social enterprises have a credible potential
as agents of technological change in Tanzania, through their work in technology localization.
This makes social enterprises valuable assets in technological development in Tanzania, leading
to eventual technological autonomy as anticipated in the Tanzanian National Development Plan
II (FYDP-II). This claim of the potential of social enterprises can be reasonably extended to
other East African countries.
The renowned biochemist and philosopher, Lawrence Joseph Henderson, was attributed
with saying, “Science owes more to the steam engine than the steam engine owes to science.”
The statement suggests that technological breakthroughs often usher in scientific breakthroughs.
This is not always the case, of course, but has been a consistent trend in most of human history.
The industrial revolution is a prime example of this. The engineering work of the steam engine
ushered in new attempts to understanding heat transfer and thermal energy, leading to
discovering the laws of thermodynamics. While highly debatable in today’s intricate integration
of massive, cutting-edge technology and scientific frontiers, this observation nonetheless bears
relevance to the context of developing societies. There is wisdom in focusing on increasing a
country’s technological capabilities and processes of technology localization. Prioritizing
technological development can unleash the endogenous creative forces that could innovate and
implement solutions to local economic, social and environmental problems. It can also launch
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developing societies on learning curves that make them gradually attain and internalize advanced
scientific knowledge and creative capacities (STIPRO 2010).
The pursuit of technological autonomy through the activities of technology localization
are connected to human and economic development aspirations of the populations of developing
societies. This research has shown that social enterprises can play a positive role as agents of
technological change. As a result, development practitioners and scholars should pay them more
interest.
As discussed earlier, there are good reasons to conditionally extend the conclusions of
this study from Tanzania to East Africa. There are also similar reasons to think about whether
those conclusions can encourage similar lines of work and research in developing countries more
generally. Earlier reviews of the status of social enterprises in various developing countries
around the world tell us diverse stories that may not be easily generalized. There are however,
similar trends of new approaches to solving old problems. There are also examples of social
enterprises already engaging in activities of technological development. We can conclude from
such reviews, and this study, that there are no strong reasons to dismiss the possibility that the
conclusion of this study may be have broader implications than Tanzania and East Africa.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
This research provides intellectual support for efforts to enhance the enabling environment for
emerging agents of technological change in Tanzania. As Tanzania is witnessing policy shifts
regarding the involvement of local non-state actors (e.g., private sector and third sector) in
economic development and diffusion of innovations, this research can draw attention to the value
of regulations that accommodate social enterprise and formally acknowledged models of
business. For example, since social enterprises represent an array of organizations that are
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neither simply for-profit nor charitable status, business registration and taxation schemes by the
state could accommodate them with business type registration options that do not currently exist.
Additionally, regional governments could consider involving SEs for inclusion in government-
led localization projects, whether in diffusion, institutional support (e.g., managing finance and
credit systems, or providing technical training assistance to communities) or technical
adaptation. As governments are known to sometimes relegate parts of their big projects to NGOs
or CBOs to fulfill parts of the projects for particular communities, they can include SEs as well.
The research also helps in clarifying some of the demands and expectations of
communities of potential adopters of new technologies in developing rural communities. The
feedback of the clients of the case SEs brings to light some of their perceptions about the
effectiveness of the technological products and services they adopted that should receive more
attention in future efforts of technology localization (whether by the case SEs or other agents of
localization). Also, generally, this research contributes to the growing scholarship of social
enterprise in developing societies. As discussed earlier, the literature is currently centred on
social enterprise and entrepreneurship in the economic North, but some shifts are taking place.
Finally, the technology localization concept, constructed through this thesis, can be used
further to aid in developing new or modified explanations for technological change processes in
developing societies. It can also contribute to guiding related research on technology localization
and agents, identifying research gaps in topics of technological change, and contributing to
policy formation for more coherent approaches to localization. It could also incite some
researchers to explore what others activities besides diffusion, institutional support and technical
adaptation could be included under the localization umbrella.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The data collection could have been stronger. For example, the size and diversity of the SEs
included and the number of persons interviewed from each SE could be increased. In addition the
number of interviews with community members could always have been increased.  The number
of communities observed could have been increased as well.
This study is also limited by its narrowed focus on the activities of social enterprises.
Other factors that have immense influence on the development process in rural Tanzania and
Tanzania in general have not been integrated into the analysis. For example, the sociological,
environmental and legal intricacies that smallholder farmers in Tanzania grapple with are not
addressed, and thus the sources of their resistance to technological change – and how to
overcome that resistance – are not included in this research. It is quite conceivable that politics
and legalities of land tenure, crop prices, and environmental challenges to agricultural produce
(e.g. droughts) will significantly limit the potential for technology localization among many rural
communities in the country.
Additionally, this study took place in a limited time period. It can be reasonably expected
that some of the cases would face more fluctuations in their experiences over longer spans of
time. Some of the cases were also relatively young, thus it cannot be said that their stories satisfy
reasonable conditions of durability. Moreover, being a relatively new concept – yet synthesized
from older concepts – the concept of technology localization itself may require further
elaboration through the identification of additional localization activities and more robust
measures and indicators of all localization activities.
147
SUBJECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The case of TDBP, and the partnerships between some of the cases and Tanzania’s public
technology intermediaries, show that social enterprises could work well in partnership with the
public sector in developing countries. Research that explores such partnerships would benefit
decision makers, practitioners and the social enterprise research community. The findings of this
study may be conditionally generalized about rural East Africa, since rural conditions in the
region are often comparable across national borders. Ultimately however it would depend on the
national policy and attitude towards the private sector. Tanzania is visibly different from the
other East African countries in this aspect, due to its legacy of a long-lasting command economy
which was less friendly towards the private sector than neighbouring Kenya, for example. That is
changing however, as discussed earlier (chapter III). Differences in national enabling
environments (policies, infrastructure, etc.) may pose a limitation to generalizing the results of
this study to other East African countries. Future research could take comparisons of national
policies and how social enterprises perform under them.
Another possible topic for future research can be on models of diffusion, discussed in
chapter V. They rely on different elements that make each model successful or problematic.
Also, models can be replicated (with modifications). Studying models of diffusion, such as
microfranchizing, sector-enterprise cultivation, and business-technology incubation, is a good
suggestion for future research as it will make the lessons learned from this research more useful
for a wider range of researchers and practitioners.
Another area of possible future research can be about how social enterprises integrate
environmental principles, and climate change awareness, in their technology localization efforts.
As climate change is no longer a topic that can be postponed in many developing countries,
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approaches to technological autonomy will need to include it. Can social enterprises help
communities in activities of technology localization that are conducive to low-carbon
industrialized economies?
Finally, the field study provides supportive evidence that empowering rural women
works well with, and for, technology localization. The researcher interviewed multiple rural
women among the clients of social enterprises – around half of the interviewed clients were
women – and interacted with others in the field. There was a visible level of enthusiasm for new
technology adoption among the women that were interviewed and observed. Many of them
engaged new technologies with eagerness to learn and to seize whatever opportunities they could
bring to improve their livelihoods and those of their families. Multiple women rafikis proved to
be tenacious entrepreneurs and early adopters. In a trend that is visibly more than simply isolated
cases, the results of economic improvement in these women’ households was directly felt in the
quality of life and the education of the children of the household. Women rafikis appeared to
invest immediately in their family members: better food and water supply, sanitation, better
housing conditions and better schools (for their children). This gendered aspect is worth further
investigation in future research. It would be appropriate to have a research project devoted
exclusively to the role of women in the work of social enterprises, or relevant research that more
systematically disaggregates data by sex.
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APPENDICES
The following pages contain the appendices of this manuscript. They are:
Appendix I:
Nvivo 10 field data analysis – Coded sources and frequency of themes
Appendix II:
Nvivo 10 field data analysis – coding of interview texts
Appendix III:
Excel analysis of multiple choice-and-rating question
Appendix IV:
MS Excel data analysis – organizing likert-scale answers
Appendix V:
Tables V.1 and V.2 draw criteria for 1) identifying an organization as a social enterprise, and 2)
inform decision-making processes by SEs in uptaking technological innovations and promote
them for socioeconomic value creation.
Appendix VI:
Table 9: List of field study interviewees (by codes)
Appendix VII:
Table 10: Responses of interviewees about perceived attributes of technologies
Appendix VIII:
Interview Guide (for technology adopters)
Appendix IX:
Information/recruitment letter for organizations
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Appendix I: Nvivo 10 field data analysis – Coded sources and frequency of themes*
*This screenshot shows ‘nodes’ used to highlight recurring themes and trends in the data collected, especially the interviews
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Appendix II: Nvivo 10 field data analysis – coding of interview texts*
*This screenshot shows how each interviewee (with assigned code for name) was coded in various nodes (themes and orgs) to conclude trends and
connections.
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Appendix III: Excel analysis of multiple choice-and-rating question*
*This screenshot shows the excel sheet used to organize and give quantifiable representation to the summary of answers of interviews to a
multiple-choice question about the main challenges to technological change in Tanzania.
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Appendix IV: MS Excel data analysis – organizing likert-scale answers*
*This screenshot shows the MS excel formatting used to collect and organize all the responses of interviewees to a series of liker-scale questions about the
perceived attributes of technologies diffused by SEs. These questions were answered by SE staff as well as by users/adopters and partners of SEs.
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Appendix V:
Tables V.1 and V.2, below, draw criteria for 1) identifying an organization as a social enterprise,
and 2) inform decision-making processes by SEs that are interested in taking up innovations and
promote them for socio-economic value creation for target beneficiaries. After going through the
exercise of recognizing whether an organization qualifies for an SE (Table V.1), the decision-
making criteria in table V.2 becomes appropriate to consider. The first step (column 1, table V.2)
is to state the claim/justification of the innovation that the SE is thinking about taking up—with
different levels of radical claims. After the claim is made it will then need to be verified with a
measurable parameter (columns 2 and 3). If the claim is successfully verified, it will then need to
be tested against the criteria of ‘social value creation’—the one that makes the difference
between a conventional/commercial entrepreneurial decision and a social entrepreneurial
decision (column 4). An exercise like this allows innovation-inclined SEs to keep themselves in
check against imperatives that they voluntarily embrace as business ventures with social
missions/goals.
Table V.1: Is it a social enterprise? A check-box for investigation
Criteria SE fulfills?
(Y/N)





credit union, NGO with revenue
generation, private firm with
surplus investment for public
interest, etc.)
Justified method(s) of surplus






Source(s) of revenue: Self-reliant
(?%), funding/grants (?%) (if not
NGO or relatively new
establishment then self-reliant
revenue should be significantly
larger then funding/grants)




Table V.2: sample of criteria for considering technologies for uptake or promotion by SEs
Claim about the innovation Criteria to verify Yes? Social value created
Causes a shift in the market
(transformative/disruptive)*
New energy source or way of acquiring
service




production dynamics in at
least one major factor
yield increase of two-folds or closer
changes gender relations
empowers the local economic cycle
Ideal appropriate technology
type that responds to a
known need in communities
Known need verified
less capital intensive [and] more labor
intensive than the hi-tech versions
less dependent on scarce foreign exchange
for imported goods
easier to maintain, operate and repair
labor saving in comparison to traditional
methods
* for this claim, either one of the criteria will suffice
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Appendix VI:
Table 9 List of Field Study Interviewees (by codes)
Code Role Gender Association Location
AS01 SE Staff (lead) M GCS Arusha
AS02 SE Staff (lead) M GCS Arusha
AS03 SE Staff M GCS Arusha
AS04 SE Staff F GCS Arusha
AS06 SE Staff M GCS Arusha
AS07 SE Staff M GCS Arusha
AS10 SE Staff (lead) F GCS Arusha
AS11 SE Staff M GCS Arusha
AS12 SE Staff F GCS Arusha
AS20 SE Staff (former) M GCS Arusha
AU01 Rafiki F GCS Arusha
AU02 Rafiki F GCS Arusha
AU03 Rafiki F GCS Arusha
AU04 Rafiki F GCS Arusha
AU05 Rafiki M GCS Arusha
AU06 Rafiki F GCS Arusha
AU07 Rafiki M GCS Arusha
AU08 Rafiki M GCS Morogoro
AU09 Rafiki F GCS Morogoro
AU10 Rafiki F GCS Morogoro
AU11 Rafiki (and SE staff) F GCS Morogoro
AU12 Rafiki M GCS Morogoro
AU13 Rafiki M GCS Morogoro
AU14 Rafiki F GCS Morogoro
AU15 Rafiki F GCS Morogoro
AU16 Rafiki (and SE staff) M GCS Morogoro
BS01 SE Staff (lead) M AISE-Twende Arusha
BS02 SE Staff M AISE-Twende Arusha
BS03 SE Staff M AISE-Twende Arusha
CS01 SE Staff (lead) M AISE-Twende Arusha
CS03 SE Staff M AISE-Twende Arusha
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CS04 SE Staff (lead) F AISE-Twende Arusah
CU01 Partner (lead) M ECHO East Africa
DS01 Staff (lead) M RafikiSoft Global
FP01 Partner (lead) M Embark Arusha
FS01 SE Staff (lead) M Kakute Arusha
FS02 SE Staff M Kakute Arusha
FS03 SE Staff F Kakute Arusha
FS04 SE Staff (lead) F Kakute Arusha
FS05 SE Staff M Kakute Arusha
FS06 SE Staff F Kakute Arusha
FS07 SE Staff M Kakute Arusha
FU01 Kakute/Mobisol client M Kakute
Arusha
(Ngusero)
FU02 Same as above M Kakute
Arusha
(Ngusero)
FU03 Same as above M Kakute
Arusha
(Ngusero)
FU04 Same as above F Kakute
Arusha
(Ngusero)
FU05 Same as above M Kakute
Arusha
(Ngusero)
FU06 Kakute client (group A) F Kakute
Arusha
(Longido)
FU07 Kakute client (group A) F Kakute
Arusha
(Longido)




8 users of solar home systems.




4 users of solar home systems.
As as bove. M Kakute
Arusha
(Longido)
GS01 SE Staff (lead) M Dorgo Agro Enterprises Arusha
GS02 SE Staff M Dorgo Agro Enterprises Arusha
GS03 SE Staff M Dorgo Agro Enterprises Arusha




GU02 Dorgo client M
Kilimanjaro
(Hai)







GU04 Dorgo client M
Arusha
(Morombo)







GU06 Dorgo client M
Nelson Mandela African




KP01 Partner F CAMARTEC
KP02 Partner (lead) M CAMARTEC
KP03 Partner M CAMARTEC
KP04 Partner F CAMARTEC
KP05 Partner (lead) M CAMARTEC
KP06 Partner M CAMARTEC
LP01 Partner M TEMDO Arusha
MP01 Partner M MVIWATA Arusha
SP01 Partner (lead) M SIDO Arusha
TS01 Staff (lead) M TDBP National
TS02 Staff M TDBP National















(certified mason) M TDBP Manyara





(certified mason) M TDBP Mwanza
TSU09
BCE member (lead)































TSU20 BCE member (lead) M TDBP
Manyara
(Bermi)
TSU23 BCE member (lead) F TDBP
Manyara
(Bermi)
TU15 Farmer with biogas digester M
Kilimanjaro
(Same)





digester and big animal farm F
Kilimanjaro
(Saweni)



















XX01 Informant (lead) F STIPRO
Dar es
Salaam













(3) Complexity Trialability Observability Technology/product
AS01 S. Agree S. Agree S. Agree Neutral S. Agree Neutral Over Years Maize sheller
AS02 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Neutral Maize sheller
AS03 S. Agree S.Disagree Agree S. Agree S. Agree S. Agree Over Years Maize sheller
AS04 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Maize sheller
AS06 Agree S.Disagree S. Agree Disagree S. Agree S.Disagree Maize sheller
AS07 S. Agree Agree Agree S. Agree S. Agree S. Agree Over Months Maize sheller
AS10 Agree Neutral Disagree S. Agree S.Disagree Agree Over 1 Season Maize sheller
AS11 *no info
AS12 *no info
AS20 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Maize sheller
AU01 S. Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree S.Disagree Over Years Solar lanterns
AU02 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns
AU03 Agree Agree S.Disagree S.Disagree Agree Solar lanterns
AU04 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns
AU05 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns
AU06 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns
AU07 Solar lanterns
AU08 S. Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns, 3-4 months
AU09 S. Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns, 5 months
AU10 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns, 3 months
AU11 Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Agree Solar lanterns
AU12 Agree Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns, 12 months
AU13 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months
Solar lanterns, 4 months (for
small light) and 1 year for big
AU14 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns, 1 month
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AU15 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months Solar lanterns, 3 months
AU16 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over Years Solar lanterns, 1 year
BS01 Agree Agree Neutral S.Disagree Agree Agree Over Years general, seven years
BS02 S.Disagree S.Disagree Disagree Disagree S.Disagree Disagree Over 1 Season
BS03 Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral
CS01 Agree Agree Agree S.Disagree S. Agree Agree Over Months
drip irrigation system (after
one season) and solar water
heater (after a few years)
CS03 S. Agree S. Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Over Months
drip irrigation system (one
year) and solar water heater
(two years)
CS04 Neutral S. Agree S. Agree Neutral Neutral Agree Over Months
drip irrigation system (one
year) and solar water heater
(two years)
CU01 S. Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Disagree Over Months 3-4 months




FS03 S. Agree S. Agree Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Immediately
FS04 Agree Agree S.Disagree S. Agree Agree Agree Over Years solar and biogas (2-3 years)
FS05 Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Neutral Over Months
FS06 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Over Years solar home systems, 5 years
FS07
FU01 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Years
FU02 Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Immediately
FU03 Agree Agree S. Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Over Years
FU04 Agree Agree S. Agree S.Disagree S. Agree S.Disagree Over Years
FU05 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree S.Disagree Over Years
FU06 S. Agree Neutral Disagree Neutral Agree S. Agree
FU07 Agree Agree S. Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Over Months 3 months
FU08 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree S.Disagree Over Years 3 years
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FU09 S. Agree Agree Neutral S.Disagree Neutral Neutral
solar systems, multiple
respondents (8)




GS02 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Over Months agro-machineries
GS03 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Over 1 Season
GU01 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months
GU02 Agree Agree S. Agree Neutral S. Agree Neutral Over Years 4 years
GU03 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over 1 Season
GU04 S. Agree S.Disagree S. Agree Agree Agree S.Disagree Over Years
GU05 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Immediately
GU06 S. Agree Agree Disagree Neutral S. Agree Agree Over Years less than 2 years
KP01 *no info








TS01 Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over Years Biogas (lasts for 20 years)
TS02 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Years 2 years
TS03 Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Agree Disagree Over Years
TS04 Agree Agree S.Disagree S. Agree Agree S. Agree Over Months
TSU06 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months 12 months
TSU07 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months 6 months
TSU08 Agree Agree S. Agree Disagree S. Agree S. Agree Over Months 16 months
TSU09 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Over Years
TSU10 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree S. Agree Over Years
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TSU11 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over Months 6 months
TSU12 Agree Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months 11 months
TSU13 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree
TSU14 Agree Agree S. Agree Disagree S. Agree Agree Over Years 2 years
TSU20 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Months 6 months
TSU23 Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Over Years 1 year
TU15 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree S. Agree Over Years 5 years
TU16 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree
TU17 Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Over Years 1 year
TU18 S. Agree S. Agree Agree Disagree Over Years
TU19 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Over Years 1 year
TU21 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree
TU22 Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
TU24 Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree
TU25 Agree Agree S. Agree S. Agree Agree Agree Over Years 1 year
XX01 *no info
XX02 *no info
*The questions were presented in likert-scale format. Each question had 5 scales: Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neutral, Somewhat Agree, and Agree. In the
last question on observability the interviewee was asked to tell how long does it take to see a return on first investment (or payment) for the technology in
question; the options were: immediately, over one season, over months, or over years (mention number of months or years if chosen). Questions were
presented as below:
Please state your level of agreement with each of the statements below:
Relative Advantage:
Compared to the commonly available technology performing the same function in your community, this technology is generally more effective.
Compatibility (x3):
(1) This technology is suitable to the local environmental conditions of this country/region
(2) This technology is affordable to the majority of the target population
(3) This technology invoked cultural changes in targeted communities (if agree explain, and whether it’s favorable or unfavorable)
Complexity:
This technology is easy to understand, operate and maintain by the local users
Trialability (if applicable):
This technology can be sufficiently tried first to determine whether to adopt or not before complete purchase or change




Interview Guide (for technology adopters)
Technological Development and Social Enterprises in Africa:
Challenges and opportunities of diffusion
Interview Guide (for users and micro-distributers of technologies which are diffused by case social enterprises)
I. Background of Interviewee (in relevance to the research topic)
1. What is your business/vocation? And how are you using the technology provided by the SE?
II. Business with the social enterprise(s) and the products/services involved
2. What type of entity is yours officially registered as? (if applicable)
3. What do you see the major challenges to technological development in this country/region?
(Examples given below, optional)
The types of technologies introduced are not
suitable for the majority of the population
Technological change is costly, beyond the means
of the majority of communities
State regulation of the technology market inhibits
diffusion
There is a general cultural resistance to adopting
new technologies
There are limited incentives for technological
innovation
Communication networks for technology
diffusion are weak
Technological education is not sufficient (such as
shortage of engineers and technicians)
Other (explain):
4. Which of the technologies, provided by the social enterprise you do business with, do you use or distribute?
5. Tell us about each product or service you receive from your partner social enterprise:
III. How communication and marketing for the products/services was conducted
6. How did you first hear about the social enterprise and its products/services?
7. Were you interested in the products/services of the social enterprise from the first time, or not right away?
8. Can you describe the marketing approach of the social enterprise, as you understand it?
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10. From your perspective, recount the advantages and disadvantages of the communication and marketing
approach of the social enterprise.
IV. Perceived Attributes of Technologies
(Below are questions to evaluate perception of the technologies being diffused by the organization. The questions
should be asked about each single technology product/service of interest for this research).
11. Is this technology totally new to the market targeted, or is it an incremental improvement to existing products?
Explain.
12. Does the technology introduce an innovative system/product that shifts production dynamics in at least one
major dimension? If so, what are these dimensions (i.e. changes gender relations to more equal power, increases
yield two-fold or more, enhances local economic cycle, etc.)
13. Are there other, but less dramatic, changes that this technology introduces? Explain.
14. Please state your level of agreement with each of the statements below:
Relative Advantage:
Compared to the commonly available technology performing the same function in your community, this technology
is generally more effective.






This technology is suitable to the local environmental conditions of this country/region





This technology is affordable to the majority of the target population





This technology invoked cultural changes in targeted communities (if agree explain, and whether it’s favorable or
unfavorable)








This technology is easy to understand, operate and maintain by the local users






This technology can be sufficiently tried first to determine whether to adopt or not before complete purchase or
change






The return of investment in this technology can be witnessed over the following length of time
Immediately Over one season
or salary period
Over a few months
(approx. how many)
Over a few years
(approx. how many)
IV. Recognition and Engagement of Early Adopters
15. Do you hold any leadership role or conduct leadership activities in your community?  And if yes, please
elaborate.
16. Describe your general connections and investments in this community. Do you have a long-term investment in
the well-fare of the community?
17. What are the major economic relations you have with the members of this community (i.e. employer, merchant,
family business, skilled employee, labourer, etc.)
18. What have you done in your community, so far, to promote the technologies in question?
VII. Perceived Challenges and Opportunities of Business
19. What are the main challenges in your relation with the social enterprise? And how do you see they could be
resolved?
20. What is the most interesting story of your business experience with the social enterprise or with its
products/services?




Information/recruitment letter for organizations
RESEARCH INFORMATION LETTER (FOR PARTICIPANT ORGANIZATIONS)
FOR THE RESEARCH PROJECT ENTITLED
Technological Development and Social Enterprises in Africa:
Challenges and Opportunities for Diffusion
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Gussai Sheikheldin, Dr. John
Devlin, Dr. Nonita Yap  and Dr. Adam Sneyd from the University of Guelph (Canada). The results of
this study will be used, in the form of a dissertation authored by Gussai Sheikheldin towards completion of
a Doctorate degree in Rural Studies. This study is funded through a research grant by the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Canadian federal agency, established in 1970, that supports
research in developing countries to promote growth and development.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Gussai
Sheikheldin by email: gsheikhe@uoguelph.ca or Dr. John Devlin 519 824 4120 x 52575 (email
jdevlin@uoguelph.ca).
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study seeks to understand the challenges and opportunities faced by social enterprises in promoting
technological change in rural Africa. Technological change is important for agricultural and rural
development.  But technological change in rural Africa faces many challenges. Some of these challenges
are evident in the slowness of adopting new useful technologies, the scarcity of information among the
rural population about available alternative technologies, and the financial limitations that make it difficult
to adopt new technologies.This research asks whether social enterprises are successful agents of
technological change in Africa and what conditions influence their success. The research will explore
case studies of technology-oriented social enterprises in Tanzania. The research will collect data from
participant organizations and individuals through key informant interviews and field observations.
PROCEDURES
If your organization agrees to participate in this study, we will ask your organization to do the
following things:
1. Accept that your staff can participate in interviews conducted by the student investigator, Gussai
Sheikheldin. There will be an information letter and consent form provided to each individual staff
selected for an interview.
2. Allow the student investigator to accompany your operations staff and observe your operations
related to technology diffusion first hand, for about 3-4 weeks (working hours only). It is within
your discretion to allow the student investigator access to certain activities and keep him from
access to others as you see fit. It is also within your organization’s discretion to allow your staff to
answer the questions that may arise from the student investigator’s field observations.
3. We will also ask your organization to allow us access to some of your organization’s documents
(including pictures, videos, and other forms of media) pertaining to your organizational model and
activities pertaining to technology diffusion. The research team will make use of only those official
documents which your organization allow us to have access to.
We have provided you with our contact information.  You may contact us at any point if you have any
questions. A pdf of research results will be emailed to all participants who request a copy.
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POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
We anticipate that your organization faces no risk associated with participating in this project. During the
time when the student investigator is taking field observation notes, if the host organization decides the
student shall no longer continue to collect data, the student will stop collecting data as per the request of
the organization’s representative(s).
CONFIDENTIALITY
Every effort will be made to ensure the confidentiality of all identifying information that is obtained during
this study. A coding system will be used instead of directly identifying information of your staff, customers
or partners. Over the course of this project, all data will be accessed only by the researchers, in addition
to a Swahili interpreter/translator who will sign a confidentiality agreement with the research team as part
of his/her contract. With the completion of the project all the identifying data will be destroyed. The
research team would like to identify the organizations who are participating in this research but we will not
do so without your permission.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
Your organization will have an opportunity to bring more visibility to its work in technology diffusion. Your
organization will have exposure to academic study and this may illuminate areas for potential
improvement. Participating in this research can also be a window to inform policy and research of what
institutional changes could be made to help social enterprises in their missions. The results of the study
may encourage increased engagement with social enterprises by development donors.
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
There will be no payment for participation.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw
at any time without consequences of any kind.  You may exercise the option of removing your data from
the study.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still remain in the
study.  The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise that warrant doing so.
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are not
waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  This
study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University of Guelph Research Ethics
Board.   If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant you may contact:
Dr. John F. Devlin Telephone: 001(519) 824-4120 x. 52575
Principal Investigator E-mail: jdevlin@uoguelph.ca
Gussai Sheikheldin E-mail: gsheikhe@uoguelph.ca
Student Investigator Telephone (Tanzania): 0754-515-226
Research Ethics Coordinator Telephone: 001(519) 824-4120, ext. 56606
University of Guelph E-mail: sauld@uoguelph.ca
437 University Centre Fax: 001(519) 821-5236
Guelph, ON   N1G 2W1
